O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 34-7-6 (2019)

Professional employer organizations; rights, powers, and responsibilities

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) As used in this Code section, the term ‘‘professional employer organization’’ means an employee leasing company as defined in Code Section 34-8-32 that has established a coemployment relationship with another employer, pays the wages of the employees of the coemployer, reserves a right of direction and control over the employees of the coemployer, and assumes responsibility for the withholding and payment of payroll taxes of the coemployer. (b) A professional employer organization may collect information to evaluate costs; may obtain life, accident and sickness, disability income, workers’ compensation, and other types of insurance coverage; may establish retirement plans; may have other types of employee benefits; and may discuss such benefits with prospective coemployers and their employees. (c) A coemployer of a professional employer organization shall retain sufficient direction and control over the employees involved in a coemployment relationship as is necessary to conduct its business operations and fulfill its obligations to such employees. Unless otherwise agreed in writing, such coemployer shall be considered to be the sole employer of such employees for licensing purposes, provided that nothing contained in this Code section shall be deemed to prohibit a professional employer organization and its coemployer from agreeing that the professional employer organization shall be considered to be an employer for licensing purposes. The professional employer organization shall give written notice of such an agreement to the appropriate licensing agency and to the employees involved. (d) It is the intent of this Code section that professional employer organizations shall be considered to be employers under this title and are required to comply with the provisions of Code Sections 34-8-32, 34-8-34, and 34-8-172. Professional employer organizations and their coemployer clients are entitled to exclusive remedy under Code Section

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 5 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 2017–2025 · leading case: Coleman v. H2S Holdings, LLC, 230 F. Supp. 3d 1313 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
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Coleman v. H2S Holdings, LLC, 230 F. Supp. 3d 1313 (N.D. Ga. 2017). · cites it 5× “See O.C.G.A. § 34-7-6(a), (d). Title 34 of the Georgia Code never specifies that employers must provide notice to an employee of that employee’s termination.”
Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Zep, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 2× “In doing so, the Appellate Division explained that unlike professional employer organizations or employee leasing companies — which under OCGA § 34-7-6 are considered co-employers — temporary help contracting firms are in the business of employing individuals and, for…”
Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Zep, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 2× “In doing so, the Appellate Division explained that unlike professional employer organizations or employee leasing companies — which under OCGA § 34-7-6 are considered co-employers — temporary help contracting firms are in the business of employing individuals and, for…”
Halo Human Resources, LLC v. Am. Dental of LaGrange LLC (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2025). · cites it 2× “Plaintiff’s Allegations & Claims Plaintiff is a professional employer organization (“PEO”) as that term is defined in O.C.G.A. § 34-7-6. It works as an employee leasing company as defined in O.”
Brandon L. Coleman v. Oasis Outsourcing, Inc. (11th Cir. 2019). “The district court agreed with Coleman’s arguments that PEOs qualify as employers under Georgia law, O.C.G.A. § 34-7-6(d), and that at-will employees can recover under a breach of contract theory in certain circumstances, see Walker Elec.”
— 34-7-6(a) — 1 case
Coleman v. H2S Holdings, LLC, 230 F. Supp. 3d 1313 (N.D. Ga. 2017). “See O.C.G.A. § 34-7-6(a), (d). Title 34 of the Georgia Code never specifies that employers must provide notice to an employee of that employee’s termination.”
— 34-7-6(d) — 2 cases
Coleman v. H2S Holdings, LLC, 230 F. Supp. 3d 1313 (N.D. Ga. 2017). “See O.C.G.A. § 34-7-6(a), (d). Title 34 of the Georgia Code never specifies that employers must provide notice to an employee of that employee’s termination.”
Brandon L. Coleman v. Oasis Outsourcing, Inc. (11th Cir. 2019). “The district court agreed with Coleman’s arguments that PEOs qualify as employers under Georgia law, O.C.G.A. § 34-7-6(d), and that at-will employees can recover under a breach of contract theory in certain circumstances, see Walker Elec.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.