O.C.G.A. § 24-8-825 (2019)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1873, § 3794, former Code 1882, § 3794, former Penal Code 1910, § 1033, former Code 1933, § 38-412, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-51 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Reason for rule. - Keeping in view the true reason upon which confession evidence is excluded, and the test by which the courts have sought to determine whether or not the truthfulness of the confession is sufficiently evidenced to admit the evidence thereof to the jury, it is clear that a confession should not be excluded because made under spiritual exhortation, or promise of secrecy, or promise of collateral benefit, since these means, or none of them, have the slightest tendency in a proper sense to induce one to confess falsely. Wilson v. State, 19 Ga. App. 759, 92 S.E. 309, 1917 Ga. App. LEXIS 352 (1917) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1033). Confessions otherwise admissible are not rendered inadmissible because the accused was told by another in substance that it was always best to tell the truth. Turner v. State, 203 Ga. 770, 48 S.E.2d 522, 1948 Ga. LEXIS 514 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38412); Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 274 S.E.2d 549, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 641, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S. Ct. 364, 70 L. Ed. 2d 191 (1981). Prayers overheard. - Testimony that the defendant while alone in defen-

dant’s cell was overheard to say, “Lord, have mercy upon me for what I have done; the only thing I regret is killing my father,” was not incompetent because the witness was the jailer in charge of the defendant, the law not disqualifying a jailer from testifying as to voluntary acts and confessions of prisoners under the jailer’s charge. Testimony as to prayers in which the defendant declared defendant’s innocence of the crime, although offered in reply to the above, was properly rejected, the rule being to admit inculpatory declarations or confessions, and to exclude those which are exculpatory, when disconnected therewith. Woolfolk v. State, 85 Ga. 69, 11 S.E. 814, 1890 Ga. LEXIS 4 (1890) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3794). Confession made by the defendant to a fellow-prisoner, who was in jail for stealing, and grossly irreligious, as appears from defendant’s own evidence, but who read the Bible and sang Psalms to the defendant, and told the defendant that if the defendant were guilty the defendant had better confess and seek the defendant’s God, was admissible. Stafford v. State, 55 Ga. 591, 1876 Ga. LEXIS 425 (1876) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3794). Fact that the statements made by the defendant were in response to an appeal made by defendant’s sister, in which she alluded to the death of defendant’s brother and incarceration of defendant’s mother as results of the crime, would not render the statements inadmissible. The appeal

was not stronger than “spiritual exhortations,” which the Code declares shall not exclude a confession. White v. State, 177 Ga. 115, 169 S.E. 499, 1933 Ga. LEXIS 129 (1933) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1033). Timing of confession following allegedly improper statement. - Defendant’s confession was not induced by an impermissible hope of benefit as defendant testified and specifically denied that the defendant’s motivation for confessing was based upon a hope that doing so would lead to reduced charges or a reduced sentence; the fact that a confession was made under spiritual exhortation, promise of secrecy, or a promise of a collateral benefit did not exclude it; and the defendant made no admissions and did not confess immediately after any of the disputed statements, but, instead, the defendant confessed to shooting the victim approximately 20 minutes after the final allegedly improper statement. Kessler v. State, 311 Ga. 607, 858 S.E.2d 1, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 192 (2021). Promise to help keep defendant out of certain prison. - Confession is not rendered inadmissible by an assurance that whatever help could be given would be given in keeping the defendant out of a certain prison, since this is similar to a promise to inform the court of a defendant’s cooperation. Patrick v. State, 169 Ga. App. 302, 312 S.E.2d 385, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3468 (1983), aff’d, 252 Ga. 509, 314 S.E.2d 909, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 755 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-51). Investigator offered collateral benefit by talking to DA office. - An investigator’s statement that the investigator would talk to the district attorney’s office at a later time about having a warrant against the defendant dismissed was no more than a promise of a collateral benefit and thus did not make the defendant’s custodial statement inadmissible under former O.C.G.A. §§ 24-3-50 and 24-3-51 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-824 and 24-8825). Boone v. State, 293 Ga. App. 654, 667 S.E.2d 880, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1041 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-51). Promises to obtain psychiatric help and medical attention for defendant

