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2018 Georgia Code 32-6-111 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 32-6-111 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 32-6-111

TITLE 32 HIGHWAYS, BRIDGES, AND FERRIES

Section 6. Regulation of Maintenance and Use of Public Roads Generally, 32-6-1 through 32-6-248.

ARTICLE 4 LIMITED-ACCESS ROADS

32-6-111. Establishment and maintenance of limited-access roads.

  1. The department or a county or a municipality in this state, acting alone or in cooperation with each other or with any federal, state, or local agency, is authorized and empowered to plan, designate, establish, regulate, abandon, alter, improve, maintain, and provide limited-access public roads wherever the department or such authorities consider that traffic conditions, present or future, justify such special facilities, provided that the term "traffic conditions, present or future, justifying such special facilities" shall be construed to mean a road having present traffic volumes requiring a minimum of four lanes of road or traffic volumes estimated to be accommodated by the road within a period not to exceed 20 years from the date of such consideration that will require a minimum of four lanes of road; provided, further, that within municipalities such authorization for limited-access public roads shall be subject to such municipal consent as may be provided by law, except that such municipal consent is not necessary for any limited-access road if the limited-access road includes space or other provisions for the construction of a heavy rail line as a part of a public transportation system or a rapid busway operating on a designated lane as a part of a public transportation system and such public transportation system is a part of a regional transportation plan developed by the metropolitan planning organization or other such similar body.
  2. The department or a county or a municipality, in addition to the specific powers granted in this article, also shall have and may exercise, relative to limited-access facilities, any and all additional authority vested in them relative to other public roads in their jurisdiction.

(Ga. L. 1955, p. 559, § 3; Code 1933, § 95A-936, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 163, § 1.)

Cross references.

- Manner of operation of motor vehicles on divided highways and controlled-access roadways, § 40-6-50 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Resolution and ordinance authorizing land transfer constituted "municipal consent" as well as "cooperation" between city and the Department of Transportation and thus estopped city from revoking the department's consent to construction of parkway. DOT v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124, 337 S.E.2d 327 (1985).

No need to condemn "right of access" not existing previously.

- Condemnor creating a limited access highway does not have to condemn a purported "right of access" where none has previously existed. DOT v. Hardin, 231 Ga. 359, 201 S.E.2d 441 (1973).

Political subdivisions not liable for each others' torts in joint project.

- While the law authorizes the cooperation of counties and municipal corporations with the Department of Transportation for the purpose of establishing limited access highways, there is nothing in the statute or in the law generally which expressly or by implication makes one of the cooperating governmental entities liable for the unilateral tortious acts of another cooperating governmental entity in a project of this type. Madden v. Fulton County, 102 Ga. App. 19, 115 S.E.2d 406 (1960).

Courts may, and the Court of Appeals does, take judicial cognizance that municipalities and counties are separately created and possess divergent powers; accordingly, the unilateral action of one may not be construed as imposing liability upon the other even though the action taken by the one may be under a statute authorizing a cooperative effort. Madden v. Fulton County, 102 Ga. App. 19, 115 S.E.2d 406 (1960).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Validity of restrictions as to points at which jitney bus passengers may be taken on and discharged, 6 A.L.R. 110.

Effect of expiration of charter of turnpike or tollroad company on title to road, 30 A.L.R. 206.

Abutting owner's right to damages or other relief for loss of access because of limited-access highway or street, 43 A.L.R.2d 1072; 42 A.L.R.3d 13; 42 A.L.R.3d 148.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 32-6-111

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Dep't of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 337 S.E.2d 327 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 40 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 8, 1985 | 255 Ga. 124

...f the present legislature, that body, as the law-making branch of the government, may enact such laws as it sees fit to effectuate that intent. 4. The DOT contends that the city may not withdraw its consent *136 for construction of the Parkway. OCGA § 32-6-111 (a) states that limited access roads may be planned, built, and maintained in municipalities, "provided, further, that within such municipalities such authorization shall be subject to such municipal consent as may be provided by law." Th...
...DOT may be "authorized by *142 law" to acquire private property from private individuals through devise. The DOT is not "authorized by law" to acquire public property by devise or by condemnation. Furthermore, as noted previously in Division 4, OCGA § 32-6-111 (a) provides that authorization to "plan, designate, establish, regulate, abandon, alter, improve, maintain, and provide" limited access facilities within municipalities "shall be subject to such municipal consent as may be provided by law." This statute applies to limited access facilities that lie within municipalities, not just limited access facilities upon municipal property. The DOT's reading of OCGA § 32-6-112 conflicts with OCGA § 32-6-111 (a), in that Code § 32-6-111 (a) requires municipal consent, and Code § 32-6-112 would, in the next breath, enable the DOT to render that requirement useless....
...it can be done. No doubt courts could sometimes better legislation by rejecting some of the words delivered to them by the legislature for construction; but to do this courts have no power." Smith v. Davis, 85 Ga. 625, 631 (11 SE 1024) (1890). OCGA § 32-6-111 (a) not only distinguishes condemnation from other methods of property acquisition under OCGA § 32-6-112, it also supports the appellee's position that the legislature did not intend to expand the DOT's power and authorize condemnation of public property in enacting OCGA § 32-6-112....