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2018 Georgia Code 32-6-83 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 32-6-83 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 32-6-83

TITLE 32 HIGHWAYS, BRIDGES, AND FERRIES

Section 6. Regulation of Maintenance and Use of Public Roads Generally, 32-6-1 through 32-6-248.

ARTICLE 3 CONTROL OF SIGNS AND SIGNALS

32-6-83. Acquisition by municipal corporation or county of outdoor advertising which does not comply with requirements of applicable ordinances, regulations, or resolutions.

Any municipal corporation or county is authorized to acquire by purchase, gift, or condemnation and to pay just compensation for any property rights in outdoor advertising signs, displays, and devices which were lawfully erected but which do not conform with the provisions of any lawful ordinance, regulation, or resolution or which at a later date fail to comply with the provisions of any lawful ordinance, regulation, or resolution due to changed conditions beyond the control of the sign owner. No municipal corporation or county shall remove or cause to be removed any such nonconforming outdoor advertising sign, display, or device without paying just compensation. Such compensation shall be paid in accordance with the conditions stated in Code Section 32-6-84. For the purposes of this Code section, the term "devices" means light, lighting fixtures, or other fixtures which are permanently attached to an advertising sign or display.

(Ga. L. 1967, p. 423, § 8; Code 1933, § 95A-923.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1979, p. 803, § 1.)

Law reviews.

- For article surveying legislative and judicial developments in Georgia local government law for 1978-79, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 155 (1979).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

County ordinance violated O.C.G.A. § 32-6-83 since the ordinance provided that a nonconforming sign damaged by weather or an act of God could not be repaired or reerected. State v. Hartrampf, 273 Ga. 522, 544 S.E.2d 130 (2001).

Just compensation.

- County sign ordinance was unconstitutional since the ordinance conflicted with O.C.G.A. § 32-6-83 requiring the payment of just compensation after the county acquired an owner's property rights when an advertiser attempted to repair a nonconforming outdoor advertising sign damaged by a tornado and the ordinance contained no provision for paying compensation. Thus, the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the county was erroneous when the county failed to pay the advertiser just compensation for taking of the advertiser's sign. Outdoor Sys. v. Cobb County, 274 Ga. 611, 555 S.E.2d 435 (2001).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Municipal power as to billboards and outdoor advertising, 58 A.L.R.2d 1314.

Municipality's power to permit private owner to construct building or structure overhanging or crossing the air space above public street or sidewalk, 76 A.L.R.2d 896.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 32-6-83

Total Results: 2  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. Cobb Cnty., 555 S.E.2d 689 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 19, 2001 | 274 Ga. 606, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 3487

