Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation
Call Now: 904-383-7448
(Code 1981, §24-13-130, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24; Ga. L. 2013, p. 524, § 1-4A/HB 78.)
The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, in subsection (b), added "or great bodily harm" at the end of paragraph (b)(1), substituted "state," for "state" and substituted "a criminal trial or proceeding" for "the trial" in paragraph (b)(3), substituted "testify as a witness at a criminal trial or proceeding;" for "attend the trial; or" in paragraph (b)(4), substituted "witness," for "witness" and substituted "; or" for a period at the end of paragraph (b)(5), and added paragraph (b)(6); and added "unless, for good cause shown, the court allows an exception to this paragraph" at the end of paragraph (c)(3).
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-130 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Any technical violation of the notice provision of former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-130 was harmless since the defendant did in fact receive notice of the date, time, and place of the deposition and did not request a predeposition hearing on the propriety or necessity of taking a deposition. Burrell v. State, 258 Ga. 841, 376 S.E.2d 184 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-130).
Defendant's pretrial request to depose victims after the victims refused to talk with defense counsel was properly denied by the trial court. Evans v. State, 233 Ga. App. 85, 503 S.E.2d 344 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-130).
- Because the state never filed a motion to take a material witness's deposition as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-130, the trial court never held a hearing, never found grounds for the deposition, and never ordered that the deposition be taken during a particular time period; therefore, the defendant's conviction for financial transaction card fraud under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-33(a) was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial. Evans v. State, 275 Ga. App. 621, 621 S.E.2d 584 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-130).
- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in allowing an 80-year-old victim's deposition to be taken under former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-130(b)(4) because the victim had a brain tumor, which predisposed the victim to dizziness and vertigo, and a generalized anxiety disorder, which sometimes caused the victim to suffer chest pains, shortness of breath, blurred vision, confusion, and loss of consciousness when the victim was exposed to unfamiliar or stressful public situations. Austin v. State, 275 Ga. App. 560, 621 S.E.2d 546 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-130).
- When a habeas court found an inmate's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not procedurally barred, under O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d), for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal because the allegedly ineffective counsel could not, due to illness, attend a hearing held on remand during the inmate's direct appeal, and, thus, could not be cross-examined, this was error because, even if the claim was different enough from barred claims to fall within a defaulted-claim analysis, it overlooked the readily available legal remedy of a court order to obtain counsel's sworn testimony for use at the remand hearing, under former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-130, so counsel's absence from the hearing did not establish cause for failure to raise the ineffective assistance claim. Schofield v. Meders, 280 Ga. 865, 632 S.E.2d 369 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1126, 127 S. Ct. 958, 166 L. Ed. 2d 729 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-130).
No results found for Georgia Code 24-13-130.