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2018 Georgia Code 24-3-10 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 24-3-10 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 24-3-10

TITLE 24 EVIDENCE

Section 3. Parol Evidence, 24-3-1 through 24-3-10.

ARTICLE 2 LEGISLATIVE FACTS; ORDINANCES OR RESOLUTIONS

24-3-10. Explanation of blank endorsements.

Blank endorsements of negotiable paper may always be explained between the parties themselves or those taking with notice of dishonor or of the actual facts of such endorsements.

(Code 1981, §24-3-10, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)

Cross references.

- Effect of blank endorsement generally, § 11-3-204.

Provision that signature on negotiable instrument is an endorsement unless instrument clearly indicates that signature was made in some other capacity, § 11-3-402.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1873, § 3808, former Code 1882, § 3808, former Civil Code 1895, § 5209, former Civil Code 1910, § 5796, former Code 1933, § 38-509, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-10 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Only blank endorsements affected by statute.

- Law of blank endorsements changes the rule that even a blank endorsement was not subject to be modified in the endorsement's legal effect by parol evidence, but the law does not expose any other endorsements to like modification. Meador v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 56 Ga. 605 (1876) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3808); Jones v. Commercial Credit Co., 52 Ga. App. 796, 184 S.E. 652 (1936);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-509).

Application to parties or those taking with notice.

- As between the parties themselves, or those taking with notice of dishonor or of the actual facts of the endorsement, parol evidence was admissible to explain the endorsement. Pickett v. Bank of Ellijay, 182 Ga. 540, 186 S.E. 426, answer conformed to, 53 Ga. App. 607, 186 S.E. 746 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-509); Hopkins Auto. Equip. Co. v. Lyon, 59 Ga. App. 468, 1 S.E.2d 460 (1939); Massell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 57 Ga. App. 460, 196 S.E. 115 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-509).See also (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-509).

But not to innocent third parties.

- Law was plain and emphatic that a blank endorsement may be explained by parol, except as against subsequent holders for value, bona fide and without notice. McMillan v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 17 Ga. App. 590, 87 S.E. 843 (1916) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796).

Law had application between the parties, or those taking with notice of dishonor, or of the actual facts of such endorsement, and had no application to the rights of third parties. Pickett v. Bank of Ellijay, 182 Ga. 540, 186 S.E. 426, answer conformed to, 53 Ga. App. 607, 186 S.E. 746 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-509).

As against a third party, the holder of the note before maturity, for value, and without notice of dishonor or of the actual facts of the endorsement, parol evidence was not admissible to contradict or explain the capacity in which such written endorsement was signed, but the construction thereof was for the court. Guaranty Mtg. Co. v. National Life Ins. Co., 55 Ga. App. 104, 189 S.E. 603 (1936), aff'd, 184 Ga. 644, 192 S.E. 298 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-509). Hopkins Auto. Equip. Co. v. Lyon, 59 Ga. App. 468, 1 S.E.2d 460 (1939) See also (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-509).

Endorsements.

- Former statute was not confined to technical endorsements, i.e., endorsements essential to transfer of title, but extended to endorsements in the broader sense which were irregular and unnecessary to pass title. Atkinson v. Bennett, 103 Ga. 508, 30 S.E. 599 (1898) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5209).

Former statute was not confined merely to blank endorsements in the strict sense as when the endorser wrote only the endorser's name upon the negotiable instrument; the former statute related to all endorsements which were not full or complete. McMillan v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 17 Ga. App. 590, 87 S.E. 843 (1916) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796); Procter v. Royster Guano Co., 21 Ga. App. 617, 94 S.E. 821 (1918); Bowden v. Owens, 33 Ga. App. 700, 127 S.E. 664 (1925) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796);(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796).

Agreement to endorse may be construed as a contract of guarantee. Georgia Cas. Co. v. Dixie Trust & Sec. Co., 23 Ga. App. 447, 98 S.E. 414 (1919) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796).

Endorsement in full.

