Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Civil Code 1895, § 5151, former Civil Code 1910, § 5737, former Code 1933, § 38-115, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-25 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

In general.

- Purchaser must be ignorant of the falsity of the alleged inducements and really act upon the inducements and not upon purchaser's own knowledge or judgment and have no convenient means of acquiring knowledge of title. Tune v. Beeland, 131 Ga. 528, 62 S.E. 976 (1908) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5151); Stonecipher v. Kear, 131 Ga. 688, 63 S.E. 215, 127 Am. St. R. 248 (1908); Wall v. Louisville & N.R.R., 143 Ga. 417, 85 S.E. 325 (1915) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5151); Norman v. McMillan, 151 Ga. 363, 107 S.E. 325 (1921); Jackson v. Lipham, 158 Ga. 557, 123 S.E. 887 (1924) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5737);(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5737);(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5737).

Elements of estoppel.

- In order to constitute estoppel by conduct, there must occur: (1) a false representation or concealment of facts; (2) it must be within the knowledge of the party making the one or concealing the other; (3) the person affected thereby must be ignorant of the truth; (4) the person seeking to influence the conduct of the other must act intentionally for that purpose; and (5) persons complaining shall have been induced to act by reason of such conduct of the other. Jones v. Tri-State Elec. Coop., 212 Ga. 577, 94 S.E.2d 497 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-115).

Estoppels do not convey title in this state. Kennedy v. Hannans, 246 Ga. 55, 268 S.E.2d 646 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-115).

Recovery of land.

- If estoppel by acts or false declarations can in any case be the basis upon which to predicate the recovery of land, it fell clearly within the provisions of the former statute. Groover v. Simmons, 163 Ga. 778, 137 S.E. 237 (1927) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5737).

Good faith and reasonable diligence.

- Party who claims the benefit of an estoppel must not only have been free from fraud in the transaction, but must have acted in good faith and reasonable diligence; otherwise, no equity will arise in the party's favor. Travelodge Corp. v. Carwen Realty Co., 223 Ga. 821, 158 S.E.2d 378 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-115).

Exercise of due diligence.

- No estoppel defense is available when a party fails to exercise due diligence to obtain information concerning the title. Allen v. Bacon, 171 Ga. 479, 156 S.E. 20 (1930) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5737).

No ignorance of true title.

- When there was nothing in the evidence showing or tending to show that the defendant or any of its predecessors in title were ignorant of the true title when they purchased, the evidence failed to establish any estoppel which would preclude the plaintiff from asserting and recovering on plaintiff's legal title. Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Holliday, 165 Ga. 200, 140 S.E. 507 (1927) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5737); Bank of Lenox v. Webb Naval Stores Co., 171 Ga. 464, 156 S.E. 30 (1930);(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5737).

Ignorance of true title.

- Fact that a deed from a husband to his wife, under which a wife claimed title, may have been based upon a valuable consideration and duly recorded would not necessarily prevent a subsequent purchaser, by security deed, from relying upon the principle of estoppel, if the subsequent purchaser was in fact ignorant of the true title. Roop Grocery Co. v. Gentry, 195 Ga. 736, 25 S.E.2d 705 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-115).

Ignorance of adverse interest.

- It must appear that the party to the deed was ignorant of the interest of the attesting witness. Duncan v. Beasley, 174 Ga. 28, 161 S.E. 829 (1931) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5737).

No means of acquiring knowledge.

- When the estoppel relates to real estate, it is essential to the application of the doctrine that the party claiming to have been influenced by the conduct of another was personally not only destitute of knowledge of the true state of the title, but also of any convenient and available means of acquiring such knowledge. Bennett v. Davis, 201 Ga. 58, 39 S.E.2d 3 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-115).

Means of knowing over extended period of time.

- If a person having legal title to land, which fact the person does not know but has convenient means of knowing, and after a lapse of 27 years, during which time the person was under no legal disability, the person still has not learned the fact of the person's interest in the land, and in those circumstances the person induces one to buy the land from a third person by representations that the land is the property of such third person, the person's misrepresentations to the purchaser innocently made, coupled with the person's delay in ascertaining the truth, will amount to constructive fraud, and may be pleaded as an estoppel by the purchaser on the faith of the title of the person's vendor. Lanier v. Bryant, 180 Ga. 409, 179 S.E. 346 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-115).

Equal means of knowledge.

- Disclaimer of interest by a distributee, in ignorance, when the other party had equal means of knowledge, is no estoppel as to the distributee or the grantee. Peyton v. Stephens, 130 Ga. 338, 60 S.E. 563, 124 Am. St. R. 170 (1908) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5151).

Contrary to a cotenant's contention, the cotenant's affidavit did not create an issue of fact as to whether heirs should have been estopped from challenging the cotenant's adverse possession claim relating to certain real estate; the cotenant had equal means to obtain the truth about the status of a probate case by which the cotenant claimed exclusive possession of the property at issue, and the consequences of letting the case languish. Ward v. Morgan, 280 Ga. 569, 629 S.E.2d 230 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-25).

Prior recorded deed becomes constructive notice for subsequent purchasers and the holder of a prior recorded interest will not be subject to estoppel. Pressley v. Maxwell, 242 Ga. 360, 249 S.E.2d 49 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-115).

Recorded deed as means of acquiring knowledge.

