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O.C.G.A.Title 23Chapter 4

O.C.G.A. § 23-4-31 (2020)

Power of court to mold and enforce decrees

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2020 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest cited 1983–2023 19citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 19 opinions since 1983, 2 of them in the last five years.

A superior court shall have full power to mold its decrees so as to meet the exigencies of each case and shall have full power to enforce its decrees when rendered.

History

Orig. Code 1863, § 4123; Code 1868, § 4154; Code 1873, § 4213; Code 1882, § 4213; Civil Code 1895, § 4853; Civil Code 1910, § 5426; Code 1933, § 37-1203.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article comparing sections of the Georgia Civil Practice Act with preexisting provisions of the Georgia Code, see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 295 (1967).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Decree may be partly final and partly interlocutory; final as to its determination of all issues of law and fact, and interlocutory as to its mode of execution. Johnson v. James, 246 Ga. 680, 272 S.E.2d 692 (1980). A final decree disposing of all the substantial equities of the case is not made interlocutory by the mere reservation of the right to direct the mode of its execution. Johnson v. James, 246 Ga. 680, 272 S.E.2d 692 (1980). Judgment of the court should conform to the reasonable intendment of the verdict upon which it is based. McGill v. McGill, 247 Ga. 428, 276 S.E.2d 587 (1981). Decree of a court of equity must in every case follow the verdict, and may not embrace questions which the verdict does not cover. Burke v. Wilkins, 49 Ga. 257 (1873); Hall v. Huff, 80 Ga. 31, 5 S.E. 49 (1887); Gray v. Junction City Mfg. Co., 195 Ga. 33, 22 S.E.2d 847 (1942). Decree may be molded to meet exigencies of the case. - After a jury returns a general verdict finding a nuisance exists, the trial court is authorized to mold its decree so as to meet the exigencies of the case and the prayers of the plaintiffs. Tufts v. DuBignon, 61 Ga. 322 (1878); Parnell v. Wooten, 202 Ga. 443, 43

S.E.2d 673 (1947); City of Cordele v. Hobby, 240 Ga. 207, 240 S.E.2d 16 (1977); Cotts v. Cotts, 245 Ga. 138, 263 S.E.2d 163 (1980). Trial court was entitled to enter an order molding the verdict in continuing a nuisance case pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 23-4-31, as doing so was necessary to meet the exigencies of the case and the prayers of the landowners, and the order entered three months after judgment did not modify the judgment in any matter of substance not contemplated by the parties at the time the judgment was entered. City of Columbus v. Barngrover, 250 Ga. App. 589, 552 S.E.2d 536 (2001). Enforcement order proper. - Trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in balancing the equities and entering a second order requiring conveyance of property in exchange for payment of the sum determined in its original order, plus interest, and refusing to order either party to reimburse the other for taxes, maintenance, or rental value related to the property. Nowlin v. Davis, 278 Ga. 240, 599 S.E.2d 128 (2004). Enforcement of divorce decree not an impermissible modification. - Trial court’s order requiring a husband to return to the wife items of jewelry which were not mentioned in the original decree

was not an impermissible modification of the decree but an enforcement of a settlement agreement reached between the parties themselves, as permitted by the decree, which the court could enforce under O.C.G.A. § 23-4-31. Doritis v. Doritis, 294 Ga. 421, 754 S.E.2d 53 (2014). Manner of enforcement of decree is within discretion of judge. - In molding a decree upon the jury’s verdict upon the facts, the chancellor (now judge) has a very broad discretion in determining what steps shall be taken to secure the enforcement of the rights awarded by the verdict, to the end that equity may afford adequate and complete relief, and this discretion will not in any case be controlled unless it is manifest there has been an abuse of discretion in a material matter. Bank of Tupelo v. Collier, 191 Ga. 852, 14 S.E.2d 59 (1941); Bregman v. Rosenthal, 212 Ga. 95, 90 S.E.2d 561 (1955). An order entered by the trial court after appeal was not an impermissible modification of a final judgment, where the second decree became necessary only because the owner refused to obey the first decree. Gallogly v. Bradco, Inc., 260 Ga. 311, 392 S.E.2d 529 (1990). Out-of-term modification of order not permitted. - Where the trial court’s order is final in that the case is no longer pending in the trial court, the trial court lacks authority, in a succeeding term, to modify that order so as to relieve parties from their duty of compliance. Cobb County v. Buchanan, 261 Ga. 854, 413 S.E.2d 198 (1992). Creation of trust for child support effectuated jury’s intent. - Where, in a divorce case, the jury clearly intended to create a trust for the purpose of providing support for the minor child during his minority and they also intended that

