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Call Now: 904-383-7448A diligent creditor shall not needlessly be interfered with in the prosecution of his legal remedies.
(Civil Code 1895, § 3942; Civil Code 1910, § 4539; Code 1933, § 37-121.)
- This section is derived from the decision in Burgwyn Bros. Tobacco Co. v. Bentley & Co., 90 Ga. 508, 16 S.E. 216 (1892).
- Where grievance is not that Public Service Commission refuses to hear and act upon an application of the telephone company for increased rates, but that the commission, having so heard and acted thereon, has fixed rates that are confiscatory, mandamus could merely require that the commission act again in the exercise of that discretion vested in it by law. If the evidence shows that the rates ordered will result in confiscation, equity has jurisdiction to render the judgment complained of. Rates that are unjustly and unreasonably low are confiscatory. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 203 Ga. 832, 49 S.E.2d 38 (1948).
- O.C.G.A. § 23-1-22 did not provide grounds for refusing to allow a debtor corporation to assert an alter ego cause of action against its former principal or for allowing a creditor to bring an alter ego action against the former principal in state court as the creditor's chosen remedy was interfered with only because, in bankruptcy, all unsecured creditors with like claims were to be treated equally. Baillie Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 279 Ga. 288, 612 S.E.2d 296 (2005).
Cited in Saul v. Vaughn & Co., 240 Ga. 301, 241 S.E.2d 180 (1977).
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2005-04-26
Citation: 612 S.E.2d 296, 279 Ga. 288, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 1378, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 300
Snippet: corporation. 2. Baillie also argues that OCGA § 23-1-22 provides grounds for refusing to allow a corporation