- If an endorsement in blank had been partially completed by a subsequent endorser writing the words, "without recourse," and signing the endorser's name, it was not an endorsement in full, and parol evidence was admissible. West Yellow Pine Co. v. Kendrick, 9 Ga. App. 350, 71 S.E. 504 (1911) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796).

When the endorsement was one "in full," though followed by the words "without recourse," parol evidence was not admissible to explain any unambiguous terms. Odom Realty Co. v. Central Trust Co., 22 Ga. App. 711, 97 S.E. 116 (1918) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796).

Endorsement for special purpose.

- It may be shown by parol evidence that the endorsement of a note was made for a special purpose. Carhart Bros. & Co. v. Wynn, 22 Ga. 24 (1857) (decided under former law).

Transfer for collection.

- When the payee of a note, payable to the payee or order, transfers the note in writing to a third person, without recourse, and signs the transfer, parol evidence was admissible, at the instance of the payee or the payee's executors to show that such transfer was made for collection. This was the rule at common law; and the former statute was not intended to abrogate this principle of the common law, the purpose of the former statute being, not to narrow the admission of parol evidence when it was permissible by common law, but to extend the admission of such evidence to the explanation of endorsements in blank, which was not permissible by that law. Sanders v. Ayers, 155 Ga. 630, 117 S.E. 651 (1923) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796).

Accommodation endorsements.

- Former law applied to accommodation endorsements. Taff v. Larey, 29 Ga. App. 631, 116 S.E. 866 (1923) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796).

Accommodation endorser had the right to stipulate the character of the liability which the endorser assumed in signing a particular paper. Taff v. Larey, 29 Ga. App. 631, 116 S.E. 866 (1923) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796).

Endorsements to pass title merely.

- Parol evidence was, in any given instance, admissible to show that such an endorsement upon a promissory note was made simply to pass title and not to create liability in the endorser. Bryan v. Windsor, 99 Ga. 176, 25 S.E. 268 (1896) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5209); Cowart Co. v. Sheffield, 18 Ga. App. 512, 89 S.E. 1101 (1916); Stapler v. Burns, 43 Ga. 382 (1871) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796). Galceran v. Noble, 66 Ga. 367 (1881) See also (decided under former law);(suit by plaintiff who took note after dishonor) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3808).

In a suit by the payee of a promissory note signed in the name of a corporation as maker, a plea by certain individuals who had signed their names in blank upon the back of the note, to the effect that their names were so placed upon the instrument "only for the purpose of perfecting title and passing title, and upon the distinct understanding that they were not to be held liable thereon in any way," did not set up a good defense. Proctor v. Royster Guano Co., 21 Ga. App. 617, 94 S.E. 821 (1918) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796).

Assuming that the contract of suretyship or accommodation endorsement sued on should be taken as having been signed in blank, a plea merely denying all liability thereunder, without showing any bona fide reason why the endorsement was entered for a purpose other than that of incurring liability, cannot be taken as an effort to explain the true nature and intent of the contract, as was permitted by the former statute, and did not set up a good defense. Pearce v. Swift & Co. Fertilizer Works, 21 Ga. App. 622, 94 S.E. 915 (1918) (see former Civil Code 1910, § 5796).

Capacity of signers.

- When a promissory note was upon the note's face payable to the order of the payee at a chartered bank, though reading "we promise to pay," etc., and signed by one person only, the prima facie import of an endorsement thereon in blank by a third person was that such endorser undertook to be liable as a second endorser, and not as a joint maker. The true intent of the parties, however, in an action by the payee upon the instrument, was open to explanation by parol evidence. Neal & Co. v. Wilson, 79 Ga. 736, 5 S.E. 54 (1887) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3808).

Party signing negotiable paper in blank may show by parol that the party was a surety only. Sibley v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank, 97 Ga. 126, 25 S.E. 470 (1895) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3808).

When several parties are sued on a check, one as maker and the others as endorsers, the payee could show by parol that those signing apparently as endorsers were in fact sureties or joint makers. James v. Calder, 7 Ga. App. 707, 67 S.E. 1125 (1910) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5796).

