Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1868, § 3738, former Code 1873, § 3791, former Code 1882, § 3791, former Penal Code 1895, § 1004, former Civil Code 1910, § 5783, former Code 1933, § 38-410, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

It is the universal rule, in both civil and criminal cases, that if part of a conversation is introduced, all that is said in the same conversation which is relevant to the issue should be admitted. West v. State, 200 Ga. 566, 37 S.E.2d 799, later appeal, 74 Ga. App. 423, 40 S.E.2d 98 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-410).

Admission defined.

- An admission is positive or substantive proof of the facts asserted. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Duncan, 123 Ga. App. 479, 181 S.E.2d 535 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-410).

An admission is an out-of-court statement which is inconsistent with the contention of the party. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Duncan, 123 Ga. App. 479, 181 S.E.2d 535 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-410).

All of confession must be admitted.

- On the trial of a person charged with an offense, it is error to admit part of the person's confession and exclude the other part. Long v. State, 22 Ga. 40 (1857) (decided under former law); Peterson v. State, 47 Ga. 524; 50 Ga. 142 (1873), later appeal,(decided under former Code 1868, § 3788).

Because the earlier exculpatory portions of the defendant's transcribed statement were relevant as to both whether the defendant committed the rape and whether the defendant's statement was voluntary, the trial court violated the rule of completeness and abused the court's discretion when the court excluded those earlier portions of that statement; however, the error was harmless because the admitted and improperly excluded evidence showed overwhelmingly that the defendant was guilty of rape, whether principally or as a party to the crime, rendering it highly probable that any error in failing to admit the earlier portions of the defendant's statement did not contribute to the jury's verdict. Morales v. State, 337 Ga. App. 614, 788 S.E.2d 535 (2016).

Remainder of conversation shown by cross-examination.

- Generally, when part of a conversation has been introduced in evidence, the rest of the conversation may be brought out by the opposite party on cross-examination of the witness. Cox v. State, 64 Ga. 374, 37 Am. R. 76 (1879) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3791). Betts v. State, 66 Ga. 508 (1881) See.

No cross-examination when no direct examination.

- Trial court did not err in preventing the defendant from cross-examining the investigating officer about an incriminating statement made by the defendant after the state introduced evidence concerning the statement. Former O.C.G.A. §§ 24-3-38 and24-9-64 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-822 and24-6-611) ("The right of a thorough and sifting cross-examination shall belong to every party as to the witnesses called against him") were inapplicable because there had been no direct examination relating to any part of the statement by the state. Davis v. State, 261 Ga. 382, 405 S.E.2d 648 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

Refusal to state remainder of conversation.

- If in the examination in chief the witness should testify to anything occurring in such communications material to the witness's side of the case, the other party would have the right to inquire concerning the entire conversation. If there should be anything tending to incriminate the witness and the witness should refuse to answer as to it, the whole conversation should be excluded. Young v. State, 65 Ga. 525 (1880) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3791).

Use to avoid impeachment.

- When witness was asked about a conversation, with a view to laying a foundation to impeach the witness, the witness had the right to give the whole conversation so far as it is pertinent. Archer v. Gwinnett County, 110 Ga. App. 442, 138 S.E.2d 895 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-410).

Irrelevant matters not admissible.

- Matters in conversation or documents otherwise irrelevant, and wholly disconnected with the part first offered, were not thereby made admissible by the former statute. Brown v. State, 119 Ga. 572, 46 S.E. 833 (1904) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1004).

Since past sexual experiences of a victim of child molestation were not shown to be relevant, the trial court did not err by redacting such material from a taped interview of the victim. Roberts v. State, 232 Ga. App. 745, 503 S.E.2d 614 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

In a prosecution for rape, the omission, premised on the former rape-shield statute, of defendant's reference to the victim as a "well known whore" in a statement to police was not error. Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. App. 677, 520 S.E.2d 221 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

Admissibility into evidence of a complete one page letter to a detective that contained defendant's signature at the bottom was not affected by the fact that other pages enclosed with the letter, relating to the alleged criminal activity of other people, had been forwarded by the detective to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation. Boatman v. State, 272 Ga. 139, 527 S.E.2d 560 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

Matters irrelevant and wholly disconnected with the conversation first offered are not rendered admissible by admission of some of the conversation. Brown v. State, 119 Ga. 572, 46 S.E. 833 (1904) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1004).

Self-serving declarations.

- In a suit by an executrix to recover certain personal property from another, there was no error in excluding a self-serving declaration made by the surviving party to a contract under which the possession of the property in dispute was held by the surviving party, which attempted to set up an additional claim or demand against the deceased party to the contract, as a basis for the surviving party's adverse possession. May v. Subers, 19 Ga. App. 306, 91 S.E. 435 (1917) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5783).

Subsequent conversations.

