O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 3-8-1 (2019)

Regulation and taxation of sale, storage, and distribution of alcoholic beverages at airports owned or operated by counties or municipalities

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) The issuance of licenses for the package sale, sale by the drink, storage, and distribution of alcoholic beverages within the boundaries of any airport owned or operated, or both, by a county or municipality may be approved by a proper resolution or ordinance of the county or municipal governing authority owning or operating the airport. A license for such sales, storage, and distribution of distilled spirits may be issued only by the governing authority of a municipality or county in which the sale of alcoholic beverages is lawful.

(b) This Code section shall apply regardless of the location of the airport.

(c) For the purposes of regulating the sale, storage, and distribution of alcoholic beverages, but not for the purposes of taxation, the airport boundaries of an airport owned or operated, or both, by a county or municipality shall be treated:

(1) If the airport is owned or operated, or both, by a county, as though the airport boundaries were located entirely within the boundaries of the county which owns or operates, or owns and operates, the airport; or

(2) If the airport is owned or operated, or both, by a municipality, as though the airport boundaries were located entirely within the corporate limits of that municipality and entirely within the boundaries of the county in which the greater portion of the municipality owning or operating, or owning and operating, the airport lies.

(d) No county or municipality may control, license, regulate, or exercise police powers over the sale, storage, or distribution of alcoholic beverages within the boundaries of an airport owned or operated, or both, by another municipality or county which has lawfully approved the sale in any fashion or storage of any alcoholic beverages within all or part of the municipality or county.

(e) The county or municipality authorized by law to impose and collect taxes on the sale, storage, and distribution of alcoholic beverages at the airport may impose and collect such taxes, unaffected by this Code section; and the county or municipality owning or operating, or both, the airport shall not impose or collect such taxes. The proceeds of the taxes which the county and the municipality are authorized by law to impose and collect on the sale, storage, and distribution of alcoholic beverages at the airport shall be equally divided between the county and the municipality.

(f ) The county or municipality which issues the license pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code section may impose, collect, and receive licensing fees generally paid in connection with the licensing of the sale, storage, and distribution of alcoholic beverages; and any county or municipality that would, apart from this Code section, otherwise license or regulate, or both, the sale, storage, and distribution of alcoholic beverages at the airport shall not impose or receive any such licensing fees unless it is the county or municipality issuing the license.

History

Ga. L. 1968, p. 1441, § 1; Ga. L. 1968, p. 1443, § 1; Code 1933, § 58-828, enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 1316, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 501, § 1; Code 1933,

§ 5A-6501, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1573, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 759, § 1.

Annotations

Cross references. - Construction and regulation of airports generally, T. 6, C. 3.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Entitlement to taxes between municipalities. - Trial court granted an impermissible advisory opinion when the court granted a second city’s request for a declaratory judgment that the second city was authorized to impose and collect taxes on the sale, storage, and distribution of alcoholic beverages at an airport within that city’s limits because the second city failed to show that there was any justiciable controversy; the first city conceded that, under Georgia’s Alcoholic Beverages Code, O.C.G.A. § 3-8-1 et seq., only the second city was authorized to impose and collect taxes on the sale, storage, and distribution of alcoholic beverages at the airport within the city’s limits and that the first city had to refund any alcoholic

beverage taxes that the city received in error for the sale, storage, and distribution of alcohol in portions of the airport located within the corporate boundaries of the second city. City of Atlanta v. City of College Park, 311 Ga. App. 62, 715 S.E.2d 158 (2011). Applicability of sovereign immunity to action between city and county. - In a suit by a city against a county, seeking a portion of tax revenue raised by the county from alcoholic beverage sales, there was a threshold question of whether sovereign immunity applied in suits between political subdivisions of the same sovereign (such as the city and the county), which the trial court had not addressed; therefore, remand was re-

quired. Clayton County v. City of College Park, 301 Ga. 653, 803 S.E.2d 63 (2017). RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 188 et seq., 213.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7 cases, 2011–2019 · leading case: Clayton Cnty. v. City of Coll. Park, 803 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. 2017).
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Clayton Cnty. v. City of Coll. Park, 803 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 18× “In its complaint, the City asserts that since the 1983 enactment of OCGA § 3-8-1 (regulation and taxation of alcoholic beverages at public airports), it has not been receiving the *654 proper amount of alcoholic beverage taxes to which it is entitled, and that the County…”
City of Coll. Park v. Clayton Cnty., 830 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. 2019). · cites it 10× “In its complaint, the City asserts that since the 1983 enactment of OCGA § 3-8-1 (regulation and taxation of alcoholic beverages at public airports), it has not been receiving the proper amount of alcoholic beverage taxes to which it is entitled, and that the County improperly…”
Bellsouth Telecomms., LLC v. Cobb Cnty., 824 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. 2019). · cites it 2× “te a host of scenarios in which, they say, statutes impose upon private parties duties to handle public money without also explicitly authorizing an action to recover for a breach of those duties, including the statute at issue in Clayton County that addresses allocation of tax…”
City of Atlanta v. City of Coll. Park, 715 S.E.2d 158 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 2× “23 OCGA § 3-8-1 (e) provides: The county or municipality authorized by law to impose and collect taxes on the sale, storage, and distribution of alcoholic beverages at the airport may impose and collect such taxes, unaffected by this Code section; and the county or municipality…”
Bellsouth Telecomm., LLC v. Cobb Cnty., 305 Ga. 144 (Ga. 2019). · cites it 2× “te a host of scenarios in which, they say, statutes impose upon private parties duties to handle public money without also explicitly authorizing an action to recover for a breach of those duties, including the statute at issue in Clayton County that addresses allocation of tax…”
Clayton Cnty. v. City of Coll. Park (Ga. 2017). · cites it 17× “In its complaint, the City asserts that since the 1983 enactment of OCGA § 3-8-1 (regulation and taxation of alcoholic beverages at public airports), it has not been receiving the proper amount of alcoholic beverage taxes to which it is entitled, and that the County improperly…”
City of Coll. Park v. Clayton Cnty., 306 Ga. 301 (Ga. 2019). · cites it 10× “In its complaint, the City asserts that since the 1983 enactment of OCGA § 3-8-1 (regulation and taxation of alcoholic beverages at public airports), it has not been receiving the proper amount of alcoholic beverage taxes to which it is entitled, and that the County improperly…”
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