there be monthly payments from the trust for the use of the child, but the husband failed to take any substantive steps to set up the trust, there was no error in the trial court naming a trustee and providing the necessary provisions to effectuate the trust for the purpose of providing monthly child support, such as requiring the husband to make the payments necessary to keep current on his obligations for his share of the debts, encumbrances and maintenance of the trust property. Aycock v. Aycock, 251 Ga. 104, 303 S.E.2d 456 (1983). Cited in Wade v. Peacock, 121 Ga. 816, 49 S.E. 826 (1905); Swift & Co. v. First Nat’l Bank, 161 Ga. 543, 132 S.E. 99 (1926); Gore v. Humphries, 163 Ga. 106, 135 S.E. 481 (1926); Watters v. Southern Brighton Mills, 168 Ga. 15, 147 S.E. 87 (1929); Holst v. City of La Grange, 175 Ga. 402, 165 S.E. 217 (1932); Westberry v. Reddish, 178 Ga. 116, 172 S.E. 10 (1933); Jarecky v. Arnold, 51 Ga. App. 954, 182 S.E. 66 (1935); Kirk v. Bray, 181 Ga. 814, 184 S.E. 733 (1935); Snyder v. Elkan, 187 Ga. 164, 199 S.E. 891 (1938); Payne v. Home Sav. Bank, 193 Ga. 406, 18 S.E.2d 770 (1942); Hughes v. Cobb, 195 Ga. 213, 23 S.E.2d 701 (1942); Johnson v. Wilson, 212 Ga. 264, 91 S.E.2d 758 (1956); G.S. & M. Co. v. Dixon, 220 Ga. 329, 138 S.E.2d 662 (1964); Moon v. Moon, 222 Ga. 650, 151 S.E.2d 714 (1966); Bradley v. Bradley, 233 Ga. 83, 210 S.E.2d 1 (1974); Brown v. Techdata Corp., 238 Ga. 622, 234 S.E.2d 787 (1977); Gorman v. Gorman, 239 Ga. 312, 236 S.E.2d 652 (1977); Golden v. Frazier, 244 Ga. 685, 261 S.E.2d 703 (1979); Holman v. Ruesken, 246 Ga. 557, 272 S.E.2d 292 (1980); Hudson v. Hudson, 258 Ga. 692, 373 S.E.2d 372 (1988); Getman v. Ackerly, 259 Ga. 534, 384 S.E.2d 651 (1989); Hirsh v. City of Atlanta, 261 Ga. 22, 401 S.E.2d 530 (1991).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equity, § 251. C.J.S. - 30 C.J.S., Equity, § 12. 31 C.J.S., Equity, § 612 et seq. ALR. - Constitutionality of statute conferring on chancery courts power to

abate public nuisance, 22 A.L.R. 542; 75 A.L.R. 1298. Power of equity to require acceptance of damages in lieu of injunctive relief asked, 105 A.L.R. 1381.