Evidence could not be introduced, as against third persons, to show a different capacity, but could be introduced to show as between the immediate parties, an agreement that the person signing should be bound in a capacity different from that shown by the instrument. Massell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 57 Ga. App. 460, 196 S.E. 115 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-509).

Showing agency of drawer.

- Agency of the drawer and knowledge by the payee and endorsee cannot be shown by parol in defense to a suit on a draft. Bedell v. Scarlett, 75 Ga. 56 (1885) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3808).

Endorsement of mortgage note.

- Blank endorsement of a mortgage note may be explained by parol to show an agreement that an indebtedness of the mortgagee was to be first satisfied out of the mortgaged property. Willingham & Cone v. Huguenin, 129 Ga. 835, 60 S.E. 186 (1908) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5209).

Cited in Rai v. Reid, 294 Ga. 270, 751 S.E.2d 821 (2013).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Endorsement, "to the order of any bank or banker," as a restrictive endorsement, 10 A.L.R. 709.

Admissibility of parol evidence to vary or explain the contract implied from the regular endorsement of a bill or note, 35 A.L.R. 1120; 54 A.L.R. 999; 92 A.L.R. 721.

Parol evidence as to liability of irregular endorser to payee, 37 A.L.R. 1222.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 24-3-10

Total Results: 20  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Hill v. State, 291 Ga. 160 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 88 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 29, 2012 | 728 S.E.2d 225, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 1775

...The trial court refused to allow the introduction of the transcript of Poole’s prior testimony, and Hill enumerates this ruling as error. “Testimony given by an ‘inaccessible’ witness under oath in a former proceeding on substantially the same issue and between the same parties is admissible under OCGA§ 24-3-10....
...“Hearsay offered under this section is admitted from necessity since the declarant is unavailable to give testimony at trial. [Cit.]” Paul S. Milich, Ga. Rules of Evidence § 19:27 (2011-2012 ed.). “ ‘(T)he inaccessibility of a witness under (OCGA § 24-3-10) depends upon a showing by the party *163seeking to use the witness’ former testimony that he has used due diligence in trying to locate and bring to court the absent witness.’ [Cit.]” Thomas v....
...known address are contrary to the requirements of diligence necessary to show that the witness was inaccessible. See Gaither v. State, 227 Ga. 668, 670-671 (182 SE2d 434) (1971). “ ‘Whether a witness is inaccessible within the meaning of [OCGA] § 24-3-10 is a decision left to the discretion of the trial court, which will not be reversed absent manifest abuse.’ [Cit.]” Thomas v....
...State, supra. “We find that there is evidence to support the trial [judge’s] ruling and that he did not abuse his discretion.” Jones v. State, supra. We also note that, although Hill did rely on the “former testimony” hearsay exception in OCGA § 24-3-10 on motion for new trial, he has argued on appeal the applicability of the general “necessity” exception to the hearsay rule....
...However, the latter argument is of no possible benefit to Hill because the members of this Court have consistently agreed that the test of unavailability under the general necessity exception is at least as strict as the test of inaccessibility under OCGA§ 24-3-10....
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Walker v. State, 640 S.E.2d 274 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 40 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 22, 2007 | 281 Ga. 521, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 194

...Counsel testified that she spoke with Hood, who reiterated her testimony, and originally intended to call both Hood and Angel Walker. When counsel's repeated attempts to subpoena Hood failed because Hood could not be located, counsel first decided not to proceed under the unavailable witness statute, OCGA § 24-3-10, because Angel Walker was still available to testify about the events....
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Willingham v. State, 622 S.E.2d 343 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 21, 2005 | 279 Ga. 886, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 3539

