O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 32-6-131 (2019)

Permit requirement as to construction or improvement of commercial driveways; authority of department to close driveways for violations

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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It shall be unlawful for any person to construct a new commercial driveway or to reconstruct, alter, or improve any existing commercial driveway without first obtaining a permit from the department therefor and complying with the department regulations authorized by Code Section 32-6-133. A violation of this Code section, in addition to being unlawful, shall entitle the department to barricade, displace, or otherwise close such driveway and to collect the costs therefor from the violator as provided in Code Section 32-6-134.

History

Code 1933, § 95A-943, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 34.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Purpose of section. - By requiring permits for commercial access to state roads, the legislative intent was to promote public safety by mandating Department of Transportation oversight as to whether, among other things, every new or changed commercial driveway is, in

fact, safe to the public. Keith v. Beard, 219 Ga. App. 190, 464 S.E.2d 633 (1995). Construction of unpermitted driveway negligence per se. - Motorcyclist who was injured in a collision with a vehicle that pulled out from an unpermitted commercial driveway into

the motorcyclist’s path was within the category of persons protected by O.C.G.A. § 32-6-131 and, from the evidence, the jury could determine that the construction or maintenance of the driveway in violation of that section would be negligence per se. Keith v. Beard, 219 Ga. App. 190, 464 S.E.2d 633 (1995). Exclusion of evidence proper. - In a wrongful death action, the trial court did not err by granting the defendants’ motion in limine to exclude evidence related to an alleged violation of O.C.G.A. § 32-6-131 with regard to the plaintiff ’s allegation that the defendants violated § 32-6-131

or were negligent per se in failing to get a permit for a speed bump in which the decedent collided as the trial court properly reasoned that the relationship between the permitting process, the speed-bump, and the accident involving the decedent was too tenuous, making the evidence irrelevant; the plaintiff failed to include the theory of the alleged statutory and regulatory violation in the pretrial order; and the plaintiff failed to provide the defendants’ counsel with notice of the regulations until the day before trial. Land v. Ricks, 288 Ga. App. 497, 654 S.E.2d 643 (2007).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 6 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1985–2023 · leading case: Keith v. Beard, 464 S.E.2d 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).

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Keith v. Beard, 464 S.E.2d 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 10× “Although Beard has admitted he failed to obtain a commercial driveway permit as required by OCGA § 32-6-131, he contends the failure to obtain the proper permit constituted neither negligence per se nor negligence and was not the proximate cause of the accident on February 22,…”

King Cotton, Ltd. v. Powers, 380 S.E.2d 481 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 4× “lication from King Cotton and subsequent permit issued by the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) pursuant to OCGA § 32-6-131, and a conveyance of access rights from King Cotton's predecessor in title granting to the DOT all rights to exit the gin property anywhere along…”

Land v. Ricks, 654 S.E.2d 643 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 6× “Land next argues that the trial court erred by granting the appellees’ motion in limine to exclude evidence related to an alleged violation of OCGA § 32-6-131 by appellees. “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine only for an abuse of discretion.”

Dep't of Transp. v. Pilgrim, 333 S.E.2d 866 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 2× “They are deemed abandoned. Court of Appeals Rule 15 (c) (2); Trowell v.”

Benton v. Chatham Cnty., 425 S.E.2d 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “The jury was instructed, regarding the pertinent provisions of OCGA §§ 32-6-131 and 32-6-133, including respectively, the requirement to obtain a permit to construct a new commercial driveway or to alter an existing one and that in promulgating reasonable regulations in…”

Georgia Dep't of Transp. v. James B. White, Jr. (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 2× “[that] specify among other things the circumstances under which commercial driveway permits may be issued or revoked, provided that such regulations shall not deprive the landowner of reasonable access to the public road on the state highway system.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.