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Call Now: 904-383-7448(Ga. L. 1914, p. 92, § 1; Code 1933, § 36-1104; Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 251, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 1187, § 3.)
The 1986 amendment, effective April 7, 1986, designated the existing language as subsection (a) and added subsection (b).
- In a statutory proceeding, where a person may be deprived of property, the statute must be strictly construed. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115, 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955).
- "Private property" does not include property owned by a government or a governmental entity. DOT v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124, 337 S.E.2d 327 (1985).
The Department of Transportation may not condemn municipally owned property as the legislature has not clearly granted such authority or created a procedure therefore, and as such grant may not be implied from statutory provisions generally establishing a procedure for state agencies to condemn "private property." DOT v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124, 337 S.E.2d 327 (1985).
This article authorizes condemnation of lands in fee simple. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115, 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955).
- The 1937-1938 amendment to this section permits counties to condemn land by petition under the provisions of this article. Hoch v. Candler, 190 Ga. 390, 9 S.E.2d 622 (1940).
Under the 1937-1938 amendment to this section, it is not necessary that the condemnation petition allege an unsuccessful effort to procure the land by contract or a failure to agree as to compensation. Hoch v. Candler, 190 Ga. 390, 9 S.E.2d 622 (1940).
Prior negotiations to procure land from owner by contract are not necessary in a proceeding brought under this section. St. Clair v. State Hwy. Bd., 45 Ga. App. 488, 165 S.E. 297 (1932).
Venue of in rem proceeding is in county in which land lies; but if the tract of land lies in two counties, such proceeding can be brought in the superior court of either county. Cook v. State Hwy. Bd., 162 Ga. 84, 132 S.E. 902 (1926).
- It is the duty of persons claiming an interest in property sought to be condemned to establish the amount and character of the interest claimed, and in such a proceeding all interests may be condemned, whether acquired by easement or by fee simple title to the property. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115, 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955).
- Owners of remainder interest in property who were not made parties to an in rem proceeding to condemn that property for a public purpose could obtain monetary relief for the value of their remaindermant but could not set aside the judgment of condemnation awarding title to a public body. Nelson v. State, 254 Ga. 611, 331 S.E.2d 554 (1985).
Court may enjoin condemnor from taking possession of and entering upon land until the issues made by the petition and defensive pleadings have been determined. Mitchell v. State Hwy. Dep't, 216 Ga. 517, 118 S.E.2d 88 (1961).
Condemnor cannot just abandon condemnation proceeding. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115, 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955).
Tender or payment of award is necessary before property may be taken or the work thereon commenced. Wilson v. State Hwy. Dep't, 85 Ga. App. 907, 70 S.E.2d 535 (1952).
Where no motion for new trial is made and no exception taken to verdict and judgment following an appeal by the condemnor to the superior court, the land is condemned to public servitude subject only to payment of the amount of compensation fixed by the verdict and judgment. Harrison v. State Hwy. Dep't, 183 Ga. 290, 188 S.E. 445 (1936).
To vacate and set aside judgment for value of property condemned, affirmative action seeking to set aside judgment in favor of condemnor, and payment of all expenses and damages accrued to the condemnee, are essential. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115, 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955).
County authorities may by petition condemn land for road which is about to become a part of the State Highway System. Hoch v. Candler, 190 Ga. 390, 9 S.E.2d 622 (1940).
- Under this section, the State can, in one proceeding, condemn a right of way over two tracts of land, one owned by one of the plaintiffs and the other owned by both plaintiffs, the proceeding being one in rem and not against the individuals. In such a proceeding, all persons interested will be allotted the damages to which they are respectively entitled. Cook v. State Hwy. Bd., 162 Ga. 84, 132 S.E. 902 (1926).
The condemnor can, in one proceeding, condemn a right-of-way over several tracts of land owned by different persons. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115, 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955).
- Plaintiff's claim, that defendants' intentions in planning to condemn his property without public need and without the funds to pay for the property presented a threat of irreparable harm to him in the future, was not cognizable under Georgia law because a separate equitable petition to enjoin a condemnation governed by the statute will not lie. Saffold v. Carter, 739 F. Supp. 1541 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
- Previous condemnation proceeding by petition of the county authorities was not subject to attack by the present injunction petition of the former landowner, as containing an insufficient description of the condemned land, where the description in the former proceeding identified the property as being described in plans on file in the office of the road commissioner of the county, and where the petition neither denied the existence of such plans and description nor alleged any fact showing their insufficiency. Hoch v. Candler, 190 Ga. 390, 9 S.E.2d 622 (1940).
Where charter of municipality requires adoption of valid ordinance as prerequisite to condemnation of private property, and such requirement is not complied with prior to the condemnation proceedings, the action will be enjoined. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115, 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955).
- See Georgia Power Co. v. Bishop, 162 Ga. App. 122, 290 S.E.2d 328 (1982), decided under Ga. L. 1957, p. 387.
Cited in State Hwy. Dep't v. H.G. Hastings Co., 187 Ga. 204, 199 S.E. 793 (1938); Stewart v. Board of Comm'rs, 66 Ga. App. 108, 17 S.E.2d 203 (1941); United States v. A Certain Tract or Parcel of Land, 47 F. Supp. 30 (S.D. Ga. 1942); Patterson v. State Hwy. Dep't, 201 Ga. 860, 41 S.E.2d 260 (1947); Cable v. State Hwy. Bd., 208 Ga. 593, 68 S.E.2d 564 (1952); City of Atlanta v. Wilson, 209 Ga. 527, 74 S.E.2d 455 (1953); State Hwy. Dep't v. Hendrix, 215 Ga. 821, 113 S.E.2d 761 (1960); Cureton v. Cureton, 218 Ga. 88, 126 S.E.2d 666 (1962); State Hwy. Dep't v. Robinson, 107 Ga. App. 854, 131 S.E.2d 786 (1963); Varnadoe v. Housing Auth., 221 Ga. 467, 145 S.E.2d 493 (1965).
- 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 379, 380, 390, 391, 419-442.
9A Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Eminent Domain, §§ 3, 59.
- 29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §§ 196-205. 30 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §§ 276-291.
- Condemnation by de facto corporation, 44 A.L.R. 542.
Condemnation of public utility property for public utility purposes, 173 A.L.R. 1362.
Total Results: 3
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1988-03-09
Citation: 365 S.E.2d 413, 258 Ga. 58, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 158
Snippet: et seq., and proceedings before a court. OCGA § 22-2-130 et seq. [3] Georgia Marble owns approximately
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1985-10-08
Citation: 337 S.E.2d 327, 255 Ga. 124, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 1002
Snippet: property. OCGA § 32-3-4; see also OCGA §§ 22-2-102, 22-2-130, supra. Why would the General Assembly grant the
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1985-07-02
Citation: 254 Ga. 587, 331 S.E.2d 557
Snippet: (in rem) vesting title in the condemnor, OCGA § 22-2-130, the other awarding just and adequate compensation