O.C.G.A. § 24-3-10 (2019)

Annotations

Cross references. Effect of blank endorsement generally, § 11-3-204.

Provision that signature on negotiable instrument is an endorsement unless instrument clearly indicates that signature was made in some other capacity, § 11-3402.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1873, § 3808, former Code 1882, § 3808, former Civil Code 1895, § 5209, former Civil Code 1910, § 5796, former Code 1933, § 38509, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-10 are

included in the annotations for this Code section. Only blank endorsements affected by statute. - Law of blank endorsements changes the rule that even a blank endorsement was not subject to be modified in the endorsement’s legal effect by

parol evidence, but the law does not expose any other endorsements to like modification. Meador v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 56 Ga. 605, 1876 Ga. LEXIS 382 (1876) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3808); Jones v. Commercial Credit Co., 52 Ga. App. 796, 184 S.E. 652, 1936 Ga. App. LEXIS 252 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-509). Application to parties or those taking with notice. - As between the parties themselves, or those taking with notice of dishonor or of the actual facts of the endorsement, parol evidence was admissible to explain the endorsement. Pickett v. Bank of Ellijay, 182 Ga. 540, 186 S.E. 426, 1936 Ga. LEXIS 485 (1936); Hopkins Auto. Equip. Co. v. Lyon, 59 Ga. App. 468, 1 S.E.2d 460, 1939 Ga. App. LEXIS 327 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-509); see also Massell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 57 Ga. App. 460, 196 S.E. 115, 1938 Ga. App. LEXIS 313 (1938). But not to innocent third parties. - Law was plain and emphatic that a blank endorsement may be explained by parol, except as against subsequent holders for value, bona fide and without notice. McMillan v. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 17 Ga. App. 590, 87 S.E. 843, 1916 Ga. App. LEXIS 806 (1916) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796). Law had application between the parties, or those taking with notice of dishonor, or of the actual facts of such endorsement, and had no application to the rights of third parties. Pickett v. Bank of Ellijay, 182 Ga. 540, 186 S.E. 426, 1936 Ga. LEXIS 485 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-509). As against a third party, the holder of the note before maturity, for value, and without notice of dishonor or of the actual facts of the endorsement, parol evidence was not admissible to contradict or explain the capacity in which such written endorsement was signed, but the construction thereof was for the court. Guaranty Mtg. Co. v. National Life Ins. Co., 55 Ga. App. 104, 189 S.E. 603, 1936 Ga. App. LEXIS 439 (1936), aff’d, 184 Ga. 644, 192 S.E. 298, 1937 Ga. LEXIS 595 (1937); see also Hopkins Auto. Equip. Co. v. Lyon, 59 Ga. App. 468, 1 S.E.2d 460, 1939 Ga. App. LEXIS 327 (1939).

Endorsements. - Former statute was not confined to technical endorsements, i.e., endorsements essential to transfer of title, but extended to endorsements in the broader sense which were irregular and unnecessary to pass title. Atkinson v. Bennett, 103 Ga. 508, 30 S.E. 599, 1898 Ga. LEXIS 153 (1898) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5209). Former statute was not confined merely to blank endorsements in the strict sense as when the endorser wrote only the endorser’s name upon the negotiable instrument; the former statute related to all endorsements which were not full or complete. McMillan v. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 17 Ga. App. 590, 87 S.E. 843, 1916 Ga. App. LEXIS 806 (1916) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796); Proctor v. Royster Guano Co., 21 Ga. App. 617, 94 S.E. 821, 1918 Ga. App. LEXIS 432 (1918) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796); Bowden v. Owens, 33 Ga. App. 700, 127 S.E. 664, 1925 Ga. App. LEXIS 695 (1925) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796). Agreement to endorse may be construed as a contract of guarantee. Georgia Cas. Co. v. Dixie Trust & Sec. Co., 23 Ga. App. 447, 98 S.E. 414, 1919 Ga. App. LEXIS 154 (1919) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796). Endorsement in full. - If an endorsement in blank had been partially completed by a subsequent endorser writing the words, “without recourse,” and signing the endorser’s name, it was not an endorsement in full, and parol evidence was admissible. West Yellow Pine Co. v. Kendrick, 9 Ga. App. 350, 71 S.E. 504, 1911 Ga. App. LEXIS 548 (1911) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796). When the endorsement was one “in full,” though followed by the words “without recourse,” parol evidence was not admissible to explain any unambiguous terms. Odom Realty Co. v. Central Trust Co., 22 Ga. App. 711, 97 S.E. 116, 1918 Ga. App. LEXIS 708 (1918) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796). Endorsement for special purpose. - It may be shown by parol evidence that the endorsement of a note was made for a special purpose. Carhart Bros. & Co. v. Wynn, 22 Ga. 24, 1857 Ga. LEXIS 102 (1857) (decided under former law).

