O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
No person may be appointed or continue to serve as conservator of the estate of an adult who: (1) Is a minor, a ward, or a protected person; (2) Who has a conflict of interest with the adult unless the court determines that the conflict of interest is insubstantial or that the appointment clearly would be in the adult’s best interest; or (3) Is an owner, operator, or employee of a long-term care or other caregiving institution or facility at which the adult is receiving care, unless related to the adult by blood, marriage, or adoption.
History
(Code 1981, § 29-5-2, enacted by Ga. L. 2004, p. 161, § 1.)
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former O.C.G.A. § 29-5-2 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Failure to explain reason for selection of county guardian. - Probate court, when selecting a new guardian for appellant, erred in failing to consider appellant’s next of kin; because the hearing was not recorded, and because the order failed to explain the reason the probate court selected the county guardian as the new guardian, the record supported appellant’s argument that the probate court failed to consider the statutory preferences of former O.C.G.A. § 29-5-2(c) in naming a new guardian. In re Phillips,
No. A02A2368, No. A02A2368, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1311 (Oct. 9, 2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 29-5-2). Court’s order amounted to an abuse of discretion requiring remand as the order failed to give the mother a reasonable opportunity to meet the court’s requirements for bond, before passing the mother over in favor of the county guardian, and implicitly found that the mother was unavailable to serve as guardian. In re Estate of Taylor, 270 Ga. App. 807, 608 S.E.2d 299 (2004). Cited in Twitty v. Akers, 218 Ga. App. 467, 462 S.E.2d 418 (1995); Gary v. Weiner, 233 Ga. App. 284, 503 S.E.2d 898 (1998).
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Guardian and Ward, §§ 24 et seq., 46 et seq.
C.J.S. - 57 C.J.S., Mental Health, § 135 et seq.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
9
cases, 1995–2019 · leading case:
In Re Holloway, 555 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
In Re Holloway, 555 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 14× “Finding none of the children qualified to act as guardian, the Superior Court of Crisp County appointed certain third parties as guardians under OCGA § 29-5-2. The daughters appeal. They contend that the trial court erroneously relied on OCGA § 29-4-8 and Kelley v.”
In Re Est. of Taylor, 608 S.E.2d 299 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 10× “When a probate court is called upon to appoint a guardian of the person or property of an incapacitated adult, OCGA § 29-5-2 requires the court to apply certain preferences to a list of qualified petitioners.”
In Re Hodgman, 602 S.E.2d 925 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 6× “Chapman contends that the trial court’s appointments thereby violated OCGA § 29-5-2 (c) (1), which indicates that the most preferable individual to be appointed as guardian over an incapacitated adult is “[a]n individual nominated by the incapacitated adult prior to the filing…”
In Re Moses, 615 S.E.2d 573 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 6× “OCGA § 29-5-2 sets forth preferences for the probate court to consider in appointing a guardian for an incapacitated adult.”
Gary v. Weiner, 503 S.E.2d 898 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 6× “discretion in removing her as guardian and failed to follow OCGA § 29-5-2 in its appointment of Weiner as successor guardian.”
Cruver v. Mitchell, 656 S.E.2d 269 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 2× “501, 503-504 ( 615 SE2d 573 ) (2005) (decided under former OCGA § 29-5-2). Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse the trial court’s determination as to who will serve an individual’s best interests as conservator.”
Twitty v. Akers, 462 S.E.2d 418 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 6× “See OCGA § 29-5-2 (a), (b), and (c). Akers did not, and could not, waive an argument that arose upon appeal.”
In Re Martin, 460 S.E.2d 304 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 2× “Calhoun also argues that no good cause for the failure to appoint her as guardian was shown. In another enumeration, Calhoun argues that the court abused its discretion by failing to follow Martin’s preference as to which guardian she wanted.”
Law v. The State., 824 S.E.2d 778 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 2× “In addition, Law was issued letters of guardianship and conservatorship by the Probate Court which directed that he act in his mother's best interest; that he keep his mother's funds separate from his own; and that he was specifically prohibited from selling, giving away, or…”
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