The 19 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 23-4-31 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENDoritis v. Doritis, 754 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. 2014).
cites § 23-4-31 11×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“Although the trial court had broad authority to enforce and seek compliance with its original decree, OCGA § 23-4-31, it could not do so by imposing upon husband a pre-condition to his receipt of the net proceeds that did not exist in the original decree.”
2
GREENCity of Columbus v. Barngrover, 552 S.E.2d 536 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 23-4-31 4×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“21 Thus, “[a]fter the jury return[s] a general verdict finding a nuisance existed, the trial court was authorized under [OCGA § 23-4-31] to mold its decree so as to meet the exigencies of the case and the prayers of the plaintiffs.”
The case’s holding
The exercise of dominion or control over property causing harm is sufficient to establish nuisance liability regardless of whether the defendant owns the property.
Later courts cite it for
“the exercise of dominion or control over the property causing the harm is sufficient to establish nuisance liability” · 1 citing court
3
GREENO'donnell v. Durham, 573 S.E.2d 23 (Ga. 2002).
cites § 23-4-31 4×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“OCGA § 23-4-31. Accordingly, I believe the superior court judge sitting as a habeas court judge was authorized to enforce its decree granting habeas relief by granting bond pending appeal to the successful habeas petitioner.”
Later courts cite it for
“shall' is generally construed as a word of mandatory import.” · 6 citing courts
4
GREENFulton Cnty. Bd. of Assessors v. Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc., 547 S.E.2d 620 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 23-4-31 4×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“While the trial court is barred from issuing a protective order which violates statutory law, such as OCGA § 48-5-314, it has full authority under OCGA § 23-4-31 to mold its decrees to meet the demands of each situation it faces.”
5
GREENGoode v. Mountain Lake Investments, L.L.C., 524 S.E.2d 229 (Ga. 1999).
cites § 23-4-31 4×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“2d 372 (1988); OCGA §§ 23-4-31; 9-5-8. [4] Prime Bank v.”
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court has broad discretion to fashion equitable remedies based upon the exigencies of each case” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENHirsh v. City of Atlanta, 401 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. 1991).
cites § 23-4-31 4×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“The trial court was authorized to enjoin a public nuisance, and the public nuisance herein involved had constitutionally-protected elements.”
7
GREENSmith v. Smith, 748 S.E.2d 456 (Ga. 2013).
cites § 23-4-31 2×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“OCGA § 23-4-31 provides in this regard that “[a] superior court shall have full power to mold its decrees so as to meet the exigencies of each case and shall have full power to enforce its decrees when rendered.”
The case’s holding
A trial court in contempt proceedings may craft a remedy, such as monetary compensation, that deviates from the divorce decree to enforce it without impermissibly modifying it.
Later courts cite it for
“a superior court shall have full power to mold its decrees so as to meet the exigencies of each case and shall have full power to enforce its decrees when rendered” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENJones v. Jones, 787 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. 2016).
cites § 23-4-31 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“See OCGA § 23-4-31 (“[a] superior court shall have full power to mold its decrees so as to meet the exigencies of each case and shall have full power to enforce its decrees when rendered”).”
Later courts cite it for
“motions to set aside may be premised on a lack of jurisdiction; some allegation of fraud, accident, mistake, or acts of the adverse party unmixed with the negligence or fault of the movant; or a 'nonamendable defect' appearing on the face of the pleadings or record.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENSponsler v. Sponsler, 800 S.E.2d 564 (Ga. 2017).
cites § 23-4-31 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“” OCGA § 23-4-31 (“[a] superior court shall have full power to mold its decrees so as to meet the exigencies of each case and shall have full power to enforce its decrees when rendered”).”
Later courts cite it for
“for this reason, we must vacate the trial court's award of attorney fees and remand the case for reconsideration of that award in light of this opinion.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENNowlin v. Davis, 599 S.E.2d 128 (Ga. 2004).
cites § 23-4-31 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“OCGA § 23-4-31 provides that “[a] superior court shall have full power to mold its decrees so as to meet the exigencies of each case and shall have full power to enforce its decrees when rendered.”
Later courts cite it for
“cases involving contempt of court are not within this court's appellate jurisdiction.” · 1 citing court
11
GREENCobb Cnty. v. Buchanan, 413 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. 1992).
cites § 23-4-31 4×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“Citing the superior court’s power under OCGA § 23-4-31 to enforce its judgments, this court held that the second order became necessary only because of the failure of a party to abide by the first judgment, and that the second order was not a modification of the first judgment.”
12
GREENVictor W. Patterson v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 820 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2016).
cites § 23-4-31 1×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“”); Ga.Code § 23-4-31 ("A superior court shall have full power to mold its decrees so as to meet the exigencies of each case and shall have full power to enforce its decrees when rendered.”
13
GREENGallogly v. Bradco, Inc., 392 S.E.2d 529 (Ga. 1990).
cites § 23-4-31 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“The second decree became necessary only because the owner refused to obey the first decree.”
14
GREENAycock v. Aycock, 303 S.E.2d 456 (Ga. 1983).
cites § 23-4-31 2×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“§ 110-106), and “to meet the exigencies of each case,” OCGA § 23-4-31 (Code Ann. § 37-1203), although the law also provides that a verdict “may not be amended in matter of substance,” OCGA § 9-12-7 (Code Ann.”
15
GREENHudson v. Hudson, 373 S.E.2d 372 (Ga. 1988).
cites § 23-4-31 2×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“” OCGA § 23-4-31. The superior courts, on the trial of any civil case, shall give effect to all the rights of the parties, legal, equitable, or both, and apply remedies or relief, legal, equitable, or both, in favor of either party, as the nature of the case may allow or require.”
16
GREENChristopher H. Cowart v. Georgia Power Co., 868 S.E.2d 241 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022).
cites § 23-4-31 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“In that regard, he maintains that the most recent superior court order pre- dating Georgia Power’s 2012 contempt petition — the 2006 Final Consent Order — did not put him on notice that a violation of its terms could result in such a “drastic sanction,” but rather delineated…”
17
GREENSponsler v. Sponsler, No. S17A0001 (Ga. May 30, 2017).
cites § 23-4-31 2×cited by 0 cases200
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“” OCGA § 23-4-31 (“[a] superior court shall have full power to mold its decrees so as to meet the exigencies of each case and shall have full power to enforce its decrees when rendered”).”
18
GREENMtn Investments, LLC v. D. Magen, LLC, 894 S.E.2d 149 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023).
cites § 23-4-31 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“” OCGA § 23-4-31. “[T]he discretion of the judges of the superior courts in all matters pertaining to contempt of their authority and mandates will never be controlled unless grossly abused.”
19
NO FLAGGetman v. Ackerly, 384 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989).
cites § 23-4-31 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 23-4-31
“…decrees so as to meet the exigencies of each case and shall have full power to enforce its decrees when rendered.” OCGA § 23-4-31.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198320032023

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 2001. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga.14Ga. Ct. App.411th Cir.1
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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