CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 28, 2014 | 757 S.E.2d 96, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 684, 29 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1376, 37 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1749
...APPLE INC.
NAHMIAS, Justice.
In 2000, the General Assembly enacted legislation to assist employers in
protecting their workplaces and employees from potential violence. See Ga. L.
2000, p. 1081, § 1. The statute was codified as OCGA §
34-1-7, which says:
Any employer whose employee has suffered unlawful
violence or a credible threat of violence from any individual, which
can reasonably be construed to have been carried out at the...
...ohibiting further unlawful
violence or threats of violence by that individual at the employee’s
workplace or while the employee is acting within the course and
scope of employment with the employer. . . .
OCGA §
34-1-7 (b).1
1
OCGA §
34-1-7 (a) (4) defines “unlawful violence” to include “stalking, as prohibited by
Code Section ....
...serves no legitimate purpose. This Code section shall not be construed to require that
an overt threat of death or bodily injury has been made.
OCGA §
16-5-90 (a) (1). “Credible threat of violence” is defined in OCGA §
34-1-7 (a) (2) to mean
“a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct which would cause a reasonable person to
believe that he or she is under threat of death or serious bodily injury, and which is intended to, and
which actually causes, a person to believe that he or she is under threat of death or serious bodily
In late 2012, appellee Apple Inc. petitioned for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and an injunction under OCGA §
34-1-7 against appellant
Catherine Danforth, a former employee who had worked at the Apple store at
Lenox Square Mall in Atlanta. After a TRO was entered pursuant to OCGA §
34-1-7 (d), the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition for an
injunction pursuant to OCGA §
34-1-7 (e).2 In an order entered on January 17,
2013, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Danforth had
a history of mental illness, which included a prior suicide attempt and
hospitalization in a mental health facility w...
...exhibited
behavior that caused Apple’s employees to reasonably fear for their safety; that
she had continued to contact Apple employees following her termination even
injury, and which serves no legitimate purpose.”
2
OCGA §
34-1-7 (e) says:
Within ten days of filing of the petition under this Code section or as soon as
practical thereafter, but in no case later than 30 days after the filing of the petition,
a hearing shall be held on the petition for the injunction....
... Danforth filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.3 Danforth, who
appeared pro se in the trial court, is represented by counsel on appeal. She
argues that the evidence presented to the trial court was insufficient to support
an injunction under OCGA §
34-1-7 and that the injunction that was issued is
overbroad. As explained below, the evidence was legally sufficient to support
the issuance of an injunction under OCGA §
34-1-7. However, Apple sought
relief under OCGA §
34-1-7 alone, and the injunction exceeds the scope
authorized by that statute to some extent. Accordingly, we affirm the injunction
order in part and vacate it in part, and we remand the case to the trial court for
the entry of an injunction fully consistent with OCGA §
34-1-7.
1. Danforth argues first that the evidence presented to the trial court
was insufficient to support the issuance of an injunction under OCGA §
34-1-7.
We disagree.
3
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court because the appeal challenges not just the legal basis for
the injunctive relief but also its proper scope....
...have rendered a
judgment based upon equitable principles, and that decision must be the primary issue on appeal.”).
3
(a) Georgia’s appellate courts have not previously construed OCGA §
34-1-7, which establishes clear and convincing evidence as the standard of proof
for the issuance of an injunction to protect an employer’s workplace and
employees. See OCGA §
34-1-7 (e)....
...Thus, the reviewing court must view the evidence,
and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the
4
judgment. See Srinivasa,
269 Ga. at 737-738. We hold that this standard of
review applies to evidentiary challenges to an injunction issued under OCGA
§
34-1-7.
(b) So viewed, the evidence presented to the trial court at the injunction
hearing showed the following....
...On November 20, Campbell
saw Danforth a second time in the area of the Lenox Square parking lot used by
most Apple store employees.
On November 21, 2012, Apple filed a petition in the Superior Court of
Fulton County seeking a TRO and an injunction against Danforth under OCGA
§
34-1-7 on the ground that, after Apple terminated her employment, Danforth
“engaged in an escalating scheme of threatening and harassing stalking
primarily directed at three Lenox store management employees” — Heggan,
Campbell, and Lane ...
...mployees. On
November 26, after Apple tried to serve the TRO and discovered that Danforth
actually resided in Cobb County, the Fulton County court transferred the case
to the Superior Court of Cobb County (“trial court”). See OCGA §
34-1-7 (c)
(1) (prescribing venue for OCGA §
34-1-7 petitions).
Despite the TRO, Danforth continued to contact Apple’s employees by
copying them on e-mails that she sent to Apple’s outside legal counsel....
...authorize a rational trier of fact to find by clear and convincing evidence that
Danforth engaged in “unlawful violence” against Apple employees by stalking
them, “which can reasonably be construed to have been carried out at the
employee[s’] workplace.” OCGA §
34-1-7 (b)....
...10
witnesses and against Danforth, and to resolve other factual disputes and make
other reasonable inferences in Apple’s favor.4 Accordingly, the trial court was
authorized to grant Apple an injunction under OCGA §
34-1-7 (e) prohibiting
Danforth from engaging in further unlawful violence against Apple’s employees
at the workplace or while acting within the course and scope of their
employment.5
2....
...Because the evidence of “unlawful violence” supports the issuance of an injunction in this
case, we need not address Apple’s contention that the evidence also established a “credible threat
of violence,” as that phrase is defined in OCGA §
34-1-7 (a) (2), that would also support an
injunction.
11
exceeds the scope authorized by OCGA §
34-1-7. See Bd. of Commrs. of
Spalding County v. Stewart,
284 Ga. 573, 575 (668 SE2d 644) (2008)
(explaining that an injunction must be tailored to the facts and law of the
particular case). The injunctions authorized by OCGA §
34-1-7 (e) are limited
to “prohibiting further unlawful violence or threats of violence at the employee’s
workplace or while the employee is acting within the course and scope of
employment with the employer.” (Emphasis added.) The eviden...
...demonstrates that Danforth poses a threat to Apple as an employer and to its
employees. The injunction first bars Danforth from entering any Apple
workplace — any store, office, or facility — and thus comes fairly within the
scope authorized by OCGA §
34-1-7 (e)....
...dia with a person
anywhere in the world who happens to be an Apple employee, even if Danforth
is unaware of that person’s connection to Apple and the communication has
nothing to do with Apple or her unhappy relationship with Apple.
OCGA §
34-1-7 gives employers standing to obtain protective orders
based on unlawful violence and credible threats of violence directed against
13
their employees — but only with respect to those persons as employees. Thus,
the injunction that is supported by the evidence in this case may extend only as
far as Apple’s workplace and Apple’s employees while “acting within the
course and scope of [their] employment with [their] employer.” OCGA §
34-1-7
(e)....
...To the extent, however,
that the second and third restrictions in the injunction apply on their face even
to contacts that Danforth has with persons who happen to be employed by
Apple, for reasons that have nothing to do with Apple or their employment with
that company, the injunction exceeds the scope authorized by OCGA §
34-1-7.
Accordingly, we affirm the injunction order to the extent that the trial
court ruled that the evidence supports an injunction under OCGA §
34-1-7, but
we must vacate the injunction and remand the case to the trial court for the entry
of a new injunction that is fully consistent with OCGA §
34-1-7 (e).
14
Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and case remanded with
direction....