Transfer for collection. - When the payee of a note, payable to the payee or order, transfers the note in writing to a third person, without recourse, and signs the transfer, parol evidence was admissible, at the instance of the payee or the payee’s executors to show that such transfer was made for collection. This was the rule at common law; and the former statute was not intended to abrogate this principle of the common law, the purpose of the former statute being, not to narrow the admission of parol evidence when it was permissible by common law, but to extend the admission of such evidence to the explanation of endorsements in blank, which was not permissible by that law. Sanders v. Ayers, 155 Ga. 630, 117 S.E. 651, 1923 Ga. LEXIS 137 (1923) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796). Accommodation endorsements. - Former law applied to accommodation endorsements. Taff v. Larey, 29 Ga. App. 631, 116 S.E. 866, 1923 Ga. App. LEXIS 147 (1923) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796). Accommodation endorser had the right to stipulate the character of the liability which the endorser assumed in signing a particular paper. Taff v. Larey, 29 Ga. App. 631, 116 S.E. 866, 1923 Ga. App. LEXIS 147 (1923) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796). Endorsements to pass title merely. - Parol evidence was, in any given instance, admissible to show that such an endorsement upon a promissory note was made simply to pass title and not to create liability in the endorser. Bryan v. Windsor, 99 Ga. 176, 25 S.E. 268, 1896 Ga. LEXIS 276 (1896) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5209); Cowart Co. v. Sheffield, 18 Ga. App. 512, 89 S.E. 1101, 1916 Ga. App. LEXIS 1075 (1916) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796); see also Stapler v. Burns, 43 Ga. 382, 1871 Ga. LEXIS 255 (1871); Galceran v. Noble, 66 Ga. 367, 1881 Ga. LEXIS 25 (1881) (suit by plaintiff who took note after dishonor) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3808). In a suit by the payee of a promissory note signed in the name of a corporation as maker, a plea by certain individuals who had signed their names in blank upon

the back of the note, to the effect that their names were so placed upon the instrument “only for the purpose of perfecting title and passing title, and upon the distinct understanding that they were not to be held liable thereon in any way,” did not set up a good defense. Proctor v. Royster Guano Co., 21 Ga. App. 617, 94 S.E. 821, 1918 Ga. App. LEXIS 432 (1918) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796). Assuming that the contract of suretyship or accommodation endorsement sued on should be taken as having been signed in blank, a plea merely denying all liability thereunder, without showing any bona fide reason why the endorsement was entered for a purpose other than that of incurring liability, cannot be taken as an effort to explain the true nature and intent of the contract, as was permitted by the former statute, and did not set up a good defense. Pearce v. Swift & Co. Fertilizer Works, 21 Ga. App. 622, 94 S.E. 915, 1918 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 (1918) (see former Civil Code 1910, § 5796). Capacity of signers. - When a promissory note was upon the note’s face payable to the order of the payee at a chartered bank, though reading “we promise to pay,” etc., and signed by one person only, the prima facie import of an endorsement thereon in blank by a third person was that such endorser undertook to be liable as a second endorser, and not as a joint maker. The true intent of the parties, however, in an action by the payee upon the instrument, was open to explanation by parol evidence. Neal & Co. v. Wilson, 79 Ga. 736, 5 S.E. 54, 1887 Ga. LEXIS 293 (1887) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3808). Party signing negotiable paper in blank may show by parol that the party was a surety only. Sibley v. American Exch. Nat’l Bank, 97 Ga. 126, 25 S.E. 470, 1895 Ga. LEXIS 303 (1895) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3808). When several parties are sued on a check, one as maker and the others as endorsers, the payee could show by parol that those signing apparently as endorsers were in fact sureties or joint makers. James v. Calder, 7 Ga. App. 707, 67 S.E. 1125, 1910 Ga. App. LEXIS 480 (1910) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796).

Evidence could not be introduced, as against third persons, to show a different capacity, but could be introduced to show as between the immediate parties, an agreement that the person signing should be bound in a capacity different from that shown by the instrument. Massell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 57 Ga. App. 460, 196 S.E. 115, 1938 Ga. App. LEXIS 313 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-509). Showing agency of drawer. - Agency of the drawer and knowledge by the payee and endorsee cannot be shown

by parol in defense to a suit on a draft. Bedell v. Scarlett, 75 Ga. 56, 1885 Ga. LEXIS 69 (1885) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3808). Endorsement of mortgage note. - Blank endorsement of a mortgage note may be explained by parol to show an agreement that an indebtedness of the mortgagee was to be first satisfied out of the mortgaged property. Willingham & Cone v. Huguenin, 129 Ga. 835, 60 S.E. 186, 1908 Ga. LEXIS 205 (1908) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5209).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. Endorsement, “to the order of any bank or banker,” as a restrictive endorsement, 10 A.L.R. 709. Admissibility of parol evidence to vary

or explain the contract implied from the regular endorsement of a bill or note, 35 A.L.R. 1120; 54 A.L.R. 999; 92 A.L.R. 721. Parol evidence as to liability of irregular endorser to payee, 37 A.L.R. 1222.