...In two enumerations of error, Willingham complains of the admission over a right-of-confrontation objection of O'Bryant's testimony at Johnson's trial and of O'Bryant's statement to a police officer. O'Bryant's testimony at Johnson's trial was admitted pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-10 and testimony regarding a statement he gave to police during the investigation of the murder was admitted under the necessity exception to the rule against using hearsay. OCGA § 24-3-10 permits the testimony of "a witness since deceased ......
...Farmer v. State, 266 Ga. 869(1), 472 S.E.2d 70 (1996); Cates v. State, 245 Ga. 30(2), 262 S.E.2d 796 (1980). Since Willingham did not have an opportunity to cross-examine O'Bryant at Johnson's trial, O'Bryant's testimony there was not admissible under OCGA § 24-3-10 and the trial court's contrary ruling was error. Cates v. State, supra. In addition to a misapplication of OCGA § 24-3-10, it appears the admission of O'Bryant's former testimony was an error of constitutional proportion because it was testimonial hearsay prohibited by Crawford v....
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Mundy v. State, 385 S.E.2d 666 (Ga. 1989).

Cited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 30, 1989 | 259 Ga. 634

...of Mundy's girl friend. However, because Mundy did not assert this objection at trial, we will not consider it for the first time on appeal. White v. State, 255 Ga. 210 (3) (336 SE2d 777) (1985). 5. Mundy contends that the trial court violated OCGA § 24-3-10 by admitting testimony given at a preliminary hearing by Mundy's girl friend, Donna Kincaid. We find that although Mundy's counsel objected at trial to the admission of Kincaid's testimony, he failed to base his objection on OCGA § 24-3-10....
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Holmes v. State, 516 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1999).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 3, 1999 | 271 Ga. 138, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 1793

...should be broadened to allow officers to testify to out-of-court statements made by missing witnesses. In addition, I take issue with the plurality's use of standards developed with regard to the "prior testimony" exception to the hearsay rule (OCGA § 24-3-10) to make it easier to admit hearsay under the "necessity" exception, OCGA § 24-3-1(b)....
...ocate and bring the missing declarant to court, the plurality cites Jones v. State, 250 Ga. 166(2), 296 S.E.2d 598 (1982). [3] That case, however, did not involve the necessity exception, but the "prior testimony" exception to the hearsay rule, OCGA § 24-3-10....
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De La Cruz v. State, 810 S.E.2d 84 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 5, 2018

...Appellant alleges this was an abuse of discretion. We disagree. Under our old Evidence Code, [t]estimony given by an "inaccessible" witness under oath in a former proceeding on substantially the same issue and between the same parties [was] admissible under [former] OCGA § 24-3-10. [Cit.] "The inaccessibility of a witness under [former] OCGA § 24-3-10 depend[ed] upon a showing by the party seeking to use the witness' former testimony that he ha[d] used due diligence in trying to locate and bring to court the absent witness." [Cit.] (Punctuation omitted.) Thomas v....
...Indeed, "due diligence requires more than a few phone calls," and a "party must make a serious, competent effort to find and bring the witness to court." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id."Whether a witness is inaccessible within the meaning of [former] § 24-3-10 is a decision left to the discretion of the trial court, which will not be reversed absent manifest abuse." *89(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Thomas, 290 Ga....
...ts. I've had members of [Appellant's] family trying to find him, making inquiries, trying to locate him. We cannot get him. We cannot find him. A witness who has permanently moved to a foreign country is unavailable within the meaning of former OCGA § 24-3-10....
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Hunt v. State, 608 S.E.2d 616 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 7, 2005 | 279 Ga. 3, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 366

...urt. [12] Here, the prior identifications were made in court during trials, and therefore, the rule regarding admissibility of out-of-court identifications does not apply. Nor is the rule regarding the admissibility of former testimony found in OCGA § 24-3-10 applicable, because the witnesses were not inaccessible....
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Moody v. State, 537 S.E.2d 666 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 23, 2000 | 273 Ga. 24, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 3958

