O.C.G.A. § 22-2-82 (2019)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Payment of amount of jury verdict is condition precedent to appeal. - Under the mandate of the Constitution, that private property cannot be taken or damaged for public use without first paying just and adequate compensation to the owner, the payment of the amount of a

jury verdict in excess of the prior appraisal by assessors, or special master, is a condition precedent to a valid appeal from such verdict and the judgment based thereon. City of Atlanta v. Wright, 159 Ga. App. 809, 285 S.E.2d 250 (1981). Tender of award did not impact

right to jury. - Although the condemnor tendered compensation into the trial court’s registry that appeared to represent the sum the condemnor and condemnee had agreed was sufficient compensation, the tender of the award did not affect the condemnee’s right to appeal to a jury. Morrison v. Derdziak, 255 Ga. App. 89, 564 S.E.2d 500 (2002). Prayer seeking to enjoin appeal cannot be maintained when the plaintiff has an available remedy at law. Bibb Brick Co. v. Central of Ga. Ry., 150 Ga. 65, 102 S.E. 521 (1920). Effect of amendment on appeal alleging tender. - An amendment on appeal, alleging tender and acceptance of an assessment operates as a waiver of any irregularity in the notice and assessment. Georgia G.R.R. v. Venable, 129 Ga. 341, 58 S.E. 864 (1907). Liability for interest on difference between assessors’ award and final judgment. - When the amount of the final judgment is less than the award made by the assessors, the condemnee is not liable for the payment of interest on the difference in the amount of the award and the judgment except from the date of the judgment. City of Atlanta v. Lunsford, 105 Ga. App. 247, 124 S.E.2d 493 (1962). Interest on award withdrawn by condemnee held improper. - When the condemnor paid into the registry of the court the sum awarded to the condemnee by the appointed assessors, and the court paid the sum to the condemnee, the condemnor appealed from the assessors’ award, and the court entered judgment for the condemnor for the difference between the assessors’ award

and the jury’s verdict, the award of interest at seven percent per annum from the date the condemnee withdrew the award from the court was improper. Fletcher v. State Hwy. Dep’t, 105 Ga. App. 251, 124 S.E.2d 755 (1962). Error in instruction on computation of interest cured. - While the court erred in instructing the jury that interest should be computed from the date of the award, as the amount of the award of the assessors was paid, and the interest on the difference between the amount of the verdict and the amount tendered should have been computed from the date of the tender, and not from the date of the award, the error was fully cured and rendered harmless to the plaintiff by the defendants writing off all possible interest that the jury could have computed on the damages awarded by them, in excess of the amount of the original award, from the date of that award to the date of the verdict. State Hwy. Bd. v. Warthen, 54 Ga. App. 759, 189 S.E. 76 (1936). Jury verdict larger than assessor’s award. - See Atlanta, B. & Atl. R.R. v. Smith, 132 Ga. 725, 64 S.E. 1073 (1909). Cited in Atlanta Terra Cotta Co. v. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co., 132 Ga. 537, 64 S.E. 563 (1909); Central of Ga. Power Co. v. Stone, 142 Ga. 662, 83 S.E. 524 (1914); Wilson v. State Hwy. Dep’t, 85 Ga. App. 907, 70 S.E.2d 535 (1952); First Nat’l Bank v. State Hwy. Dep’t, 219 Ga. 144, 132 S.E.2d 263 (1963); Sadtler v. City of Atlanta, 236 Ga. 396, 223 S.E.2d 819 (1976); Hendley v. Housing Auth., 160 Ga. App. 221, 286 S.E.2d 463 (1981); Georgia Dep’t of Transp. v. Woodard, 254 Ga. 587, 331 S.E.2d 557 (1985).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Appellate Review, § 75 et seq. C.J.S. - 29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 613. ALR. - Right of court to reduce or increase award in condemnation and confirm it as reduced or increased, 61 A.L.R. 194.

Condemnor’s right, as against condemnee, to interest on excessive money deposited in court or paid to condemnee, 99 A.L.R.2d 886. Eminent domain: payment or deposit of award in court as affecting condemnor’s right to appeal, 40 A.L.R.3d 203.