O.C.G.A. § 34-9-100 (2019)

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 1995, p. 642, § 13, not codified by the General Assembly, provides for severability. Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘Workers’

Compensation,’’ see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 521 (2001). For survey article on workers’ compensation law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 463 (2007).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Former Code 1933, § 114-706 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-100) must be construed in pari materia with other sections of the workers’ compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) and with former Code 1933, § 114-307 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104) in particular. Arnold v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 94 Ga. App. 493, 95 S.E.2d 29 (1956); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. White, 103 Ga. App. 607, 120 S.E.2d 144 (1961). Expeditious determination of claims intended. - It was clear from this section that the General Assembly contemplated an expeditious determination of claims filed under the workers’ compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Ogden v. Clark Thread Co., 93 Ga. App. 227, 91 S.E.2d 191 (1956). Administrative law judge can summarily dispose of a claim for benefits when the underlying issues between the same parties have already been heard and determined. Continental Baking Co. v. Brock, 198 Ga. App. 578, 402 S.E.2d 331 (1991). Force and effect of board’s decision. - A decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board has the same force and effect as the decision or judgment of any other tribunal. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Webb, 109 Ga. App. 667, 137 S.E.2d 362 (1964). ‘‘Claim’’ construed. - The word ‘‘claim,’’ as used in former Code 1933,

§ 114-305 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82), was coextensive with ‘‘case’’, and embraced the counterclaim of an employee as well as the claim of the employer. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Maloney, 56 Ga. App. 74, 192 S.E. 320 (1937). Workers’ compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) does not require any special kind of claim to be filed. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Layfield, 61 Ga. App. 1, 5 S.E.2d 610 (1939). Application by either party authorized. - When the employee and the employer or insurance carrier fail to agree as to payment of compensation, either party may make application to the board for a hearing in regard to any matter at issue and for a ruling thereon. Bailey-Lewis-Williams of Ga., Inc. v. Thomas, 103 Ga. App. 279, 119 S.E.2d 141 (1961). Power to add parties. - Administrative law judge had the power to add a party to a claim, and also had the jurisdiction and power to determine the legal question of whether the added party was the alter ego of the employer. Morgan v. Palace Indus., Inc., 195 Ga. App. 80, 392 S.E.2d 315 (1990). Claimant not required to file claim in addition to answer. - When employer instituted or filed a case seeking a hearing in regard to the matter at issue

and employee responded, it was unnecessary for employee to file a claim other than the one set up in the employee’s answer, so long as the case was pending. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Maloney, 56 Ga. App. 74, 192 S.E. 320 (1937). Injunctions. - If the employer has initiated a hearing under this section, the employee cannot enjoin proceedings in a court of equity for the reason that the employee has an adequate remedy at law to object before the board to the jurisdiction of that body. State Hwy. Dep’t v. Cooper, 104 Ga. App. 130, 121 S.E.2d 258 (1961). Withdrawal of claim before hearing. - If a claim was withdrawn by the party filing it before a hearing was had, it was as though no claim was filed, and the board would be without jurisdiction to entertain a second claim filed after the expiration of the statutory limitation for which provision was made in former Code 1933, § 114-305 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82); however, when a claim was filed within the statutory period and never withdrawn, the board may entertain the claim at any time thereafter. Ogden v. Clark Thread Co., 93 Ga. App. 227, 91 S.E.2d 191 (1956) (decided prior to 1985 amendment which added subsection (d) (now (e))). Statute of limitations not applicable when case pending. - When ‘‘case’’ or ‘‘claim’’ of employer and appearance and answer of employee were all filed within 12 months, and none of them had ever been withdrawn with the approval or consent of the court or department (now board), and the case was continued, it was still pending, and while so pending could be reset and tried; consequently, the statute of limitations did not apply. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Maloney, 56 Ga. App. 74, 192 S.E. 320 (1937). Objection to board’s jurisdiction. - When a hearing is requested and notice is given, a person so notified may object to the jurisdiction of the industrial commission (now board of workers’ compensation) on any ground that will show an absence of authority of the commission (board) to inquire into the matter. Milledgeville State Hosp. v. Clodfelter, 99 Ga. App. 49, 107 S.E.2d 289 (1959).

Stipulations. - There is nothing which prohibits the board from entering awards based on stipulations, even though the effect of the award is to deny compensation in any amount to claimant. Lavender v. Zurich Ins. Co., 110 Ga. App. 196, 138 S.E.2d 118 (1964). Burden of proof. - A person attacking a workers’ compensation agreement on the ground that it is void has the burden of proving such invalidity. Manus v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 100 Ga. App. 289, 111 S.E.2d 103 (1959). Authority to reopen or rehear case. - State board of workers’ compensation has no power to reopen or rehear a case, after a prior award, on its merits or for purposes of modification, except upon application for a hearing on a change of condition under former Code 1933, § 114-709 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104), or when an application for review has been made under former Code 1933, § 114-708 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-103). Dempsey v. Chevrolet Div., Gen. Motors, 102 Ga. App. 408, 116 S.E.2d 509 (1960). When claimant appellant had the opportunity at claimant’s 1985 hearing to proffer evidence on all the issues about which claimant complained on appeal, and appellant did not contend that any error was committed by the administrative law judge which prevented claimant from presenting material evidence to prove claimant’s entitlement to income benefits, or that there was newly discovered evidence authorizing a new trial pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-5-23 and Rule 103(d) of the Rules and Regulations of the State board of workers’ compensation, claimant attempted in claimant’s appeal to gain another chance to reargue facts and circumstances preexisting the 1985 hearing; the evidence in the record was sufficient to support the board’s conclusion, either at the time of the first award or on reappraisal. Sanders v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 192 Ga. App. 439, 385 S.E.2d 101, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 903, 385 S.E.2d 101 (1989). Agreement to discontinue payments. - Legislature intended that parties to an agreement for compensation might agree as to the discontinuance of weekly payments under such agreement