...After continuing the trial in order to attempt to secure Gay's presence, and after hearing evidence from investigators, Gay's mother, and Gay's employer that Gay could not be located, the trial court found that Gay was unavailable and allowed the State to introduce his testimony from the preliminary hearing. See OCGA § 24-3-10....
...A notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals was filed on March 8, 2000. The appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court on April 20, 2000, and it was docketed in the Supreme Court on May 5, 2000. The case was submitted for decision on July 3, 2000. [2] OCGA § 24-3-10 provides: The testimony of a witness since deceased, disqualified, or inaccessible for any cause which was given under oath on a former trial upon substantially the same issue and between substantially the same parties may be proved by any...
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Walton v. State, 526 S.E.2d 333 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 14, 2000 | 272 Ga. 73, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 602

...860, 863(2), 485 S.E.2d 470 (1997), any possible error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id. at 865, 485 S.E.2d 470. 3. The trial court did not err in permitting the State to introduce the former testimony of J.P. Fields, which was given at the first trial, pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-10....
...138, 140, 516 S.E.2d 61 (1999) (test of unavailability or inaccessibility is same for both necessity exception and prior testimony exception to hearsay rule). Walton's contention that Fields' prior testimony was unreliable and violated his right of confrontation is without merit. Fields' prior testimony satisfied OCGA § 24-3-10 and, therefore, was inherently reliable....
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Brown v. State, 401 S.E.2d 492 (Ga. 1991).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 21, 1991 | 261 Ga. 66

...ife could have testified about the time of his return home the evening of the murder. Moreover, the defendant could have introduced her Jackson-Denno testimony in evidence if he felt her testimony concerning the interrogation was important. See OCGA § 24-3-10; Wiseman v....
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Thomas v. State, 723 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 5, 2012 | 290 Ga. 653, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 742

...and thus the trial court erred in admitting his testimony as an unavailable witness. Testimony given by an "inaccessible" witness under oath in a former proceeding on substantially the same issue and between the same parties is admissible under OCGA § 24-3-10. See Dillingham v. State, 275 Ga. 665, 667, 571 S.E.2d 777 (2002). [2] "[T]he inaccessibility of a witness under [§ 24-3-10] depends upon a showing by the party seeking to use the witness' former testimony that he has used due diligence in trying to locate and bring to court the absent witness." Jones v. State, 250 Ga. 166, 168, 296 S.E.2d 598 (1982). "Whether a witness is inaccessible within the meaning of § 24-3-10 is a decision left to the discretion of the trial court, which will not be reversed absent manifest abuse." Dillingham, 275 Ga....
...Appellant argues that the State could have done more in its search, such as consulting additional public records. More might always be done, but we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the State had used due diligence and that the witness was unavailable under § 24-3-10....
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De La Cruz v. State, 303 Ga. 24 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 5, 2018

...We disagree. Under our old Evidence Code, [t]estimony given by an “inaccessible” witness under oath in a former proceeding on substantially the same issue and between the same parties [was] admissible under [former] OCGA § 24-3-10. [Cit.] “The inaccessibility of a witness under [former] OCGA § 24- 3-10 depend[ed] upon a showing by the party seeking to use the witness’ former testimony that he ha[d] used due diligence in trying to locate...
...Indeed, “due diligence requires more than a few phone calls,” and a “party must make a serious, competent effort to find and bring the witness to court.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. “Whether a witness is inaccessible within the meaning of [former] § 24-3-10 is a decision left to the discretion of the trial court, which will not be reversed absent manifest abuse.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Thomas, 290 Ga....
...I’ve had members of [Appellant’s] family trying to find him, making inquiries, trying to locate him. We cannot get him. We cannot find him. A witness who has permanently moved to a foreign country is unavailable within the meaning of former OCGA § 24-3-10....
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Wolcott v. State, 604 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 25, 2004 | 278 Ga. 664, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 3448

...determined that probable cause existed. At the subsequent revocation hearing, the trial court indicated that it would consider testimony given by some of the State's witnesses at the preliminary hearing. Wolcott urges that this was error. Under OCGA § 24-3-10, testimony given at a commitment hearing may be admissible at a subsequent proceeding if the witness has since died, is disqualified or has become inaccessible for any cause....
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Farmer v. State, 472 S.E.2d 70 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 1, 1996 | 266 Ga. 869, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 2482