CHAPTER 4 RELEVANT EVIDENCE AND ITS LIMITS Sec.

“Relevant evidence” defined. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence not admissible. Exclusion of relevant evidence on the grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; evidence of other crimes. Methods of proving character. Habit; routine practice. Subsequent remedial measures. Compromises and offers to compromise. Payment of medical and similar expenses. Inadmissibility of pleas, plea discussions, and related statements; exceptions.

Law reviews. For article, “Evidence,” see 27 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1 (2011). For article on the 2011 enactment of this chapter, see 28 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1 (2011). For comment, “Lyrics for Lockups: Us-

Sec.

Liability insurance. Complainant’s past sexual behavior not admissible in prosecutions for certain sexual offenses; exceptions. Evidence of similar transaction crimes in sexual assault cases. Evidence of similar transaction crimes in child molestation cases. Evidence of similar acts in civil or administrative proceedings concerning sexual assault or child molestation. Statements of sympathy in medical malpractice cases. Evidence of similar acts in prosecutions for violations of Code Section 40-6-391. Admissibility of criminal gang activity; disclosure. Admissibility of criminal history record information.

ing Rap Lyrics to Prosecute in America,” see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 917 (2018). For comment, “Cameras Down, Hands Up: How the Supreme Court Chilled the Development of the First Amendment Right to Record the Police,” see 71 Mercer L. Rev. 1125 (2020).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. Admissibility of evidence, and propriety and effect of questions, statements, comments, etc., tending to show that defendant in a personal injury or death action carries liability insurance, 4 A.L.R.2d 761. Admissibility, as against objection of remoteness, of evidence as to past earnings, upon issue as to amount of damages in action for personal injury or death, 81 A.L.R.2d 733. Admissibility on issue of value of real

property of evidence of sale price of other real property, 85 A.L.R.2d 110. Evidence: use and admissibility of maps, plats, and other drawings to illustrate or express testimony, 9 A.L.R.2d 1044. Admissibility, in damage action arising out of explosion or blasting, of evidence of damage to other property in vicinity, 45 A.L.R.2d 1121. Admissibility of testimony of transferee as to his knowledge, purpose, intention, or

good faith on issue whether conveyance was in fraud of transferor’s creditors, 52 A.L.R.2d 418. Admissibility and conclusiveness, as against insured, of statements in proof of loss, 58 A.L.R.2d 429. Admissibility and effect, in criminal case, of evidence as to juror’s statements, during deliberations, as to facts not introduced into evidence, 58 A.L.R.2d 556. Propriety and prejudicial effect of comment or evidence as to accused’s willingness to take lie detector test, 95 A.L.R.2d 819. Price fixed in contract violating statute of frauds as evidence of value in action on quantum meruit, 21 A.L.R.3d 9. Admissibility, in civil action, of disposal of property as bearing on question of liability, 38 A.L.R.3d 996. Admissibility in evidence, on issue of negligence, of codes or standards of safety issued or sponsored by governmental body or by voluntary association, 58 A.L.R.3d 148. Admissibility on defendant’s behalf, as matter in mitigation of punitive damages, of evidence as to his lack of financial resources, 79 A.L.R.3d 1138. Admissibility of evidence of character or reputation of party in civil action for sexual assault on issues other than impeachment, 100 A.L.R.3d 569.

Admissibility, in criminal case, of results of residue detection test to determine whether accused or victim handled or fired gun, 1 A.L.R.4th 1072. Modern status of rules as to admissibility of evidence of prior accidents or injuries at same place, 21 A.L.R.4th 472. Admissibility of evidence as to other offense as affected by defendant’s acquittal of that offense, 25 A.L.R.4th 934. Proof of mailing by evidence of business or office custom, 45 A.L.R.4th 476. Admissibility and weight of evidence of prior misidentification of accused in connection with commission of crime similar to that presently charged, 50 A.L.R.4th 1049. Thermographic tests: admissibility of test results in personal injury suits, 56 A.L.R.4th 1105. Admissibility, in prosecution for sexrelated offense, of results of tests on semen or seminal fluids, 75 A.L.R.4th 897. Admissibility of lie detector test results, or of offer or refusal to take test, in attorney disciplinary proceeding, 79 A.L.R.4th 576. Admissibility, after enactment of Rule 411, Federal Rules of Evidence, of evidence of liability insurance in negligence actions, 40 A.L.R. Fed. 541. Admissibility of evidence not related to air travel security, disclosed by airport security procedures, 108 A.L.R. Fed. 658.