and formalize the agreement by reducing it to writing, signing it, and submitting it to the board for the board’s approval. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Gates, 225 Ga. 824, 171 S.E.2d 723 (1969). Relitigation of claims. - In a bankruptcy proceeding seeking a determination that a debt arising from a workers’ compensation award was dischargeable, findings of the administrative law judge that the employer failed to provide workers’ compensation insurance as required by state law, and that claimant’s injuries were compensable and should have been timely paid by the employer would not be relitigated; however, no specific findings were made as to the employer’s intent in failing to provide insurance and, thus, there was a genuine issue of material fact and collateral estoppel was not applicable to such issue. Walters v. Betts, 174 Bankr. 636 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994). Waiver. - Compliance by a permanent partial disability claimant with an administrative law judge’s directive requiring claimant to submit claimant’s medical evidence to the judge outside of the context of a hearing does not constitute a waiver of the claimant’s right to a hearing on the claim. Miller v. Brunswick Pulp & Paper Co., 184 Ga. App. 172, 360 S.E.2d 754 (1987). Cited in Wilkins v. Travelers Ins. Co., 52 Ga. App. 142, 182 S.E. 628 (1935); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Lawson, 15 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Ga. 1936); Rourke v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 187 Ga. 636, 1 S.E.2d 728 (1939); Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Cook, 195 Ga. 397, 24 S.E.2d 309 (1943); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Camp, 69 Ga. App. 758, 26 S.E.2d 679 (1943); State Hwy. Dep’t v. Turner, 198 Ga. 795, 32 S.E.2d 805 (1945); Howard v. Murdock, 83 Ga. App. 536, 64 S.E.2d 221 (1951); Heath v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 94 Ga. App. 548, 95 S.E.2d 726 (1956); Rittenhouse v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 96 Ga. App. 407, 100 S.E.2d 145 (1957); National Sur. Corp. v. Nelson, 99

Ga. App. 95, 107 S.E.2d 718 (1959); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Teal, 100 Ga. App. 314, 111 S.E.2d 113 (1959); American Cas. Co. v. Herron, 100 Ga. App. 661, 112 S.E.2d 160 (1959); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wilson, 215 Ga. 746, 113 S.E.2d 611 (1960); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Davis, 101 Ga. App. 849, 115 S.E.2d 482 (1960); Clay v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 102 Ga. App. 498, 116 S.E.2d 686 (1960); Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Loftis, 103 Ga. App. 749, 120 S.E.2d 655 (1961); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Derwael, 105 Ga. App. 54, 123 S.E.2d 345 (1961); Amerson v. Employers Ins. Co., 105 Ga. App. 336, 124 S.E.2d 496 (1962); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Shoemake, 105 Ga. App. 432, 124 S.E.2d 653 (1962); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Davis, 106 Ga. App. 369, 126 S.E.2d 909 (1962); Anglin v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 106 Ga. App. 395, 126 S.E.2d 913 (1962); Firth v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 285, 129 S.E.2d 812 (1963); Guess v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Ga. 581, 134 S.E.2d 783 (1964); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 112 Ga. App. 574, 145 S.E.2d 816 (1965); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Tribble, 119 Ga. App. 120, 166 S.E.2d 410 (1969); NABISCO v. Martin, 225 Ga. 198, 167 S.E.2d 140 (1969); Noles v. National Engine Rebuilding Co., 119 Ga. App. 833, 169 S.E.2d 185 (1969); Royal Globe Indem. Co. v. Thompson, 123 Ga. App. 268, 180 S.E.2d 576 (1971); Handley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 131 Ga. App. 797, 207 S.E.2d 218 (1974); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Crews, 139 Ga. App. 521, 229 S.E.2d 14 (1976); West Point Pepperell, Inc. v. Springfield, 140 Ga. App. 530, 231 S.E.2d 811 (1976); Terry v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 146 Ga. App. 206, 246 S.E.2d 7 (1978); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hodges, 164 Ga. App. 757, 298 S.E.2d 570 (1982); McFadden Bus. Publications, Inc. v. Guidry, 177 Ga. App. 885, 341 S.E.2d 294 (1986); Burns v. State Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 331 Ga. App. 11, 769 S.E.2d 733 (2015).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, §§ 526 et seq., 643.

C.J.S. - 100 C.J.S., Workers’ Compensation, §§ 828, 829.

ALR. - Workmen’s compensation: character or status of right or claim within provision of act requiring or autho-

rizing approval by the court or commission of settlement or compromise, 153 ALR 285.