- In a subsequent conversation with the same person and upon the same subject, what was said in the first admission, in the absence of something to the contrary, is necessarily understood, and must be taken and considered as a component part of the subsequent conversation. West v. State, 200 Ga. 566, 37 S.E.2d 799, later appeal, 74 Ga. App. 423, 40 S.E.2d 98 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-410).

Indicative of other crimes not objection.

- Testimony which constitutes an admission by the defendant regarding the offense for which the defendant is on trial is not subject to objection for the reason that the testimony likewise indicates the defendant was guilty of another offense since the language is such that it is impossible to convey the defendant's meaning without repeating the complete statement. Crider v. State, 98 Ga. App. 164, 105 S.E.2d 506 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-410).

Failure to hear whole conversation.

- That a witness did not hear all of the conversation about which the witness is asked to testify is no ground of objection to the witness stating as much of the conversation as the witness did hear. Westmoreland v. State, 45 Ga. 225 (1872) (decided under former Code 1868, § 3738); Woolfork v. State, 85 Ga. 69, 11 S.E. 814 (1890); Lynn v. State, 140 Ga. 387, 79 S.E. 29 (1913) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3791);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1030).

Extracts from prior statements.

- An extract, shown to be substantially correct, from a prisoner's statement made on a former trial was admissible without offering the entire statement, though it was shown that the statement made at the former trial as taken down by the official reporter had been lost. Medlin v. State, 149 Ga. 23, 98 S.E. 551 (1919) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1030).

Part of trial report used.

- State may read in evidence a part of a stenographic report of a former trial without putting in the whole, the other party being at liberty to introduce the balance, or so much thereof as is pertinent. Burnett v. State, 87 Ga. 622, 13 S.E. 552 (1891) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3791).

Recorded telephone conversations with an informant.

- There was circumstantial evidence that a defendant was the participant in recorded phone conversations with an informant; therefore the conversations were admissible as admissions of a party opponent under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-31 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801), and the entirety of the calls were admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38. Kimble v. State, 301 Ga. App. 237, 687 S.E.2d 242 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

When a part of a conversation, which amounts to an incriminatory admission, is admitted in evidence, it is the right of the accused to bring out other portions of the same conversation, even though it is self-serving in its nature, or exculpatory, in that it justifies, excuses, or mitigates the act. West v. State, 200 Ga. 566, 37 S.E.2d 799, later appeal, 74 Ga. App. 423, 40 S.E.2d 98 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-410).

It was error to deny the accused the right, under cross-examination, to have a witness further testify what the accused told the witness in the first conversation which may tend to exculpate the accused after a witness had testified as to a second conversation containing an admission by the accused. West v. State, 200 Ga. 566, 37 S.E.2d 799, later appeal, 74 Ga. App. 423, 40 S.E.2d 98 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-410).

Incomplete return.

- When a plaintiff offered in evidence an incomplete return of an administrator as an admission, and it had folded in it various receipts, accounts, etc., referred to as vouchers, plaintiff was not compelled to put the vouchers in evidence along with the returns. That was the right of the defendants, if the defendants could show that the enclosed were either a part of the admission or connected therewith. Dowling v. Feeley, 72 Ga. 557 (1884) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3791).

Admission of partial statement upheld.

- In a prosecution for rape, despite former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38, the rape shield statute prohibited the admission of a portion of defendant's statement in which the defendant said that the victim had sexual intercourse with the victim's cousin. Snow v. State, 228 Ga. App. 649, 492 S.E.2d 564 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

Trial court did not err by refusing the defendant's request to admit only the portions of letters written by the codefendant that cast the codefendant in a bad light relative to the crimes and excluding other portions that described the defendant's role in the crimes as being more significant than the defendant had described in a custodial interview because the defendant was not permitted to admit portions of the letters for the purportedly-limited purpose of showing the codefendant's state of mind without waiving the defendant's objections to the state's introduction of the remainder of the letters. Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854, cert. denied, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 522, 178 L. Ed. 2d 385 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

State's introduction of a partial recording of a phone call that the defendant made to the defendant's mother did not violate the rule of completeness because the portion of the call in which the defendant told the mother about a potential plea offer was unrelated to the later conversation about the defendant's uncle, who was an eyewitness to the shooting. Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 866, 804 S.E.2d 367 (2017).

Trial court did not err by allowing the state to introduce the defendant's recorded interrogation into evidence with the defendant's statements that the victim told the defendant that the victim was almost 18 years old and that the defendant would not have had sex with the victim if the defendant had known that the victim was younger redacted as the defendant's belief as to the victim's age was not relevant because it was not an essential element of either statutory rape or child molestation; mistake of fact regarding the victim's age was not a defense to either crime; and any statement the victim might have given regarding the victim's age was not admissible for impeachment purposes. West v. State, 344 Ga. App. 274, 808 S.E.2d 914 (2017).

