O.C.G.A. § 22-2-101 (2019)
Effect of article on other methods of condemnation; intent of article
This article shall be supplementary to and cumulative of the methods of condemnation described in Articles 1 and 3 of this chapter in cases in which the state, or any branch of the government of the state, or any county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state, or any housing authority, or any other person possessing the power of eminent domain is concerned. This article is intended to provide a simpler and more effective method of condemnation in those cases where a judicial supervision of the proceedings is desirable by reason of the necessity for a quick determination of the just and adequate compensation to be paid the owner of the property or interest subject to be condemned, or by reason of the number of parties at interest or the conflicting interests of such parties, or in cases where there are parties who are non compos mentis or who are not sui juris or who are nonresidents, or in cases where there are conflicting interests or doubtful questions. In all particulars not otherwise specially provided for in this article, the court shall conform its procedure as nearly as possible to Articles 1 and 3 of this chapter.
History
Ga. L. 1957, p. 387, § 2.
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Purpose of Ga. L. 1957, p. 387, § 1 et seq. is to provide an effective method of condemnation when judicial supervision of the procedure is desirable. Golfland, Inc. v. Thomas, 107 Ga. App. 563, 130 S.E.2d 757 (1963). The primary purpose of special master proceeding is to secure a quick determination of the compensation to be paid. City of Savannah Beach v. Thompson, 135 Ga. App. 63, 217 S.E.2d 304 (1975). The special master method of condem-
nation is intended to be an expeditious method of arriving at a just and adequate compensation to be paid a citizen before the citizen’s interest in property may be condemned. Such is accomplished by having a special master appointed to hear evidence as to the value of the property taken and damage done and then to make an award upon which the superior court can enter a judgment immediately vesting title in the condemnor upon payment of the amount awarded. Shoemaker v. De-
partment of Transp., 240 Ga. 573, 241 S.E.2d 820 (1978). Ga. L. 1957, p. 387, § 1 et seq. does not repeal other statutory provisions for condemnation of property but is supplementary to and cumulative of them. City of Gainesville v. Loggins, 116 Ga. App. 548, 158 S.E.2d 287 (1967), rev’d on other grounds, 224 Ga. 114, 160 S.E.2d 374 (1968). Condemnee not allowed to raise issue of right of condemnor to take property for first time on appeal. - The special master method of condemnation is intended to be an expeditious method of arriving at the just and adequate compensation to be paid a citizen before the citizen’s interest in property may be condemned; allowing a condemnee to raise, for the first time on appeal from the special master’s award, the right of the condemnor to take the property sought to be condemned, would obstruct this purpose. Ward v. Housing Auth., 157 Ga. App. 825, 278 S.E.2d 715 (1981). Sufficient compliance with O.C.G.A. § 22-1-6 shown. - Trial court did not err in denying the property owners’ motion to dismiss the condemnation petition, nor in overruling the owners’ exception to the
special master’s award, because the evidence at the special master hearing showed that the telecommunications condemnor made an effort to agree on a purchase price for the property, but that those negotiations ultimately failed, which was sufficient to show that the condemnor could not procure the property by contract within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 22-1-6. White v. Ringgold Tel. Co., 334 Ga. App. 325, 779 S.E.2d 378 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0404, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 148 (Ga. 2016). Cited in Johnson v. Fulton County, 103 Ga. App. 873, 121 S.E.2d 54 (1961); Leach v. Georgia Power Co., 228 Ga. 16, 183 S.E.2d 755 (1971); Nodvin v. Georgia Power Co., 125 Ga. App. 821, 189 S.E.2d 118 (1972); Smith v. Georgia Power Co., 131 Ga. App. 380, 205 S.E.2d 916 (1974); Zuber Lumber Co. v. City of Atlanta, 237 Ga. 358, 227 S.E.2d 362 (1976); Fourth Nat’l Bank v. Grant, 140 Ga. App. 78, 230 S.E.2d 60 (1976); Atlanta Whses., Inc. v. Housing Auth., 143 Ga. App. 588, 239 S.E.2d 387 (1977); Allen v. Hall County, 156 Ga. App. 629, 275 S.E.2d 713 (1980); Wrege v. Cobb County, 186 Ga. App. 512, 367 S.E.2d 817 (1988); Banks v. Georgia Power Co., 220 Ga. App. 84, 469 S.E.2d 218 (1996).