JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Maxim embodied in this section is a favorite maxim of equity. Henderson v. Lott, 163 Ga. 326, 136 S.E. 403 (1926); Roach v. Terry, 164 Ga. 421, 138 S.E. 902 (1927).

Rule that equity seeks always to do complete justice will not bring into equitable jurisdiction matters over which another court has exclusive jurisdiction. Benton v. Turk, 188 Ga. 710, 4 S.E.2d 580 (1939).

Equity, having first acquired jurisdiction, will retain it to exclusion of all other courts, and for all other purposes. Gay v. Crockett, 217 Ga. 288, 122 S.E.2d 241 (1961).

The court of equity after taking jurisdiction for the grant of extraordinary relief will retain it for all purposes. McCord v. Walton, 192 Ga. 279, 14 S.E.2d 723 (1941).

Where a court of equity obtains jurisdiction for one purpose it will retain it until full and satisfactory justice is rendered to all parties concerned. Kidd v. Finch, 188 Ga. 492, 4 S.E.2d 187 (1939).

Where judge has exercised jurisdiction on the question of the sale of the property of wards for reinvestment in United States bonds, he has the right to retain jurisdiction for the purpose of passing upon the claim of the intervenor to a just and reasonable commission for producing the buyer of the property, thus rendering full and complete relief to all parties to the cause. Turner v. Prigmore, 202 Ga. 377, 43 S.E.2d 259 (1947).

Equity seeks to do complete justice, and to give full relief to all parties in reference to subject matter of suit, provided the court has jurisdiction for that purpose. Quitman Cooperage Co. v. People's First Nat'l Bank, 178 Ga. 90, 172 S.E. 17 (1933).

Equity seeks to do full justice but must do so within the parameters of the law; therefore, a temporary restraining order that acknowledged that students had no legal right to participate in graduation ceremony but ordered that they be allowed to do so anyway, so as to "do the right thing," was in error. Dolinger v. Driver, 269 Ga. 141, 498 S.E.2d 252 (1998).

It is one of the maxims of equity that it will not do justice by halves, and what constitutes its chief value is that it can bring before it all parties engaged in a transaction, and however diversified their interests and liabilities may be, it can frame a decree giving each complainant his right, and holding each defendant to his proper accountability. Matson v. Crowe, 193 Ga. 578, 19 S.E.2d 288 (1942).

When court has acquired equitable jurisdiction, it will grant complete relief as to all matters to which parties may be entitled under the pleadings and the proof, even though such relief may include legal rights and remedies. Latham v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 686, 16 S.E.2d 591 (1941).

Where equity acquires jurisdiction for any purpose, it will retain jurisdiction to give full and complete relief, whether legal or equitable, as to all purposes relating to the subject matter. Kirk v. Hasty, 239 Ga. 362, 236 S.E.2d 667 (1977); Early v. Early, 243 Ga. 125, 252 S.E.2d 618 (1979).

To preserve a trust estate, to supervise its management, to hold the trustee to the line of duty, for the purpose of preserving its corpus for the benefit of the beneficiaries, is an elementary branch of equity jurisprudence. The judge of the superior court of each county has power, either in term or at chambers, to remove and appoint trustees. When a court of equity obtains jurisdiction for one purpose, it will proceed to give full relief to all parties with reference to the subject matter of the suit, where it has jurisdiction for that purpose. Fine v. Saul, 183 Ga. 309, 188 S.E. 439 (1936).

Suits in equity shall be tried in the county where a defendant resides against whom substantial relief is prayed; and he who would have equity must do equity. Hence equity, having the parties before the court rightfully, will proceed to give full relief to all parties in reference to the subject matter provided the court has jurisdiction thereof. Pearson v. George, 211 Ga. 18, 83 S.E.2d 593 (1954).

