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Call Now: 904-383-7448(Code 1933, § 5A-302, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1573, § 1; Ga. L. 2010, p. 838, § 10/SB 388.)
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, annotations decided under from Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
- For article suggesting the inclusion of alcoholic beverage regulation under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, in order to satisfy due process and equal protection requirements, see 1 Ga. St. B.J. 269 (1965).
- The Twenty-First Amendment removes spirituous liquors and alcohol from the protection of the commerce clause to the extent necessary to allow states to adopt and enforce appropriate laws and regulations dealing with the subject, and thus to burden interstate commerce to this extent. Even in absence of any protection under the Twenty-First Amendment, the sovereign states in the exercise of their reserve police power may, without offending the commerce clause, adopt and enforce necessary laws and regulations to effectuate their own protection against illegal traffic and trade in liquors. Atkins v. Manning, 206 Ga. 219, 56 S.E.2d 260 (1949) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).
- Rules of the commissioner promulgated under authority of subsection (h) of Code 1933, § 58-1022 (see now O.C.G.A. § 3-2-2), to control distilled spirits and alcohol are not laws of this state within the meaning of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. V, Sec. III, Para. IV (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. V, Sec. III, Para. II), so as to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction to determine their constitutionality. Brosnan v. Undercofler, 220 Ga. 239, 138 S.E.2d 314 (1964) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).
Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103 makes the commissioner the administrator of the law and empowers the commissioner to promulgate rules to effectuate its administration and enforcement. Atkins v. Manning, 206 Ga. 219, 56 S.E.2d 260 (1949) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).
- Rules relating to transportation of distilled spirits and alcohol, and requiring that shipment thereof from another state through any part of this state to destination in another state must be by common carrier only, accompanied by invoice or bill of lading showing that shipment is made by shipper duly licensed and authorized, and that shipment is made to one licensed and authorized to receive such shipment, and further providing that any violation is misdemeanor, in view of the provisions of law and its expressed purpose to control all traffic or trade in liquor therein defined, come clearly within permissible legislative authorization. Atkins v. Manning, 206 Ga. 219, 56 S.E.2d 260 (1949) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).
- There can be no rules and regulations made by commissioner, a violation of which would result in seizure, condemnation, and sale of vehicle being used by owner thereof in alleged violation of such rules, where these rules and regulations, made by commissioner, are not in harmony or in accord with the law. State v. Schafer, 82 Ga. App. 753, 62 S.E.2d 446 (1950) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).
Law permitted the state revenue department to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations not inconsistent with the title under which the law fell or other laws, and the regulations challenged by the two associations were not invalid on the ground that the regulations were unauthorized since the regulations governing distribution of malt beverages in Georgia that were challenged were all authorized generally by O.C.G.A. § 3-2-2(a). Ga. Oilmen's Ass'n v. Ga. Dep't of Revenue, 261 Ga. App. 393, 582 S.E.2d 549 (2003).
Violation of administrative rule of commissioner may result in suspension or cancellation of license of offending party or parties, but such rules do not make illegal an act or contract not also prohibited by statute. Gaddy v. Silverman, 86 Ga. App. 239, 71 S.E.2d 277 (1952) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).
- 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Advertising, § 15. 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 1, 2, 22 et seq., 114 seq., 236, 254, 265, 297, 378, 383, 384, 508.
Total Results: 20
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2024-08-13
Snippet: commence, while OCGA §§ 17-3-2, 17-3-2.1, and 17-3-2.2 specify periods that are excluded from the various
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2023-10-11
Snippet: exception in OCGA § 17-3-2 (2)5 or the DNA exception in OCGA § 5 OCGA § 17-3-2 (2) provides that “[t]he
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2022-11-02
Snippet: 31, 2012, the crime was unknown. See OCGA § 17-3-2 (2) (“The period within which a prosecution must
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2021-08-24
Snippet: person committing the crime is unknown.” OCGA § 17-3-2 (2). He also correctly notes that where the State
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-08-05
Citation: 831 S.E.2d 771
Snippet: identity was unknown until April 2008. See OCGA § 17-3-2 (2) (a statute of limitations is tolled during any
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-06-24
Citation: 830 S.E.2d 99, 306 Ga. 266
Snippet: of Georgia until June 20, 2011." See OCGA § 17-3-2 (2).4 The gravamen of Jackson's argument is that,
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-06-24
Citation: 830 S.E.2d 90, 306 Ga. 277
Snippet: was not known until April 14, 2013. See OCGA § 17-3-2 (2). Appellant never asserted a statute of limitation
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-02-18
Citation: 824 S.E.2d 249, 305 Ga. 163
Snippet: limitation on his non-murder charges under OCGA § 17-3-2 (2). Because we determine that the trial court did
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-02-22
Citation: 298 Ga. 505, 783 S.E.2d 103, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 166
Snippet: Bryant’s reason for leaving. See former OCGA § 24-3-2 2 (providing that, “[w]hen, in a legal investigation
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-10-20
Citation: 296 Ga. 40, 764 S.E.2d 848, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 812
Snippet: commence, while OCGA §§ 17-3-2, 17-3-2.1, and 17-3-2.2 specify periods that are excluded from the various
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2013-02-18
Citation: 292 Ga. 557, 738 S.E.2d 584, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 299, 2013 WL 593494, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 145
Snippet: OCGA § 17-3-2 (2).5 “The knowledge component of th[e] exception [found in OCGA § 17-3-2 (2)] has been
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2011-11-29
Citation: 719 S.E.2d 482, 290 Ga. 198, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 3859, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 944
Snippet: such motions on the basis urged. Under OCGA § 17-3-2(2),[4] the applicable statute of limitation is tolled
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2011-01-10
Citation: 704 S.E.2d 767, 288 Ga. 420, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 61, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 9
Snippet: of the *771 shooting, as permitted by OCGA § 24-3-2.[2] It is true that the exception under OCGA § 24-3-2
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2008-11-17
Citation: 670 S.E.2d 429, 284 Ga. 736, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 3665, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 985
Snippet: the marshlands. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-2-3-.02 (2) (q). CSC asserts that this regulation actually
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2004-11-08
Citation: 604 S.E.2d 789, 278 Ga. 598, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 3579, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 960
Snippet: few cases that interpret the meaning of OCGA § 17-3-2(2), which states that the statute of limitations is
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2002-01-14
Citation: 558 S.E.2d 717, 274 Ga. 675, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 170, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 6
Snippet: statute of limitations was tolled under OCGA § 17-3-2(2). 4. Finn contends that the trial court's instruction
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2001-05-07
Citation: 546 S.E.2d 514, 273 Ga. 787
Snippet: admissible as original evidence under OCGA § 24-3-2. 2. Testimony of another's out-of-court identification
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1994-11-21
Citation: 264 Ga. 643, 449 S.E.2d 823, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 3737, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 888
Snippet: marriage contract without parental consent. OCGA § 19-3-2 (2). There was no evidence that parental consent had
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1991-11-15
Citation: 410 S.E.2d 290, 261 Ga. 726, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 1009
Snippet: unknown or the crime is unknown. . . .” OCGA § 17-3-2 (2). One of the objectives of criminal law is punishment;
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1990-03-13
Citation: 389 S.E.2d 240, 260 Ga. 21
Snippet: limitation was tolled, under the exception of OCGA § 17-3-2 (2), in a case of sexual crimes against a child of