were not the kind of “hope of benefit” which would invalidate defendant’s subsequent confession. Head v. State, 180 Ga. App. 901, 350 S.E.2d 854, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2302 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-51). Promise to secure counseling. - With regard to an alleged promise by a detective to help secure counseling for the defendant when the defendant got to prison, the benefit involved was no hope of lighter punishment (induced by a person other than the defendant) but was a collateral benefit which did not render defendant’s confession inadmissible. Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. 366, 349 S.E.2d 255, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2732 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-51). Trial court did not err in admitting the defendant’s pre-arrest statements because the offer to obtain counseling for the defendant did not bear on the question of punishment but involved a collateral benefit, and promises of a collateral benefit did not impact a statement’s admissibility; the defendant offered no evidence that the officers induced the defendant to believe the defendant would receive a three year sentence, but the defendant came up with that scenario on the defendant’s own, and the trial court, therefore, properly found the defendant’s statements were voluntary and admissible. Dunson v. State, 309 Ga. App. 484, 711 S.E.2d 53, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 375 (2011), cert. dismissed, No. S15C1215, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 580 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2015) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-51). Promise to end adverse publicity. - When an inculpatory statement was made by the fire department lieutenant in return for the investigator’s alleged promise to “stop all the publicity against the fire and police department and not arrest and persecute anyone else,” the promise pertained to collateral benefits and the trial court did not err in ruling the statement to be voluntary and admissible. Johnson v. State, 170 Ga. App. 71, 316 S.E.2d 160, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2852 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-51). Promise to get help for drug problem. - Officer’s promise to help the defendant with a drug problem was a collateral benefit and did not bear on the

question of punishment; hence, the trial court did not clearly err in admitting the defendant’s statement in evidence as such did not amount to a promise of leniency in exchange for the statement. Smith v. State, 281 Ga. App. 91, 635 S.E.2d 385, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1009 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-51). Exhortation to tell truth was not promise of lighter punishment. - Appellant’s statement to law enforcement was not involuntary as the appellant was advised of the appellant’s Miranda rights numerous times (and had executed a written waiver), a video-recorded statement plainly reflected that both the appellant and law enforcement understood that the appellant was free to leave anytime during the interview, and the investigator’s statement that the appellant would never see the light of day if not truthful was an exhortation to tell the truth, not a promise of a lighter punishment. Price v. State, 305 Ga. 608, 825 S.E.2d 178, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 144 (2019). Reduction in bond. - Reduction of bond is in the same class of collateral benefits as the promises of a solitary cell, a psychiatric examination, and communication to the judge of the defendant’s cooperation. Heard v. State, 165 Ga. App. 252, 300 S.E.2d 213, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3141 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-51); Pounds v. State, 189

Ga. App. 809, 377 S.E.2d 722, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 68 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-51). Long relationship as confidential informant. - Statements of an inculpatory nature made while in custody were not inadmissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-51 on the theory that defendant worked with law enforcement officers as a confidential informant for many years and that it was understood that the defendant would be “taken care of” and the sheriff admitted that in the sheriff’s own mind the sheriff felt the sheriff owed defendant something, since there were no overt promises made and the understanding was subjective in nature. Tyson v. State, 165 Ga. App. 22, 299 S.E.2d 69, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 1750 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-51). Waiver. - Because defendant requested the future assistance of an attorney, not immediate assistance, and because defendant knew that defendant’s confession would be handed over to law enforcement, the clergy-parishioner privilege in former O.C.G.A. §§ 24-3-51 and 24-9-22 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-825 and 24-5-502) was inapplicable; therefore, defendant’s confession to the crimes was voluntary. Willis v. State, 287 Ga. 703, 699 S.E.2d 1, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 491 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-351).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, §§ 740, 741, 745. ALR. Voluntariness of confession admitted by court as question for jury, 85 A.L.R. 870; 170 A.L.R. 567. Suppression before indictment or trial of confession unlawfully obtained, 1 A.L.R.2d 1012. Voluntariness and admissibility of minor’s confession, 87 A.L.R.2d 624.

Admissibility of confession as affected by its inducement through artifice, deception, trickery, or fraud, 99 A.L.R.2d 772. Voluntariness of confession as affected by police statements that suspect’s relatives will benefit by the confession, 51 A.L.R.4th 495. Voluntary nature of confession as affected by appeal to religious beliefs, 20 A.L.R.6th 479.