Since equity has concurrent jurisdiction with courts of ordinary (now probate courts) in the administration of estates, where its interference is necessary for the full protection of the rights of parties at interest and since it is a recognized rule that, where the heirs at law get together and agree to divide the estate and appoint an agent and put him in possession of the property for that purpose, a bill may be filed against him by any one or more of the distributees, the same as against an administrator, it cannot be said that a petition seeking an order restraining the heir's agent from the alleged fraudulent acts and a receivership under direction of the court of equity was devoid of equity. Shingler v. Shingler, 184 Ga. 671, 192 S.E. 824 (1937).

In an action in equity, brought against the sole heir at law of a deceased person, to reform a deed executed by a decedent and to recover possession and damages in the nature of mesne profits from a tenant of the heir at law in possession of the property, and to cancel security deeds executed by the heir at law in favor of third persons, the element of the need for reformation of the deed constitutes a common nexus in which all the parties are interested, authorizing the joinder of all interested parties; and since the other relief, both legal and equitable, prayed against the other parties respectively, for recovery of possession and damages for mesne profits and for cancellation of the security deeds, is merely such relief as is needful to make complete the justice to be done by reforming the deed, the action is not multifarious. Mims v. Lifsey, 192 Ga. 366, 15 S.E.2d 440 (1941).

Where the holder of a deed from a deceased person brings an action in equity against the sole heir at law of the decedent, there being no administration of the decedent's estate, to reform the deed so as to make the description in the deed include lands held adversely by the heir at law and his tenant for years, it is proper to join also as defendants persons to whom the heir at law has executed deeds to secure debt. It is proper in an action to reform an instrument to join as defendants all who are interested adversely to the reformation. Mims v. Lifsey, 192 Ga. 366, 15 S.E.2d 440 (1941).

Where court has jurisdiction for the purpose of giving injunctive relief against a nuisance, it could under the well-established law of this state retain it as to damages in order to do complete justice between the parties, and upon proper determination of the damages caused by each of the defendants could render judgment against them for their proportionate parts of the damage done. Vaughn v. Burnette, 211 Ga. 206, 84 S.E.2d 568 (1954).

Where the complainants under their allegations were entitled in equity to an accounting, and the amount which by the accounting they sought to establish was due them, if at all, as remainder legatees under their mother's will, the right of the executor to sell the property, the right of the petitioners to have a partition, and their right to a judgment against the defendant personally all related to the same thing, to wit, the management by the defendant as trustee and executrix of property disposed of by their mother in her will, and a court of equity would in the same suit undertake to settle the other controversies growing out of the same subject matter, and grant the other relief indicated in the prayers relating to injunction and partition, although these, standing alone, could not be granted. Matson v. Crowe, 193 Ga. 578, 19 S.E.2d 288 (1942).

An equity court, by the continuing receivership, has jurisdiction to make a final disposition of the property according to the respective interests of the parties, and to this end can order a division by sale if necessary. Roberts v. Federal Land Bank, 180 Ga. 832, 181 S.E. 180 (1935).

As general rule court of equity will not intervene to enjoin collection of tax where no execution has been issued and levied on any of the property of the taxpayer, even though the taxing authorities may have demanded of him that he pay the tax. Warren v. Suttles, 190 Ga. 311, 9 S.E.2d 172 (1940).

Where plaintiff's petition for injunction against tax collector's interference with a boxing exhibition and collection of tax alleged that he had been notified by the tax collector that he would not permit him to stage his boxing bout if the tax was not paid, that the tax collector would carry out his threat if not enjoined, and that such conduct would cause him irreparable injury and damage, equity had jurisdiction and authority to grant an injunction under the facts when the petition was presented and sanctioned, and fact that at the time of the hearing part of the relief sought, enjoining the tax collector from closing the plaintiff's boxing exhibition, was no longer appropriate for consideration since the exhibition had been held under the protection of a temporary restraining order should not have prevented the court from retaining jurisdiction of the case for the purpose of determining the legality of the alleged tax and granting a permanent injunction against its collection. Warren v. Suttles, 190 Ga. 311, 9 S.E.2d 172 (1940).

Action for land may be included in petition for equitable relief. Latham v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 686, 16 S.E.2d 591 (1941).

