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2018 Georgia Code 29-6-1 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 29-6-1 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 29-6-1

TITLE 29 GUARDIAN AND WARD

Section 6. Judges of Probate Courts as Custodians of Certain Funds, 29-6-1 through 29-6-9.

ARTICLE 13 FOREIGN CONSERVATORS

29-6-1. Judges of probate courts as custodians of certain funds; authority to collect debts.

The judges of the probate courts are, in their discretion, made the legal custodians and distributors of all moneys up to $15,000.00 due and owing to any minor or incapacitated adult who is in need of a conservator but who has no legal and qualified conservator; and the judges are authorized to receive and collect all such moneys arising from insurance policies, benefit societies, legacies, inheritances, or any other source. Without any appointment or qualifying order, the judge is authorized to take charge of the moneys or funds of the minor or adult by virtue of the judge's office as judge of the probate court in the county of residence of the minor or adult; provided, however, that notice shall be given to the living parents of a minor, if any, or the guardian of an adult, if any. The certificate of the judge that no legally qualified conservator has been appointed shall be conclusive and shall be sufficient authority to justify any debtor in making payment on claims made by the judge.

(Code 1981, §29-6-1, enacted by Ga. L. 2004, p. 161, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 805, § 16/SB 534.)

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 29-6-1

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Cross v. Stokes, 572 S.E.2d 538 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 12, 2002 | 275 Ga. 872, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 3319

...The guardian ad litem filed a caveat suggesting the will was the product of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence, but withdrew the caveat four months later. [2] In his withdrawal pleading, the guardian ad litem questioned whether OCGA § 29-6-11(c) disqualified appellant Cross from taking any bequest pursuant to the will of his DVA ward....
...as proved in solemn form; and gave the named executor leave to qualify in order that Letters Testamentary might issue to him. The order also noted that the guardian ad litem had brought to the court's attention that Cross was disqualified under OCGA § 29-6-11(c) from receiving the Robertson bequest and that the guardian had submitted his position as to how the portion of the estate left to Cross should be distributed....
...making final distribution. A week later, appellant Cross filed in the probate court a petition for declaratory judgment in which he sought a determination that the statute which purportedly disqualified him from being a beneficiary of the will, OCGA § 29-6-11(c), was unconstitutional; two weeks after that filing, appellee Stokes filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the probate court pursuant to the probate court's April 2001 order. In January 2002, the probate court issued an order on appellant's declaratory judgment petition, ruling that OCGA § 29-6-11(c) was constitutional and that the statute applied to appellant and the ward's entire estate....
...y judgment, but suggests that appellant was required to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the probate *542 court's November 2000 order in which the probate court admitted the will to probate in solemn form and implicitly determined that OCGA § 29-6-11(c) disqualified appellant Cross from receiving the bequest left him by the testator....
...Accordingly, we conclude that appellant was not required to file an appeal from the void portion of the November 2000 order admitting the will to probate in solemn form, and that the issues concerning the applicability and constitutionality of OCGA § 29-6-11(c) are properly and timely before us....
...See also Simon v. Bunch, 260 Ga. 201, n. 1, 391 S.E.2d 648 (1990); Wausau Ins. Co. v. King, 191 Ga.App. 329(1), 381 S.E.2d 574 (1989). We conclude the probate court was empowered to issue a declaratory judgment in the case at bar. 3. Appellant contends that OCGA § 29-6-11(c) is not applicable to him because it is expressly limited to "a guardian under this chapter" and he was not appointed as a DVA guardian of the testator pursuant to *543 OCGA § 29-6-6(a), but as a "general" guardian, the guardian of an incapacitated adult's person and property....
...anship, and issued to Cross, nunc pro tunc, "Letters of Guardianship of the Property of a Veterans' Affairs Beneficiary." In light of this history, appellant will not be heard to say he was not serving as a DVA guardian. Appellant next contends that § 29-6-11(c) is not applicable to him because it is statutorily limited to those guardians appointed under the provisions set forth in the 1996 revision of Chapter Six of Title 29, and he was not appointed pursuant to those procedures....
...Since appellant's appointment as successor guardian has its roots in a request by the secretary of veterans affairs that a guardian be appointed for the testator, we conclude that appellant was appointed pursuant to the statutory procedure. 4. Appellant next complains that OCGA § 29-6-11(c) violates the Georgia constitutional prohibition against passage of a bill "which ......
...constitutionally enacted therein, though not referred to in the title otherwise than by the use of the words "and for other purposes." Cady v. Jardine, 185 Ga. 9, 11, 193 S.E. 869 (1937). The 1996 legislation that contained what has been codified as § 29-6-11(c) was entitled, "Guardian and Ward—Guardians' Compensation and Expenses; Guardianship of Beneficiaries of United States Department of Veterans Affairs." 1996 Ga. L. 1174. Among the legislation's stated purposes was "to provide for a comprehensive change in the guardianship of beneficiaries of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs... and for other purposes." Id. OCGA § 29-6-11(c), which prohibits a DVA guardian who is not the ward's next of kin to be a beneficiary under the last will and testament executed by the ward while the DVA guardian/beneficiary was DVA guardian, meets the criteria set forth in Cady v....
...See also Randolph v. State, 269 Ga. 147(1), 496 S.E.2d 258 (1998); Hussey v. Chatham-County, 268 Ga. 871(1), 494 S.E.2d 510 (1998); Mead Corp. v. Collins, supra; Frazer v. City of Albany, 245 Ga. 399, 401, 265 S.E.2d 581 (1980). *544 5. Appellant next contends OCGA § 29-6-11(c) violates the equal protection clauses of the U.S....
...assification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker." [Cit.] Id. As the trial court noted, the State has a legitimate interest in regulating DVA guardianships and protecting DVA wards. OCGA § 29-6-11(c)'s prohibition of a DVA guardian being a beneficiary under the will of the guardian's DVA ward is a legitimate means by which the State can regulate DVA guardianships and protect DVA wards. In essence, appellant contends § 29-6-11(c) is unconstitutional because it is underinclusive since it does not protect all persons with guardians....
...392, 409, 474 A.2d 191 (1984) ("Underinclusiveness does not create an equal protection violation under the rational basis test."). Inasmuch as the State has a legitimate interest in the protection of DVA wards and the regulation of DVA guardians and OCGA § 29-6-11(c) bears a rational relationship to that interest, the fact that the State has the same legitimate interest in guardian-ward relationships not covered by § 29-6-11(c) does not make § 29-6-11(c) unconstitutional under the rational basis test....
...l and testament should be limited to the property over which the guardian had control, i.e., "only moneys received by the guardian from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs and all earnings, interest, and profits derived therefrom." OCGA § 29-6-1(2)....
...464, 471, 80 S.E.2d 807 (1954); In the Matter of Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028 (Wyo.1988) (the appointment of a guardian under the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act does not result in a presumption of insanity or lack of testamentary capacity). But see Rymer v. Smith, 38 Tenn.App. 414, 274 S.W.2d 643 (1954). [3] OCGA § 29-6-11(c) states: Unless a guardian under this chapter ["Guardians of Beneficiaries of United States Department of Veterans Affairs"] is the next of kin under the laws of descent and distribution of the State of Georgia, no such guardian shall be...