O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 31-10-16 (2019)

Criteria for pronouncing death; immunity from liability

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) A person may be pronounced dead by a qualified physician, by a registered professional nurse or nurse practitioner authorized to make a pronouncement of death under Code Section 31-7-16 or 31-7-176.1, by an advanced practice registered nurse authorized to make a pronouncement of death under subsection (o) of Code Section 43-34-25, or by a physician assistant authorized to make a pronouncement of death under Code Section 31-7-16 or 31-7-176.1 or subsection (j) of Code Section 43-34-103, if it is determined that the individual has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory function or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem.

(b) A person who acts in good faith in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section shall not be liable for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for such act.

(c) The criteria for determining death authorized in subsection (a) of this Code section shall be cumulative to and shall not prohibit the use of other medically recognized criteria for determining death.

History

Code 1933, § 88-1715.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1975, p. 1629, § 1; Code 1933, § 88-1716, enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 723, § 1; Code 1981, § 31-10-70; Code 1981, § 31-10-16, enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 723, § 2; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1392, § 3; Ga. L. 2009, p. 859, § 9/HB 509; Ga. L. 2017, p. 625, § 3/SB 96. The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in subsection (a), inserted ‘‘or nurse practitioner’’, inserted ‘‘31-7-16 or’’, inserted ‘‘by an advanced practice regis-

tered nurse authorized to make a pronouncement of death under subsection (o) of Code Section 43-34-25,’’, and inserted ‘‘Code Section 31-7-16 or 31-7-176.1 or’’.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘Baby Doe Cases: Compromise and Moral Dilemma,’’ see 34 Emory L.J. 545 (1986). For note, ‘‘Incubating for the State: The Precarious Autonomy of Persistently Vegetative and Brain-Dead Pregnant Women,’’ 22 Ga. L. Rev. 1103 (1988).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Cited in State v. Williams, 247 Ga. 200, 275 S.E.2d 62 (1981); Clay v. State, 256 Ga. 797, 353 S.E.2d 517 (1987). RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Tests of death for organ transplant purposes, 76 A.L.R.3d 913.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 3 cases, 1987–2013 · leading case: Hawkins v. DeKalb Med. Ctr., Inc., 721 S.E.2d 131 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
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Hawkins v. DeKalb Med. Ctr., Inc., 721 S.E.2d 131 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 16× “They cited Georgia’s Determination of Death Act, OCGA § 31-10-16, which not only sets forth criteria for determining death, *215 but provides also for immunity in specified circumstances.”
Browder v. State, 751 S.E.2d 354 (Ga. 2013). · cites it 2× “” Citing OCGA § 31-10-16 (a) and Clay v. State, 256 Ga.”
Clay v. State, 353 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1987). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 31-10-16 (a). This contention is inconsistent with the evidence.”
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