Cited in McKinney v. Powell, 149 Ga. 422, 100 S.E. 375 (1919); Calbeck v. Herrington, 169 Ga. 869, 152 S.E. 53 (1930); Georgia Creosoting Co. v. Moody, 41 Ga. App. 701, 154 S.E. 294 (1930); Holst v. City of La Grange, 175 Ga. 402, 165 S.E. 217 (1932); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Stedham, 178 Ga. 217, 172 S.E. 555 (1934); Justice v. Warner, 178 Ga. 579, 173 S.E. 703 (1934); Welch v. Williford, 182 Ga. 192, 185 S.E. 91 (1936); Voyles v. Federal Land Bank, 182 Ga. 569, 186 S.E. 405 (1936); Ellis v. Millen Hotel Co., 192 Ga. 66, 14 S.E.2d 565 (1941); Sangster v. Toledo Mfg. Co., 193 Ga. 685, 19 S.E.2d 723 (1942); Adcock v. Berry, 194 Ga. 243, 21 S.E.2d 605 (1942); Cummings v. Robinson, 194 Ga. 336, 21 S.E.2d 627 (1942); Pass v. Pass, 195 Ga. 155, 23 S.E.2d 697 (1942); Hughes v. Cobb, 195 Ga. 213, 23 S.E.2d 701 (1942); Robinson v. Murray, 198 Ga. 690, 32 S.E.2d 496 (1944); Fulmer v. Wilkins, 201 Ga. 322, 39 S.E.2d 405 (1946); Toler v. Goodin, 74 Ga. App. 468, 40 S.E.2d 214 (1946); Avary v. Avary, 202 Ga. 22, 41 S.E.2d 314 (1947); Parnell v. Wooten, 202 Ga. 443, 43 S.E.2d 673 (1947); Redmond v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 204 Ga. 699, 51 S.E.2d 409 (1949); Gaither v. Gaither, 206 Ga. 808, 58 S.E.2d 834 (1950); Salter v. Salter, 209 Ga. 90, 70 S.E.2d 453 (1952); Rountree v. Davis, 90 Ga. App. 223, 82 S.E.2d 716 (1954); Collins v. Dacus, 211 Ga. 779, 89 S.E.2d 198 (1955); Johnson v. Wilson, 212 Ga. 264, 91 S.E.2d 758 (1956); Lowry v. Rosenfeld, 213 Ga. 578, 100 S.E.2d 447 (1957); Ramsey v. Womack, 214 Ga. 722, 107 S.E.2d 180 (1959); Claxton v. Claxton, 214 Ga. 715, 107 S.E.2d 320 (1959); Brewton v. McLeod, 216 Ga. 686, 119 S.E.2d 105 (1961); Wright v. Florida-Georgia Tractor Co., 218 Ga. 824, 130 S.E.2d 736 (1963); Stith v. Willis, 219 Ga. 62, 131 S.E.2d 620 (1963); Simmons v. Watson, 221 Ga. 765, 147 S.E.2d 322 (1966); Harp v. Bacon, 222 Ga. 478, 150 S.E.2d 655 (1966); Georgia Power Co. v. City of Macon, 228 Ga. 641, 187 S.E.2d 262 (1972); Hill v. L/A Mgt. Corp., 234 Ga. 341, 216 S.E.2d 97 (1975); McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Gorman v. Gorman, 239 Ga. 312, 236 S.E.2d 652 (1977); Department of Natural Resources v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Ga. 740, 238 S.E.2d 886 (1977); Harper v. Harper, 241 Ga. 19, 243 S.E.2d 74 (1978); Head v. Walker, 243 Ga. 108, 252 S.E.2d 440 (1979); Dunaway v. Clark, 536 F. Supp. 664 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Brown v. Brown, 265 Ga. 725, 462 S.E.2d 609 (1995); Smith v. Gwinnett County, 268 Ga. 179, 486 S.E.2d 151 (1997).

RESEARCH REFERENCES