Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation
Call Now: 904-383-7448It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally to sell, offer for sale, keep for sale, barter, exchange, furnish at public places, keep on hand at a place of business, or otherwise possess distilled spirits in any quantity, except as provided in this title.
(Ga. L. 1915, Ex. Sess., p. 77, § 2; Ga. L. 1917, Ex. Sess., p. 7, § 23; Code 1933, § 58-102; Code 1933, § 5A-7102, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1573, § 1.)
Applicability of § 3-10-4. - Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103, § 23B (see now O.C.G.A. § 3-10-4), which permitted a person to possess one quart of liquor in a dry county which may have been purchased for use and consumption from a lawful retailer and properly stamped, had no applicability to express prohibition of former Code 1933, § 58-102 (see now O.C.G.A. § 3-10-2). Blackmon v. Brotherhood Protective Order of Elks, Toccoa Lodge No. 1820, 232 Ga. 671, 208 S.E.2d 483 (1974) (decided under former Code 1993 § 58-102).
- In prosecution for selling tax-paid whiskey it is entirely unnecessary to allege or prove that county is not exempted from the provisions of law prohibiting sale of whiskey, this being a matter which shall be judicially recognized without introduction of proof. Dye v. State, 118 Ga. App. 570, 165 S.E.2d 183 (1968).
- If, at time in question and at time of solicitation for sale of whiskey, defendant was engaged in business of selling and possessing intoxicating liquor, it would be no defense that the defendant was merely induced by solicitation and misrepresentation to sell or possess such prohibited liquor. Sutton v. State, 59 Ga. App. 198, 200 S.E. 225 (1938), overruled on other grounds, Keaton v. State, 253 Ga. 70, 316 S.E.2d 452 (1984).
- All engaged in commission of misdemeanor are principals, and when a defendant works for another at the defendant's place of business, where the defendant's duties are to be performed, the defendant may be guilty of selling whiskey in dry county, even though the defendant is not owner of whiskey, but merely employee and agent of owner. Faucette v. State, 71 Ga. App. 331, 30 S.E.2d 808 (1944) (decided under former Code 1993 § 58-102).
- When a person is indicted merely for possession of whiskey at place of business for purpose of sale in wet county, indictment charges no offense unless it further charges that whiskey possessed did not bear required stamps. Womack v. State, 60 Ga. App. 761, 5 S.E.2d 96 (1939).
- On an accusation or indictment couched in language of this section, defendant has burden of proving that liquor possessed is properly stamped and within legal limit. Requirement of purchase from authorized liquor retailer and requirement that liquor be held for use and not for sale are matters about which state has burden of proof. Jenkins v. State, 93 Ga. App. 360, 92 S.E.2d 43 (1956).
- Evidence that witness purchased whiskey with money furnished by officer, telling defendant that the witness had just gotten over a drunk and was feeling bad and begging defendant to sell the witness whiskey was not sufficient to raise defense of entrapment. Sutton v. State, 59 Ga. App. 198, 200 S.E. 225 (1938), overruled on other grounds, Keaton v. State, 253 Ga. 70, 316 S.E.2d 452 (1984) (decided under former Code 1993 § 58-102).
- When one is being tried for illegal sale of whiskey, evidence that one was in possession of whiskey at or near time of alleged sale is admissible as a circumstance that one kept whiskey for sale or as corroboration of evidence that a sale had taken place, but such evidence, considered alone, will not support conviction of sale, and a charge to jury which leaves them under impression that it is sufficient, in and of itself, is clearly error. Springer v. State, 60 Ga. App. 641, 4 S.E.2d 679 (1939) (decided under former Code 1993 § 58-102).
- Proof either that defendant directly or personally committed criminal offense (selling whiskey in dry county), or that the defendant aided or abetted criminal transaction of the defendant's employer at the employer's place of business, would authorize the defendant's conviction of offense of selling whiskey. Faucette v. State, 71 Ga. App. 331, 30 S.E.2d 808 (1944).
- Statement of defendant that the defendant thought the defendant would be notified in the event of a raid, in connection with the defendant's other remarks and actions during course of search of club house, was sufficient to authorize jury to infer that the defendant was aiding and assisting in commission of misdemeanors of illegal possession of liquor and slot machines. Miller v. State, 94 Ga. App. 259, 94 S.E.2d 120 (1956).
Fraternal club cannot sell liquor to its members in a dry county, but each member can keep one quart of liquor at the meeting place for the member's own use without violating the law. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 454.
- 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 18 et seq., 66, 71, 225, 246 et seq.
- 48 C.J.S., Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 21, 27 et seq., 39, 41.
- Power to prohibit the possession of intoxicating liquor, irrespective of any intention to traffic therein, 2 A.L.R. 1085.
Entrapment to commit offense against laws regulating sales of liquor, 55 A.L.R.2d 1322.
What constitutes "sale" of liquor in violation of statute or ordinance, 89 A.L.R.3d 551.
Criminal liability of member or agent of private club or association, or of owner or lessor of its premises, for violation of state or local liquor or gambling laws thereon, 98 A.L.R.3d 694.
No results found for Georgia Code 3-10-2.