O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 22-2-100 (2019)

‘‘Condemning body’’ and ‘‘condemnor’’ defined

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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As used in this article, ‘‘condemning body’’ or ‘‘condemnor’’ means: (1) The State of Georgia or any branch or any department, board, commission, agency, or authority of the executive branch of the government of the State of Georgia; (2) Any county or municipality of the State of Georgia; (3) Any housing authority with approval of the governing authority of the city or county as provided in Code Section 8-3-31.1;

(4) Any other political subdivision of the State of Georgia which possesses the power of eminent domain; and (5) All public utilities that possess the right or power of eminent domain.

History

Ga. L. 1957, p. 387, § 1; Ga. L. 1962, p. 461, § 1; Ga. L. 1967, p. 825, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 39, § 7/HB 1313.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 2006, p. 39, § 1/HB 1313, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: ‘‘This Act shall be known and may be cited as ‘The Landowner’s Bill of Rights and Private Property Protection Act.’ ’’ Ga. L. 2006, p. 39, § 25/HB 1313, not

codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code section shall only apply to petitions for condemnation filed on or after April 4, 2006. Law reviews. - For article on 2006 amendment of this Code section, see 23 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 157 (2006). For survey article on local government law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 147 (2015).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Legislative intent of 1967 amendment was to vest power companies which supply electricity to the public with the power to condemn in fee simple for public purposes and subject to the protective statutory procedures provided in the act. Harwell v. Georgia Power Co., 246 Ga. 203, 269 S.E.2d 464 (1980). Ga. L. 1957, p. 387, § 1 et seq. is ample authority for power company to condemn in fee simple whenever it can show a public purpose and necessity. Harwell v. Georgia Power Co., 246 Ga. 203, 269 S.E.2d 464 (1980). Actions to condemn sewer easements are properly brought under Ga. L. 1957, p. 387, § 1 et seq. Threatt v. Fulton County, 266 Ga. 466, 467 S.E.2d 546 (1996). Railroads as condemnors. - See Central of Ga. R.R. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 257 Ga. 217, 356 S.E.2d 865 (1987). Contract rights after condemnation. - County water and sewer authority could charge a developer tap fees after the authority acquired, by condemnation under O.C.G.A. § 22-2-100 et seq., the developer’s contract with a private company which allowed termination at will; another provider’s condemned contracts did not allow for termination, and thus, a rational basis existed under the Fourteenth Amendment for treating the developer differently. Highland Props. v. Lee

County Utils. Auth., No. 1:00-CV-198-2(WLS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36015 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2005). No bad faith shown on part of county in condemnation. - Record supported that the condemnation of the buffer property would serve a public purpose and that the county did not act in bad faith because failing to disclose the extent of methane migration provided no financial benefit for the county since at no time did the county discount the price the county was offering the property owner for the buffer property due to ignorance of the status of methane migration. Morgan County v. Gay, 352 Ga. App. 555, 834 S.E.2d 576 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0331, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 380 (Ga. 2020); cert. denied, No. S20C0495, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 390 (Ga. 2020); cert. denied, No. S20C0332, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 398 (Ga. 2020). Challenge to special masters award. - Trial court properly refused to dismiss a landowner’s appeal on grounds that it failed to express dissatisfaction with the compensation awarded by the special master, as it provided the utility with notice that the landowner was objecting to the valuation given on the property; moreover, in light of the interest that the utility acquired in the property, and the purposes for which it intended to use that property, consequential damages potentially represented a significant portion of

the compensation the landowner could recover. Ga. Power Co. v. Stowers, 282 Ga. App. 695, 639 S.E.2d 605 (2006). Condemnation of a property owner’s land by a city was upheld on appeal, as was the trial court’s judgment entered upon a jury verdict in the amount of $63,361 for the property and an award of attorney fees to the city, because the property owner never challenged the valuation made by a special master and also removed the amount awarded from the registry, thereby estopping the owner from