- Recorded deed was not necessarily such "convenient means of acquiring knowledge" of title, within the contemplation of former Code 1933, § 38-115, as to abrogate the effect of former Code 1933, § 105-304 (see O.C.G.A. § 51-6-4) on one who remained silent while a third party represented to another that the third party owned certain property which in actuality belonged to the aphonic one. Anderson v. Manning, 221 Ga. 421, 144 S.E.2d 772 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-115); Pressley v. Maxwell, 242 Ga. 360, 249 S.E.2d 49 (1978);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-115).

Admission in favor of third person.

- Admissions against one's title to land, and in favor of the title of a third person, will not be estopped in behalf of one to whom the admissions were not made, and who has merely heard of the admissions, it not appearing that the admissions were made for the purpose of being acted upon, or with any design or intention that the admissions should be acted upon. Randolph v. Merchants & Mechanics Banking & Loan Co., 181 Ga. 671, 183 S.E. 801 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-115).

Agent's knowledge.

- Estoppel did not result from an agent's knowledge when a contract provided that knowledge must be brought directly to the principal by the opposite party. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. Griffin, 30 Ga. App. 217, 117 S.E. 261 (1923) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5737).

Improvements.

- One who has title to land and sees another who is in bona fide possession thereof place valuable improvements thereon, without giving notice of one's title, is not thereby subsequently estopped from asserting one's title. Owen v. Miller, 209 Ga. 875, 76 S.E.2d 772 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-115).

Merely attesting deed will not work an estoppel. Duncan v. Beasley, 174 Ga. 28, 161 S.E. 829 (1931) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5737).

Burden of proof rests upon the party asserting an estoppel to establish all the elements necessary to constitute an estoppel. Hartsfield Loan & Sav. Co. v. Garner, 184 Ga. 283, 191 S.E. 119 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-115); Bennett v. Davis, 201 Ga. 58, 39 S.E.2d 3 (1946);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-115).

Limitation on § 51-6-4. - Former Code 1933, § 36-115 limited former Code 1933, § 105-304 (see O.C.G.A. § 51-6-4) to purchasers without notice. Fuller v. Calhoun Nat'l Bank, 59 Ga. App. 419, 1 S.E.2d 86 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-115).

Construction with § 51-6-4. - Principle stated in former Code 1933, § 105-304 (see O.C.G.A. § 51-6-4), did not depend for the principle's operation upon the existence or absence of mere constructive notice, nor would a recorded deed necessarily constitute a "convenient means of acquiring such knowledge," within the meaning of former Code 1933, § 38-115; this latter statute should have been construed in harmony with the former. Roop Grocery Co. v. Gentry, 195 Ga. 736, 25 S.E.2d 705 (1943).

ALR.

- Estoppel to assert title to real property by conduct subsequent to contract between third persons, 1 A.L.R. 1482.

Estoppel of one not a party to a transaction involving real property by failure to disclose his interest in the property, 50 A.L.R. 668.

Failure to record or delay in recording an instrument affecting real property as basis of estoppel in favor of creditors not directly within protection of recording Acts, 52 A.L.R. 183.

Nature of conveyance or covenants which will create estoppel to assert after-acquired title or interest in real property, 58 A.L.R. 345; 144 A.L.R. 554.

Estoppel of one riparian owner to complain of diversion of water by another riparian owner, 74 A.L.R. 1129.

Estoppel by apparent acquiescence in or silence concerning improvements of real property to assert antagonistic title or interest, 76 A.L.R. 304.

Estoppel of wife who permits record title to realty to remain in husband's name to assert her own title as against one extending credit to husband, 76 A.L.R. 1501.

Permitting record title to real property to stand in another's name as estopping owner to avail himself of statute or rule requiring authority to contract regarding real estate to be in writing, 78 A.L.R. 588.

Right of a purchaser assuming a mortgage debt, with the authorization of the mortgagor, to set up usury in mortgage as a defense or rely upon it as a ground of relief in equity, 82 A.L.R. 1153.

Rule of estoppel of tenant to deny landlord's title as applicable where landlord affirmatively asserts a title or interest beyond that essential to his right to create the tenancy, 89 A.L.R. 1295.

Estoppel to question validity of proceedings extending boundaries of municipality, 101 A.L.R. 581.

Effect of silence of surety or endorser after knowledge or notice of facts relied upon as releasing him, 101 A.L.R. 1310.

Promissory estoppel, 115 A.L.R. 152; 48 A.L.R.2d 1069.

Estoppel of owner of tangible personal property who knowingly or voluntarily permits another to have possession of certificates or other evidences of title, endorsed in blank or otherwise showing ownership in possessor, to deny latter's authority to sell, mortgage, pledge, or otherwise deal with, the property, 151 A.L.R. 690.

Joining in instrument as ratification of or estoppel as to prior ineffective instrument affecting real property, 7 A.L.R.2d 294.

Renunciation of beneficial interest under inter vivos trust as condition of right to contest this validity, 21 A.L.R.2d 1457.

Estoppel to rely on statute of limitations, 24 A.L.R.2d 1413.

Estoppel of oil and gas lessee to deny lessor's title, 87 A.L.R.2d 602.

Promissory estoppel as basis for avoidance of statute of frauds, 56 A.L.R.3d 1037.