...titutionality of the Sign Ordinance. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Cobb County as to all claims, and Outdoor appeals that order. 1. Outdoor contends that summary judgment was erroneous because § 134-346 conflicts with OCGA § 32-6-83 and is, therefore, void and unenforceable under Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(a) of the Georgia Constitution. OCGA § 32-6-83 requires the payment of "just compensation" when a county acquires an owner's property rights in a nonconforming outdoor advertising sign....
...Thus, a sufficient attack on the constitutionality of the ordinance was raised in the BZA. Moreover, in State v. Hartrampf, 273 Ga. 522, 523, 544 S.E.2d 130 (2001), which was decided just six months ago, we held that § 134-346 violates the Georgia Constitution because it "operates to create the situation prohibited by OCGA § 32-6-83; assuming that a sign has been damaged and, under the ordinance is in a condition so as not to be repaired, the ordinance effects its removal without compensation." Here, Cobb County revoked Outdoor's permit in reliance on § 134-346, contending that the sign, as the result of an Act of God, was in a condition such that repair was prohibited. Cobb County does not contend that, in revoking the permit under § 134-346, it paid Outdoor the compensation mandated by OCGA § 32-6-83....
...See also Osteen v. Osteen, 244 Ga. 445, 260 S.E.2d 321 (1979); Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Gwynes, 153 Ga. 606, 113 S.E. 183 (1922) (judicial notice in certiorari actions). Cobb had no vested right in enforcement of one of its ordinances which conflicts with OCGA § 32-6-83 and which is, therefore, unconstitutional....
...administrative body that an ordinance is unconstitutional in order to preserve any and all arguments that the ordinance is unconstitutional. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent. Outdoor contends that application of the sign ordinance offends OCGA § 32-6-83....
...[1] If *692 true, the ordinance would violate Article III, Section VI, Paragraph IV(a) of the State Constitution. See State v. Hartrampf, 273 Ga. 522, 523-524, 544 S.E.2d 130 (2001) (2001), which Outdoor contends controls this case. But Outdoor did not make a challenge concerning OCGA § 32-6-83 or Hartrampf until its "Second Amendment to Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Complaint," which was not filed until the County's motion for summary judgment was pending in the superior court, well over a year after the BZA had acted....
...situation." State Bd. of Equalization v. Trailer Train Co., 253 Ga. 449, 450, 320 S.E.2d 758 (1984). Neither Outdoor's written appeal to the BZA, nor its statements at the BZA hearing, made any mention of any conflict between the ordinance and OCGA § 32-6-83....
...dinance], and [which] focused the [BZA]'s attention upon the factors which might have rendered the classification unconstitutional." Merely stating that the ordinance was unconstitutional did not achieve that in regard to any challenge based on OCGA § 32-6-83....
...epriving Outdoor of all economically viable use of the property. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). That is the only claim Outdoor made to the BZA, in writing or orally. But OCGA § 32-6-83 is concerned merely with the removal of signs. OCGA § 32-6-83 does not address whether operation of the ordinance would deprive Outdoor of all economically viable use of its property, nor does an argument of a Fifth Amendment taking involve specific questions pertaining to OCGA § 32-6-83....
...at issue there did so. Id. at 523-524, 544 S.E.2d 130. For Outdoor to claim the benefit of the application of the principle addressed in Hartrampf, Outdoor must timely raise the claim that application of the ordinance in its case would violate OCGA § 32-6-83....
...As the BZA was *693 given no opportunity to address the argument, and in fact never heard of this attack on the ordinance until more than a year had passed after it acted, this Court cannot, at least by its precedents to date, countenance the untimely assertion that the ordinance conflicts with OCGA § 32-6-83 and therefore violates Article III, Section VI, Paragraph IV(a) of the State Constitution. We should affirm the trial court on this issue and address the remaining enumerations of error. I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice SEARS and Justice BENHAM join in this dissent. NOTES [1] OCGA § 32-6-83 provides in part that [a]ny......
...the control of the sign owner. No ... county shall remove or cause to be removed any such nonconforming outdoor advertising sign, display, or device without paying just compensation. [2] Among issues which are crucial to the question of whether OCGA § 32-6-83 may apply, but which are outside a takings analysis, are whether any violation of the ordinance was "beyond the control of the sign owner," or its predecessor in title, and whether the sign was "lawfully erected." The County contested thes...
...m in its "Second Amendment to Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Complaint." The County did not raise these issues before the BZA as they were simply not relevant to the taking question and Outdoor had not yet introduced any challenge based on OCGA § 32-6-83.
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State v. Hartrampf, 544 S.E.2d 130 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 2, 2001 | 273 Ga. 522, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 807

...ing Sign Ordinance § 134-346 unconstitutional as applied. But we do not reach the court's ruling that the ordinance's application violates the takings clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions. This appeal is controlled by the language of OCGA § 32-6-83....
...Cobb County Sign Ordinance § 134-346(h). If a sign does not meet the requirements of the ordinance, the county "may cause the removal" of the sign. Cobb County Sign Ordinance § 134-346(f). Thus, the ordinance operates to create the situation prohibited by OCGA § 32-6-83; assuming that a sign has been damaged and, under the ordinance is in a condition so as not to be repaired, the ordinance effects its removal without compensation. Here, criminal charges were based on the premise that, under the ordinance, the sign was in a condition such that repair was prohibited, and this application of the ordinance violates OCGA § 32-6-83....
...Local ordinances may not conflict with State statutes. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(a). Thus, the proposed application of the ordinance would violate the State Constitution. See Jenkins v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758, 75 S.E.2d 815 (1953). The County contends that OCGA § 32-6-83 does not apply because Action Outdoor did not have a lawful right to use the sign at the time of the tornado damage because the lot was a non-conforming size and had no means of ingress and egress. [3] However, the lot size and access problems were a result of the 1982 condemnation, and were "changed conditions beyond the control of the sign owner." OCGA § 32-6-83....
...ucture, and that the 1982 condemnation did not condemn the sign, only a portion of the lot. If the sign placement was rendered illegal by the condemnation and consequent failure to comply with the County's ordinance, the County could not, under OCGA § 32-6-83, "cause [it] to be removed" by operation of an ordinance without compensation....
...s a "changed condition[ ] beyond the control of the sign owner," and no ordinance could result in the sign's removal without compensation. Cobb *133 County Sign Ordinance § 134-346 is inapplicable here because it would operate to do that which OCGA § 32-6-83 declares it may not do....