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2018 Georgia Code 22-2-84 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 22-2-84 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 22-2-84

TITLE 22 EMINENT DOMAIN

Section 2. Condemnation Procedure Generally, 22-2-1 through 22-2-142.

ARTICLE 1 PROCEEDING BEFORE ASSESSORS

22-2-84. Entry of notice and award on minutes of court; payment of costs.

In all cases, the clerk shall enter the notice and award thereon upon the minutes of the court, and the condemnor shall pay:

  1. The assessors' costs as provided in Code Section 22-2-40; and
  2. Other costs as provided by law in civil cases in the superior court.

    The condemnee shall pay the assessors' costs as provided in Code Section 22-2-40.

(Ga. L. 1894, p. 95, § 26; Civil Code 1895, § 4682; Civil Code 1910, § 5232; Code 1933, § 36-605; Ga. L. 1949, p. 1404, § 1; Ga. L. 1955, p. 651, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1688, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1539, § 2.)

The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, in subsection (b), substituted "500,000 or more according to the United States decennial census of 1990 or any future such census" for "300,000 or more according to the present or any future United States census".

The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998, rewrote this Code section.

Law reviews.

- For review of 1998 legislation relating to eminent domain, see 15 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 115 (1998).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Requirement of payment of costs is for benefit of officers of court and not a condition precedent to the filing of an appeal. Hilderbrand v. Housing Auth., 109 Ga. App. 297, 136 S.E.2d 24 (1964).

Clerk is not bound to receive appeal until costs have been paid to him, but if the clerk does receive an appeal without exacting the costs, the appeal is good, and the clerk becomes estopped from saying that the costs have not been paid to him - estopped as to all persons, at least, except the appellant. Hilderbrand v. Housing Auth., 109 Ga. App. 297, 136 S.E.2d 24 (1964).

Failure of condemnor to pay costs and fees within 10 days after judgment does not vitiate its appeal therefrom regardless of whether or not it is a political subdivision of the state. Hilderbrand v. Housing Auth., 109 Ga. App. 297, 136 S.E.2d 24 (1964).

Waiver of right to have costs paid in advance.

- Where a magistrate refuses to dismiss an appeal because costs have not been paid by the appellant, this amounts to a waiver of his right to have the costs paid in advance, and the appellee has no right to complain of the refusal to dismiss the appeal. Hilderbrand v. Housing Auth., 109 Ga. App. 297, 136 S.E.2d 24 (1964).

Cited in Kellett v. Fulton County, 215 Ga. 551, 111 S.E.2d 364 (1959); Murray v. State Hwy. Dep't, 103 Ga. App. 517, 120 S.E.2d 48 (1961).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, § 473.

C.J.S.

- 30 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 305.

ALR.

- Liability for costs in trial tribunal in eminent domain proceedings as affected by offer or tender by condemnor, 70 A.L.R.2d 804.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 22-2-84

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Martin v. Henry Cnty. Water & Sewerage Auth., 610 S.E.2d 509 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 7, 2005 | 279 Ga. 197, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 663

...Being dissatisfied with the award, the Martins appealed to superior court. [1] In superior court, a jury awarded the Martins $6,900 for the property, and the trial court awarded the appellee, the Henry County Water and Sewerage Authority (Henry County) $3,500 in attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 22-2-84.1. On appeal to this Court, the Martins contend, among other things, that the trial court erred by ruling against their claim that OCGA § 22-2-84.1 is unconstitutional. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 1. OCGA § 22-2-84.1(a) provides that if a condemnee appeals a special master's award to superior court and if the appeal does not result in an increase to the master's award of at least 20%, the condemnee "shall be liable for reasonable expenses incurred by the condemnor in determining just and adequate compensation in the superior court." Similarly, OCGA § 22-2-84.1(a) provides that if a condemnor appeals a special master's award to superior court and if the appeal does not result in a decrease to the master's award of at least 20%, the condemnor "shall be liable for reasonable expenses incurred by the condemnee in determining just and adequate compensation in the superior court." OCGA § 22-2-84.1(b) provides that "reasonable expenses include, without being limited to, attorney fees." The Martins contend that OCGA § 22-2-84.1 is unconstitutional because, if they are required to pay the appellee's attorney fees, it will diminish the amount of compensation they receive, and thus violate their constitutional right to receive just and adequate compensation....
...gislature is free to impose conditions on the exercise of the right to appeal. [6] These considerations support the conclusion that, by conditioning an appeal to superior court on the payment of costs in the manner specified by the legislature, OCGA § 22-2-84.1 does not violate a property owner's right to receive just and adequate compensation before a taking of his property occurs....
...nsation by an initial tribunal such as a special master and prevails on appeal, a statute that permits the condemnor to recover the expenses of the appeal does not violate a property owner's right to just and adequate compensation. [9] Although OCGA § 22-2-84.1 does not go as far as these cases, and although we do not indicate our approval of the holdings in these cases, they support the proposition that, when a property owner initiates an appeal following an award by an initial tribunal, he ma...
...n. Because the appeal permitted by the Special Master Act is a matter of legislative grace, and because a property owner does not have a constitutional right to a trial by jury on the question of just and adequate compensation, we conclude that OCGA § 22-2-84.1(a) does not violate a property owner's constitutional right to receive just and adequate compensation before a taking of his property occurs....
...Accord 1A-4 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 4.109 [9] Moffat v. Denver, 57 Colo. 473, 143 P. 577, 580-581 (1914); Kelly v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 269 P.2d 359, 364-365 (Ok.1954). [10] See Doe v. HGI Realty, Inc. 254 Ga.App. 181, 561 S.E.2d 450 (2002). [11] See OCGA § 22-2-84.1(d)....