O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 31-11-1 (2019)

Findings; declaration of policy

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) The General Assembly finds and determines: (1) That the furnishing of emergency medical services is a matter of substantial importance to the people of this state; (2) That the cost and quality of emergency medical services are matters within the public interest; (3) That it is highly desirable for the state to participate in emergency medical systems communications programs established pursuant to Public Law 93-154, entitled the Emergency Medical Services Systems Act of 1973; (4) That the administration of an emergency medical systems communications program should be the responsibility of the Department of Public Health, acting upon the recommendations of the local entity which coordinates the program; all ambulance services shall be a part of this system even if this system is the 9-1-1 emergency telephone number; (5) That an emergency medical systems communications program in a health district should be operated as economically and efficiently as possible to serve the public welfare and, to achieve this goal, should involve the designation of geographical territories to be serviced by participating ambulance providers and should involve an economic and efficient procedure to distribute emergency calls among

participating ambulance providers serving the same health district; and (6) Any first responder falls under the department’s rules and regulations governing ambulances and can transport only in life-threatening situations or by orders of a licensed physician or when a licensed ambulance cannot respond. (b) The General Assembly therefore declares that, in the exercise of the sovereign powers of the state to safeguard and protect the public health and general well-being of its citizens, it is the public policy of this state to encourage, foster, and promote emergency medical systems communications programs and that such programs shall be accomplished in a manner that is coordinated, orderly, economical, and without unnecessary duplication of services and facilities.

History

Code 1933, § 88-3100, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 1068, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 660, § 3/HB 470; Ga. L. 2009, p. 453, § 1-4/HB 228; Ga. L. 2011, p. 705, § 6-3/HB 214.

Annotations

Cross references. - Emergency telephone number ‘‘9-1-1’’ system, § 46-5-120 et seq. Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2005, the subsection (a) designation preceding paragraph (a)(4) was deleted. Editor’s notes. - The Emergency

Medical Services Systems Act of 1973, P.L. 93-154, referred to in paragraph (a)(3), was repealed by P.L. 99-117 and P.L. 99-129. The Georgia Emergency Medical Systems Communication Program, however, was established pursuant to that Act prior to its repeal. Therefore, the reference in this Code section to that Act is being retained for historical purposes. Law reviews. - For article on the 2011 amendment of this Code section, see 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 147 (2011).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 5 cases, 1985–2019 · leading case: Bricks v. Metro Ambulance Serv., Inc., 338 S.E.2d 438 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
Bricks v. Metro Ambulance Serv., Inc., 338 S.E.2d 438 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 6× “OCGA § 31-11-1. *65 We specifically recognize that in many instances in this state there are ambulances which are not strictly required by law or regulation to serve particular calls, but instead operate independently on a competitive basis.”
Ramsey v. City of Forest Park, 418 S.E.2d 432 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 6× “The important public policy pertaining to emergency medical services is promulgated in OCGA § 31-11-1. “Laws made for the preservation of public order or good morals may not be dispensed with or abrogated by any agreement.”
Thomas v. DeKalb Cnty., 489 S.E.2d 58 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 31-11-1 (a); Anderson v. Little & Davenport Funeral Home, 242 Ga.”
Ortega Et Al. v. Coffey Et Al., 824 S.E.2d 690 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “[And] a fee charged by a governmental organization to assist in defraying the administrative costs of transporting a person to a hospital is not the equivalent of receiving remuneration for providing stated "emergency care," within the meaning of OCGA § 31-11-8 (c). What may…”
Martin v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 551 S.E.2d 415 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “What may constitute a remuneration to a private “person” may not reward and constitute remuneration to a governmental organization having to control its public expenditures carefully while providing “emergency medical services” to those within its boundaries.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.