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Call Now: 904-383-7448It shall be unlawful for any person to construct a new commercial driveway or to reconstruct, alter, or improve any existing commercial driveway without first obtaining a permit from the department therefor and complying with the department regulations authorized by Code Section 32-6-133. A violation of this Code section, in addition to being unlawful, shall entitle the department to barricade, displace, or otherwise close such driveway and to collect the costs therefor from the violator as provided in Code Section 32-6-134.
(Code 1933, § 95A-943, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 34.)
- By requiring permits for commercial access to state roads, the legislative intent was to promote public safety by mandating Department of Transportation oversight as to whether, among other things, every new or changed commercial driveway is, in fact, safe to the public. Keith v. Beard, 219 Ga. App. 190, 464 S.E.2d 633 (1995).
- Motorcyclist who was injured in a collision with a vehicle that pulled out from an unpermitted commercial driveway into the motorcyclist's path was within the category of persons protected by O.C.G.A. § 32-6-131 and, from the evidence, the jury could determine that the construction or maintenance of the driveway in violation of that section would be negligence per se. Keith v. Beard, 219 Ga. App. 190, 464 S.E.2d 633 (1995).
- In a wrongful death action, the trial court did not err by granting the defendants' motion in limine to exclude evidence related to an alleged violation of O.C.G.A. § 32-6-131 with regard to the plaintiff's allegation that the defendants violated § 32-6-131 or were negligent per se in failing to get a permit for a speed bump in which the decedent collided as the trial court properly reasoned that the relationship between the permitting process, the speed-bump, and the accident involving the decedent was too tenuous, making the evidence irrelevant; the plaintiff failed to include the theory of the alleged statutory and regulatory violation in the pretrial order; and the plaintiff failed to provide the defendants' counsel with notice of the regulations until the day before trial. Land v. Ricks, 288 Ga. App. 497, 654 S.E.2d 643 (2007).
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