O.C.G.A. § 31-7-7 (2019)
Refusal or revocation by public hospital of staff privileges
(a) Whenever any licensed doctor of medicine, doctor of podiatric medicine, doctor of osteopathic medicine, or doctor of dentistry shall make application for permission to treat patients in any hospital owned or operated by the state, any political subdivision thereof, or any municipality, the hospital shall act in a nondiscriminatory manner upon such application expeditiously and without unnecessary delay considering the applicant on the basis of the applicant’s demonstrated training, experience, competence, and availability and reasonable objectives, including, but not limited to, the appropriate utilization of hospital facilities; but in no event shall final action thereon be taken later than 90 days following receipt of the application; provided, however, whenever the applicant is licensed by any governmental entity outside the continental limits of the United States, the hospital shall have 120 days to take action following receipt of the application. This subsection shall apply solely to applications by licensed doctors of medicine, doctors of podiatric medicine, doctors of osteopathic medicine, and doctors of dentistry who are not members of the staff of the hospital in which privileges are sought at the time an application is submitted and by those not privileged, at such time, to practice in such hospital under a previous grant of privileges. The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed so as to repeal the provisions of Code Section 31-7-15, to mandate hospitals to offer or provide any type of service or services not otherwise offered, or to prohibit a hospital with a clinical training program affiliated with a school of medicine from requiring an applicant to have a faculty teaching appointment as a condition of eligibility.
(b) Whenever any hospital owned or operated by the state, any political subdivision thereof, or any municipality shall refuse to grant a licensed doctor of medicine, doctor of podiatric medicine, doctor of osteopathic medicine, or doctor of dentistry the privilege of treating patients in the hospital, wholly or in part, or revoke the privilege of such licensed medical practitioner for treating patients in such hospital, wholly or in part, the hospital shall furnish to the licensed medical practitioner whose privilege has been refused or revoked, within ten days of such action, a written statement of the reasons therefor. (c) The provisions of this Code section shall not be construed to mandate such hospital to grant or to prohibit such hospital from granting staff privileges to other licensed practitioners of the healing arts who are otherwise qualified for staff privileges pursuant to the bylaws of the governing body of the hospital and, in addition, shall not be construed to modify or restrict the rights of health service provider psychologists to be treated in a nondiscriminatory manner as provided in Code Sections 31-7-161 and 31-7-164.
History
Code 1933, § 88-1911, enacted by Ga. L. 1976, p. 326, § 1; Ga. L.
1978, p. 1969, § 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 967, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 561, § 1.
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Nurse-midwife was ‘‘licensed medical practitioner.’’ - Woman licensed by the state as a registered nurse and certified as a nurse-midwife by the American College of Nurse Midwives was a ‘‘licensed medical practitioner’’ as contemplated under O.C.G.A. § 31-7-7. Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Ctr., 705 F. Supp. 1556 (M.D. Ga. 1989). State action immunity. - Provision that staff privilege decisions may be based on ‘‘the appropriate utilization of hospital facilities’’ makes it foreseeable that a hospital authority would engage in anticompetitive conduct through its peer review activities, and, thus, the members of a peer review committee were shielded by state action immunity from a suit for injunctive relief by a doctor who was denied staff privileges. Crosby v. Hospital Auth., 93 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116, 117 S. Ct. 1246, 137 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1997). Hospital held immune from federal antitrust claims. - Hospital which was acting in accordance with the state’s policy to displace competition with regulation in the area of denying or revoking hospital
staff privileges was immune from federal antitrust claims under the ‘‘state action exemption’’ doctrine. Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Ctr., 705 F. Supp. 1556 (M.D. Ga. 1989). Injunction prohibiting hospital from limiting privileges. - Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in denying a hospital’s motion to dissolve an interlocutory and permanent injunction entered in favor of a group of doctors prohibiting the hospital from limiting the doctors from freely exercising their clinical privileges and practicing cardiology at the hospital, despite a resolution by the hospital’s board of directors prohibiting the doctors from exercising the privileges, as the prohibition denied the doctors certain procedural protections which could not be ignored when implementing exclusive provider contracts. Satilla Health Servs., Inc. v. Bell, 280 Ga. App. 123, 633 S.E.2d 575 (2006). Nondiscriminatory bylaws. - Public hospital bylaws excluding physicians who do not have allopathic postgraduate training from the medical staff do not violate O.C.G.A. § 31-7-7 when the by-
laws are rationally related to differences in allopathic and nonallopathic training and promote a legitimate state interest in providing quality health care. Silverstein v. Gwinnett Hosp. Auth., 672 F. Supp. 1444 (N.D. Ga. 1987), aff ’d, 861 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1988). Public hospital bylaw requiring specific postgraduate specialty training or residency in order for physicians to be eligible for admission to the medical staff did not transgress the equal protection or due process rights of osteopathic physicians, nor did it offend the anti-discrimination provisions of O.C.G.A. § 31-7-7(a). Silverstein v. Gwinnett Hosp. Auth., 861 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1988). After the defendant hospital amended the hospital’s bylaws to require the hospi-
tal’s medical/dental staff to have $1 million malpractice insurance, and subsequently terminated plaintiff staff physician’s hospital privileges for failure to provide proof of malpractice insurance coverage, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital on the physician’s Sherman Act claim against the hospital which included unlawful restraint of trade, monopoly, and boycott, and intentional interference with contract since the hospital’s decision was an administrative policy adopted by the hospital in furtherance of the administration, operation, maintenance, and control of the hospital. Stein v. Tri-City Hosp. Auth., 192 Ga. App. 289, 384 S.E.2d 430, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 903, 384 S.E.2d 430 (1989).
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 40A Am. Jur. 2d, Hospitals and Asylums, § 16. C.J.S. - 41 C.J.S., Hospitals, § 29 et seq. ALR. - Propriety of hospital’s conditioning physician’s staff privileges on his carrying professional liability or malpractice insurance, 7 A.L.R.4th 1238. Exclusion of, or discrimination against, physician or surgeon by hospital, 28 A.L.R.5th 107.
Denial by hospital of staff privileges or referrals to physician or other health care practitioner as violation of Sherman Act (15 USCS § 1 et seq.), 89 A.L.R. Fed. 419. What constitutes ‘‘state action’’ rendering public official’s participation in private antitrust activity immune from application of federal antitrust laws, 109 A.L.R. Fed. 758.