Death of party making statements.

- Whole conversation should go in under the former statute, though involving statements made by one since dead. Powell v. Watts, 72 Ga. 770 (1884) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3791).

At the defendant's trial for DUI and battery, the trial court did not err in excluding admission of the sheriff's return call to the homeowner, who then admitted that punching the defendant's spouse was accidental, as hearsay, because the emergency leading to the homeowner's two 911 calls had then abated, making the statement testimonial, and the homeowner had later died. Further, the defendant was acquitted of the battery charge. Danley v. State, 342 Ga. App. 61, 802 S.E.2d 851 (2017).

Non-testifying witness's hearsay statement.

- Pretermitting whether a complained-of hearsay statement was admissible under the rule of completeness, admission of the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given that the admission was cumulative of other positive witness identifications, defendant's own confession, and the videotaped evidence depicting defendant robbing the store, all of which overwhelmingly established defendant's guilt. Jackson v. State, 262 Ga. App. 451, 585 S.E.2d 745 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

Law student's testimony on pretrial interview admissible.

- Trial court did not improperly admit a law student's testimony about a pretrial interview of a witness because the testimony was not improper bolstering but admissible pursuant to the rule of completeness and former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-822). Westbrook v. State, 291 Ga. 60, 727 S.E.2d 473 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

Refusal to utilize remainder of statements.

- Trial court erred in denying a codefendant's motion to sever the trial from the defendant's trial because the codefendant was not allowed to introduce the exculpatory portions of the statements that explained the excerpted admissions introduced by the state, which supported the codefendant's antagonistic defense that the codefendant was present at the robberies due to coercion by the defendant. To avoid potential Bruton issues, the state introduced only those portions of the codefendant's9-1-1 calls or custodial statements made establishing that the codefendant was at the scene of two robberies, that the codefendant's vehicles were used, and that the codefendant sent police to a motel room to investigate the robberies, but refused the additional portions of the statements that tended to support the codefendant's defense that the codefendant was coerced into participating in the crimes. Bowe v. State, 288 Ga. App. 376, 654 S.E.2d 196 (2007), cert. dismissed, sub. nom., State v. Baker, No. S08C0548, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 318 (Ga. 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

Trial court erred in excluding testimony from a witness that, during a lengthy conversation with the defendant after the defendant killed the defendant's wife, the defendant told the witness the wife had been unfaithful, that the defendant did not mean for the wife's death to happen, and the defendant loved the wife, because such testimony was admissible under the rule of completeness. Allaben v. State, 299 Ga. 253, 787 S.E.2d 711 (2016).

Playing only portion of recording of police interview of witness.

- Defendant did not show that the trial court plainly erred by not allowing the defendant to play the entire recording of a witness's police interview because the trial court allowed the defendant to play an additional segment of the recording to show that the witness's prior statements to the police might have been affected by medication; and the defendant did not identify any other specific statements in the portions of the recording that the state played for the jury which needed to be explained by playing the rest of the witness's interview. Thompson v. State, Ga. , 816 S.E.2d 646 (2018).

Failure to listen to all of audiotape was harmless error.

- In a recorded conversation, the defendant denied committing a murder. Assuming that under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38, the defendant should have been allowed to play the audiotape in its entirety because an accomplice had testified to a portion of the conversation, any error was harmless as the defendant's recorded denial of involvement would have been cumulative of other evidence. Patterson v. State, 285 Ga. 597, 679 S.E.2d 716 (2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1117, 130 S. Ct. 1051, 175 L. Ed. 2d 892 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

Ineffective assistance of counsel not established.

- Defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective by not arguing the rule of completeness, former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38, as a means to get the defendant's entire post-stabbing statement into evidence because there were discrepancies between the defendant's trial testimony and the account of a witness regarding a statement the defendant allegedly made on the night of the stabbing; therefore, an acquittal would not likely have resulted had the jury heard the witness' testimony in its entirety. Carruth v. State, 290 Ga. 342, 721 S.E.2d 80 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

Issue not preserved for review.

- "Rule of completeness" as a ground for admissibility was not preserved for review because defense counsel did not raise the "rule of completeness" as a ground for allowing a witness to testify to the defendant's entire statement. Carruth v. State, 290 Ga. 342, 721 S.E.2d 80 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 759.

C.J.S.

- 31A C.J.S., Evidence, § 518.

ALR.

- Proof of entire conversation containing alleged confession, 2 A.L.R. 1017; 26 A.L.R. 541.

Duty of court to instruct regarding exculpatory or mitigating statements in confession or admission introduced by prosecution, 116 A.L.R. 1459.

Party's waiver of privilege as to communications with counsel by taking stand and testifying, 51 A.L.R.2d 521.

Testifying in civil proceeding as waiver of privilege against self-incrimination, 72 A.L.R.2d 830.