challenging the legality of the taking on appeal. Mayo v. City of Stockbridge, 285 Ga. App. 58, 646 S.E.2d 79 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1279, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 707 (Ga. 2007). Cited in Herron v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 177 Ga. App. 201, 338 S.E.2d 777 (1985); Stafford v. Bryan County Bd. of Educ., 212 Ga. App. 6, 440 S.E.2d 774 (1994); Clary v. City of Stockbridge, 300 Ga. App. 623, 686 S.E.2d 288 (2009).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 57 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1983–2024 · leading case: Stephens v. Dep't of Transp., 318 S.E.2d 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
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Stephens v. Dep't of Transp., 318 S.E.2d 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 20× “When condemnation proceedings are instituted pursuant to the latter provisions, the superior court “shall make an order requiring the condemnor, the person in possession of the property or interest, and any other person known to have any rights in the property or interest to…”
City of Marietta v. Summerour, 807 S.E.2d 324 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “When the City was unable to negotiate a voluntary sale of the parcel, it resolved to take the land by eminent domain, and it filed a petition in the Superior Court of Cobb County to condemn the property Following an evidentiary hearing before a special master, see OCGA §…”
Wrege v. Cobb Cnty., 367 S.E.2d 817 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 6× “Appellee used the condemnation procedure provided for in OCGA § 22-2-100 et seq. and a special master was appointed to hear the petition.”
Shiv Aban, Inc. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 784 S.E.2d 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 2× “Andrews, P. J., and Miller, P. J., concur. 1 Two other methods of condemnation exist under Georgia law: the assessor method, see OCGA §§ 22-2-1 to 22-2-86; and the special master method, see OCGA §§ 22-2-100 to 22-2-114.”
Georgia Power Co. v. Stowers, 639 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 4× “Under Georgia's Special Master Act, OCGA § 22-2-100 et seq., a party may appeal both the factual and legal findings of a special master and the value of the special master's award.”
Benton v. Georgia Marble Co., 365 S.E.2d 413 (Ga. 1988). · cites it 4× “” Three alternative methods are provided in Title 22 for conducting a condemnation proceeding under the state’s power of eminent domain, and assessing the amount of just and adequate compensation to be paid to the condemnee; of these three methods, a proceeding before a special…”
Dougherty Cnty. v. Burt, 308 S.E.2d 395 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 4× “The condemnees filed a motion before the special master to dismiss the proceedings, contending, among other things, that the county had no legal authority to operate the library and thus no legal authority to acquire land for library purposes.”
Fulton Cnty. v. Dillard Land Investments, LLC, 744 S.E.2d 880 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 6× “*345 On February 24, 2012, Fulton County filed a petition for condemnation before a special master under OCGA § 22-2-100 et seq. to acquire 12 acres of land owned by Dillard Land Investments, LLC (“Dillard”), to expand its library facilities.”
Windsor v. City of Atlanta, 695 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. 2010). · cites it 2× “The special master method of condemnation affords the owner pre-taking notice and an opportunity to be heard by the special master on the issue of just and *335 adequate compensation, see OCGA §§ 22-2-102, 22-2-107, 22-2-111, and the special master’s decision can be appealed for…”
Dillard Land Investments, LLC v. Fulton Cnty., 761 S.E.2d 282 (Ga. 2014). · cites it 2× “387 (codified as amended at OCGA §§ 22-2-100 to 22-2-114). 1 On February 24, 2012, the County filed a petition for condemnation, alleging that “all questions of necessity and public convenience with respect to said expansion and the necessity of acquiring the land herein…”
Gramm v. City of Stockbridge, 676 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “The City of Stockbridge filed a petition for condemnation before a special master under OCGA § 22-2-100 et seq. and under OCGA § § 36-61-1 et seq.”
Lanier v. Burnette, 538 S.E.2d 476 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 22-2-100 (5); Harwell v. Ga. Power Co.”
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