...hen appellant had forcefully ejected her from their home. There was no other evidence that the wife had suffered an injury or that any injury suffered was at the hands of her husband. The trial court ruled the clerk's testimony admissible under OCGA § 24-3-10 and Brown v....
...The clerk's testimony was hearsay since its value rested mainly on the veracity and competency of one other than the witness relating it. OCGA § 24-3-1. The trial court based the admission of the clerk's hearsay testimony on erroneous theories of law. OCGA § 24-3-10, cited by the trial court to support the admission of the clerk's testimony, authorizes the admission of "[t]he testimony of a witness since ......
...The clerk of the magistrate court then was called to testify as to the statements made by Mrs. Farmer and, in addition, the affidavit executed by Mrs. Farmer was introduced into evidence. The trial court found this hearsay evidence admissible under OCGA § 24-3-10 and as a prior inconsistent statement....
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Pope v. Fields, 536 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 2, 2000 | 273 Ga. 6, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 3781

...should be admitted to probate. Pope challenges three evidentiary rulings, the jury's verdict, and the trial court's rulings on the motions for a directed verdict. Because Mrs. New's deposition testimony from a related case was admissible under OCGA § 24-3-10 and the evidence supports the jury's verdict, we affirm....
...Pope challenges the trial court's decision allowing Fields to introduce the videotaped deposition of Mrs. New and the sexual battery conviction of Pope and denying Pope the right to introduce a physician's note. We find no error in these evidentiary rulings. (a) OCGA § 24-3-10 permits the testimony of a deceased, disqualified, or inaccessible witness given under oath on a former trial on substantially the same issue and between substantially the same parties....
...ment of substantial similarity is fulfilled if the party against whom the former testimony is offered is the same and the previous proceeding provided an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. [3] Mrs. New's deposition meets the requirements of § 24-3-10....
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Wade v. State, 560 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 25, 2002 | 274 Ga. 791, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 605

...*17 we conclude that the State properly authenticated the videotape. [6] 5. At Wade's trial, the trial court found that a witness who gave testimony at Wade's first trial [7] was inaccessible or unavailable for the second trial, and pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-10, the court ruled that the State could introduce the testimony given by the witness at Wade's first trial. In his fifth enumeration of error, Wade contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the witness was inaccessible within the meaning of § 24-3-10....
...ss," but that she had not heard from him. Finally, a friend and co-worker of the witness testified that he had not seen or heard from the witness in about three months. The issue whether an absent witness is "inaccessible" within the meaning of OCGA § 24-3-10 is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, [8] and under the circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the witness was inaccessible or unavailable....
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Rai v. Reid, 294 Ga. 270 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 25, 2013 | 751 S.E.2d 821, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 3675

...o the wrongful death claim. 3. Finally, Rai contends that the trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff to read into the record the testimony of Evans and Green from Rai’s criminal trial because he maintains that the provisions of former OCGA § 24-3-107 did not apply as the plaintiff never made an effort to produce these out-of-state witnesses....
...However, such complaints have no merit. *276Decided November 25, 2013. William G. Quinn III, for appellant. Chaiken Klorfein, Fredric Chaiken, Jonathan R. Brockman, Thomas D. Harper, Billing, Cochran, Lyles, Mauro & Ramsey, Donna M. Krusbe, for appellee. The exception to the hearsay rule contained in former OCGA § 24-3-10 required that the proponent show that the declarant was unavailable to be a witness at trial; that the testimony at issue was under oath at a hearing or other proceeding; and that both the parties and the issues were substantially similar....
...at 8 (1). And, this requirement is satisfied “if the party against whom the former testimony is offered is the same and the previous proceeding provided an adequate opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. The prerequisites for use of former OCGA § 24-3-10 were met in this case....
...An out-of-state witness is deemed unavailable for purposes of admitting the witness’s prior testimony. Bragg v. State, 279 Ga. 156, 157 (2) (611 SE2d 17) (2005). Rai acknowledges that both Evans and Green were in Mississippi at the time in question; therefore, they were unavailable for purposes of former OCGA § 24-3-10....
...Minors and persons who are legally incompetent because of mental retardation or mental illness, who are such when the cause of action accrues, shall be entitled to the same time after their disability is removed to bring an action as is prescribed for other persons. Former OCGA § 24-3-10 provided: The testimony of a witness since deceased, disqualified, or inaccessible for any cause which was given under oath on a former trial upon substantially the same issue and between substantially the same parties may be proved by an...
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Dillingham v. State, 571 S.E.2d 777 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 28, 2002 | 275 Ga. 665, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 3157

