O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 31-20-5 (2019)

Civil and criminal liability; compliance where other medical treatment may result in sterilization

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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When an operation shall have been performed in compliance with this chapter, no physician duly licensed without restriction to practice medicine and surgery in this state or other person legally participating in the execution of this chapter shall be liable civilly or criminally as a result of such operation or participation therein, except in the case of negligence in the performance of such operation. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed so as to require compliance therewith where medical or surgical treatment for sound therapeutic purposes, by a physician duly licensed without restriction to practice medicine and surgery in this state, is required of any person in this state and where such treatment, at the same time that it serves such purposes, may involve the nullification or destruction of reproductive functions.

History

Ga. L. 1966, p. 453, § 5; Ga. L. 1970, p. 683, § 6.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Claims based on contract barred. Shessel v. Gay, 139 Ga. App. 429, 228 S.E.2d 361 (1976). Sterilization operation. - Since O.C.G.A. § 31-20-5 bars claims based on contract and all other claims, civil or criminal, except one based on the negligent

performance of the sterilization operation, when it is uncontroverted that there was no negligence in the performance of the sterilization operation and that the sterilization procedure was performed in full compliance with O.C.G.A. Ch. 20, T. 31, the patient’s claim, whether based on con-

tract or some other negligence, fell within the scope of O.C.G.A. § 31-20-5, and the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the physician. Cummings v. Dudley, 180 Ga. App. 545, 349 S.E.2d 543 (1986). Written consent to the performance of a possible hysterectomy was not sufficient consent for the performance of a bilateral tubal ligation after obtaining only oral consent thereto. A tubal ligation is a ‘‘sterilization procedure’’ within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 31-20-1(3) and written consent was required when the only purpose served by the performance of the procedure was to prevent a future pregnancy and it served no sound therapeutic purpose which was of any immediate benefit to the patient’s non-reproductive health. Kaplan v. Blank, 204 Ga. App. 378, 419 S.E.2d 127 (1992). Purpose of every sterilization procedure is the prevention of a future pregnancy and to hold that such a purpose, standing alone, constitutes a ‘‘sound therapeutic purpose’’ within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 31-20-5 would effectively negate O.C.G.A. T. 31, Ch. 20. Kaplan v. Blank, 204 Ga. App. 378, 419 S.E.2d 127 (1992).

Operation without consent constitutes technical battery. - Operation performed without the consent of the patient constitutes a technical battery for which a physician may be held liable. Gowen v. Carpenter, 189 Ga. App. 477, 376 S.E.2d 384 (1988). Showing of negligence required. - Since the physician complied with the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 31-20-2, and the patient did not claim that the physician was negligent in performing the vasectomy procedure, claims for negligence, fraud, battery, violations of the Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 et seq., and loss of consortium were barred. Ariemma v. Perlow, 223 Ga. App. 360, 477 S.E.2d 590 (1996). Limitation of actions. - Statute of limitations for battery resulting from an unauthorized operation is the two-year statute of limitations for injuries to the person and the four-year statute of limitations for loss of consortium. Gowen v. Carpenter, 189 Ga. App. 477, 376 S.E.2d 384 (1988); Gowen v. Cady, 189 Ga. App. 473, 376 S.E.2d 390, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 912, 376 S.E.2d 390 (1988).

RESEARCH REFERENCES C.J.S. - 70 C.J.S., Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Health Care Providers, § 181. ALR. - Physicians and surgeons: res ipsa loquitur, or presumption or inference of negligence, in malpractice cases, 82 A.L.R.2d 1262.

Malpractice in appendicitis treatment and surgery, 94 A.L.R.2d 1006. Physician’s or surgeon’s malpractice in connection with diagnosis or treatment of rectal or anal disease, 5 A.L.R.3d 916. Legality of voluntary nontherapeutic sterilization, 35 A.L.R.3d 1444.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 5 cases, 1986–1996 · leading case: Gowen v. Cady, 376 S.E.2d 390 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
Gowen v. Cady, 376 S.E.2d 390 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 8× “The threshold issue to the Cadys’ remaining claims against Gowen is whether they are barred by OCGA § 31-20-5 of the Georgia Voluntary Sterilization Act, OCGA § 31-20-1 et seq.”
Dohn v. Lovell, 370 S.E.2d 789 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 8× “” OCGA § 31-20-5 codifies the other pertinent purpose: “When an operation shall have been performed in compliance with this chapter, no physician duly licensed .”
Ariemma v. Perlow, 477 S.E.2d 590 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 6× “Perlow moved for summary judgment on the ground that Ariemma’s written request for the vasectomy exempted Perlow from liability under OCGA § 31-20-5. The trial court granted Perlow’s motion in two separate orders, and in these two appeals the Ariemmas challenge those orders.”
Cummings v. Dudley, 349 S.E.2d 543 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 6× “107 ( 263 SE2d 145 ) (1980), these issues are mooted by OCGA § 31-20-5 of the Georgia Voluntary Sterilization Act, Ga.”
Kaplan v. Blank, 419 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 6× “) OCGA § 31-20-5. When, however, a sterilization procedure has not been performed in compliance with the consent requirements of the Voluntary Sterilization Act, the procedure was not otherwise lawfully performed and a physician may be held liable for the commission of a battery.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.