Classification for tax on gross insurance premiums is constitutionally permissible.

- The General Assembly may classify different businesses for the purpose of taxation and may make subclassifications within one type of business. These classifications have been held constitutional where there was a business tax involved as opposed to a property tax. A tax on gross insurance premiums is a business tax. Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966).

Section not "irrevocable" in violation of Constitution.

- Neither Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. VII, nor Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I (see, now, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X, and Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I), is applicable to this section, because the constitutional provisions contain the words "irrevocable" and "irrevocably," respectively. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "irrevocable" as "incapable of being recalled or revoked." Statutes passed by the General Assembly such as this section are clearly revocable at the will of the Legislature. Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966).

Enactment of section held constitutional.

- The Act enacting this section, Ga. L. 1964, p. 122, which empowered only municipal corporations to levy life insurance taxes and fees and prohibited all other political subdivisions from doing so, did not prevent there being uniformity of the laws. Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966) (decided prior to 1981 amendment to this section and enactment of § 33-8-8.1)

The Act enacting this section, Ga. L. 1964, p. 122, did not refer to more than one subject matter even though it dealt with the powers of both county and municipal government, since the act dealt with the taxing of insurance company premiums and that alone was the subject matter of the act. Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966).

Even though the title of Ga. L. 1964, p. 122, enacting this section, did not indicate that the Act dealt with business licenses issued by the county, the words "fees and taxes" as used in the title were sufficient to include those various and specific types which were set out in detail in the body of the Act, including business licenses. Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966).

Even though no reference was made in the title that the purpose of Ga. L. 1964, p. 122, which enacted this section, was to preempt to the state the field of imposing taxes upon life insurance companies, the title did state that the Act was to "provide a uniform policy," and there could be no such uniform policy established in this field unless total authority in this matter was preempted and placed into one policy-making body, in this case the General Assembly. The fact that the body of the Act mentioned preemption did not violate the Constitution because it was incidental and necessary to carry out the purpose of establishing a uniform policy. Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966).

Even though there was no reference in the title to the provision in Ga. L. 1964, p. 122, enacting this section, that no county or unincorporated area should be permitted to impose, levy, or charge any of the taxes and fees mentioned therein, no reference in the title had to be specifically made to the fact that no county or unincorporated area thereof could impose such taxes and fees under the Act, since the title sufficiently covered this provision by stating that the Act involved the "exercise of the powers of municipal corporations and other political subdivisions." This phrase was sufficient to cover both the granting and the taking of power from the various political subdivisions in the establishment of a uniform policy. Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966).

Independent agencies held not subject to assessment of multiple license fees.

- Independent insurance agencies which furnished and paid for their own offices and supplies, and retained a percentage of the premiums on the policies they sold, were not subject to the assessment of multiple license fees as agencies "operated and maintained" by an insurer. Columbus v. Stanton, 189 Ga. App. 251, 375 S.E.2d 503 (1988).

Municipalities may impose both license fees and gross premium taxes on life insurance companies.

- Subsection (b) of this section authorizes only municipalities to levy a license fee and divides all municipalities into seven population categories with fees ranging from $15.00 to $150.00 per annum depending upon which classification a municipality falls within. This subsection also authorizes municipalities to impose a tax based upon gross direct premiums received by life insurance companies. Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966).

Municipal tax cannot be based upon premiums received in current year.

- Under this section, a municipality may not collect premium taxes upon the premiums received by a life insurance company during the current calendar year rather than the preceding calendar year from policies upon the lives of persons residing within the municipal limits. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 673.

Tax paid upon current year premiums, cannot be deducted from state taxes.

- If an insurance company pays municipal taxes assessed upon the current rather than the preceding calendar year's business, the Insurance Commissioner may not allow such payment to be deducted from the premium taxes otherwise payable to this state under § 33-8-4. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 673.