...On appeal, appellant claims the trial court should have granted a continuance until the following morning to permit appellant one more opportunity to locate the missing witness, and he claims the use of transcribed testimony from the mistrial deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. OCGA § 24-3-10 permits the admission of testimony given by an inaccessible *779 witness under oath in a former trial on substantially the same issue and between substantially the same parties. Where, as here, an inaccessible witness's prior testimony satisfies the requirements of OCGA § 24-3-10, the testimony is deemed "inherently reliable" and its use does not violate the accused's right of confrontation. [5] Whether a witness is inaccessible within the meaning of § 24-3-10 is a decision left to the discretion of the trial court, which will not be reversed absent manifest abuse....
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Hosick v. State, 421 S.E.2d 65 (Ga. 1992).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 2, 1992 | 262 Ga. 432, 92 Fulton County D. Rep. 2220

...Tommy Bates witnessed the shooting and assisted police in developing a composite drawing which led to the defendant's arrest. Lt. Bates testified at the defendant's preliminary hearing, but was subsequently killed during the Persian Gulf conflict *435 and was unavailable to testify at the defendant's trial. Pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-10, the state was permitted to introduce the preliminary hearing testimony of Lt....
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Martin v. State, 668 S.E.2d 685 (Ga. 2008).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 27, 2008 | 284 Ga. 504, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 3374

...Wright is now deceased, and Martin filed a motion in limine to preclude the admission of her prior testimony at his guilt/innocence trial. The trial court denied Martin's motion, holding that Ms. Wright's prior testimony is admissible under the provisions of OCGA § 24-3-10 and that its admission will not violate the Confrontation Clause under Crawford v....
...hat this Court will not decide a constitutional question if the appeal can be decided upon other grounds [cit.], we first address the [evidentiary] issue[] raised by the appeal. Powell v. State, 270 Ga. 327, 327-328(1), 510 S.E.2d 18 (1998). 1. OCGA § 24-3-10, the "prior testimony" exception to the hearsay rule, permits the admission of the testimony of a witness at a prior proceeding provided the proponent is able to show that: (1) the declarant is unavailable as a witness at trial; (2) the te...
...However, he contends that, because the issues involved at the sentencing trial were not substantially similar to those that will be decided at the guilt/innocence trial, the sentencing trial did not provide him with an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Wright. For the purpose of construing OCGA § 24-3-10, it is well established that "the qualifying adverb `substantially'" means something less than "identical." Atlanta & West Point R....
...party against whom the testimony was offered had an adequate opportunity for cross-examination at the prior proceeding, implicitly "conclud[ing] that the issue of probable cause to suspect the defendant of guilt is substantially the same, for [OCGA § 24-3-10] purposes, as the issue of ultimate proof of guilt." Prater, supra, 148 Ga.App....
...The fact that defense counsel did not extensively cross-examine her does not establish that he did not have an adequate opportunity to do so. Thus, we conclude that, in this case, the issue of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the alleged statutory aggravating circumstances is substantially the same, for OCGA § 24-3-10 purposes, as the issue of ultimate proof of guilt and, therefore, that *690 the sentencing trial provided Martin a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Ms....