Purpose of section.

- It was the clear purpose of this section to provide that coverage, once granted, shall be effectual, even in circumstances when it would not otherwise be obligatory for the employer to come under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Security Ins. Group v. Plank, 133 Ga. App. 815, 212 S.E.2d 471 (1975).

This section was not a limitation or restriction on an insurer's right of subrogation to the position of its insured, but rather was an aid to the worker or the worker's dependents in receiving workers' compensation. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alsco Constr., Inc., 144 Ga. App. 307, 240 S.E.2d 899 (1977).

Although the insurer is not subrogated to the rights of the injured workmen, the insurer is subrogated to the rights of its insured. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alsco Constr., Inc., 144 Ga. App. 307, 240 S.E.2d 899 (1977).

This section did not impair the contractual relations fixed in the policy of insurance between the insurance carrier and the employer; it had the effect only of placing upon the insurance carrier an estoppel to plead as a defense that the employer was not subject to the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sanders, 49 Ga. App. 600, 176 S.E. 104 (1934), rev'd on other grounds, 182 Ga. 594, 186 S.E. 693 (1936).

Purpose of requirement that policy contain agreement that insurer will pay workers' compensation benefits to employees so entitled, regardless of any default by employer, is not to invalidate contract between insured and insurer for noncompliance, but to estop insurer from denying existence of employment relationship when policy has been issued covering claimant. Nationwide-Penncraft, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 162 Ga. App. 555, 291 S.E.2d 760 (1982).

Section not applicable to employer.

- O.C.G.A. § 34-9-124 applies only to "employees ordinarily exempt from its provisions"; thus, it could not apply to an employer. King v. James King Cleaners & Laundry, 199 Ga. App. 796, 405 S.E.2d 909 (1991).

Section not applicable to partnership.

- A partner cannot be in the category of an employee and, therefore, this section, which applies to employees ordinarily exempt from its provisions, cannot apply. Scoggins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 139 Ga. App. 805, 229 S.E.2d 683 (1976).

Injury must be "compensable accident."

- While this section did estop an insurer from denying the existence of the employment relationship when a policy had been issued covering the claimant, it did not obviate the requirement that in order for liability to attach, the injury sustained must be an otherwise "compensable accident." Tindell v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 151 Ga. App. 388, 259 S.E.2d 746 (1979).

This section did not preclude the defense that an injury was not compensable due to failure to comply with notice requirements. Tindell v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 151 Ga. App. 388, 259 S.E.2d 746 (1979).

Coverage applicable only to business specified in policy.

- Both this section and the decisions were based on the principle that a policy of insurance issued under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) covered only the business specified in the policy and an enlargement and extension of the same business, and did not cover a subsequently acquired distinct and separate business which was not operated in connection with and as a part of the business contemplated by the terms of the policy at the time it was issued. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Collier, 69 Ga. App. 235, 25 S.E.2d 136 (1943).

Effect of nonpayment of premium by employer.

- Whether any premium has been paid based upon the wages paid the claimant while employed is a matter solely between the employer and the insurance carrier. To hold that a premium based upon the wages of the employee must have been paid before the employee shall be covered by such policy would abrogate the purpose of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Hunter, 184 Ga. 196, 190 S.E. 598 (1937).

Insurance policy constitutes direct promise by insurer to person entitled to compensation.

- An insurer is required to pay promptly all awards of compensation to the person entitled thereto and the policy is a direct promise by the insurer to the person entitled to compensation. Southern Ry. v. Overnite Transp. Co., 225 Ga. 291, 168 S.E.2d 166 (1969); Hartford Ins. Group v. Voyles, 149 Ga. App. 517, 254 S.E.2d 867 (1979).

Insurer is not allowed to fail to recognize a claimant as one covered under its workers' compensation policy when it has collected premiums based on the claimant's work and has recognized the claimant as one covered under the policy and as an employee whose pay it has audited, and has increased its premium as a result of payments to this employee. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Rainwater, 132 Ga. App. 170, 207 S.E.2d 610 (1974).

Insurer is estopped, after having extended insurance coverage to nonresident employees of a nonresident company, after an otherwise compensable accident occurs in this state, to defend on the ground that the employer is not subject to the Georgia workers' compensation law generally, or that although subject, it is exempt from its provisions because of the fact that during certain weeks it had less than the required number of employees working in Georgia. Security Ins. Group v. Plank, 133 Ga. App. 815, 212 S.E.2d 471 (1975).

If an employer carries workmens' compensation insurance on the claimant, the employer and the insurer are estopped to deny that claimant was an employee under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Brawley, 135 Ga. App. 763, 219 S.E.2d 176 (1975).

Policy of compensation insurance issued covering certain work to be done is binding on the insurer and operates as a definite contract in favor of workmen performing the work, whether the workmen were or were not employees, so as to be insured thereby. Walker v. Hill-Harmon Pulpwood Co., 138 Ga. App. 282, 226 S.E.2d 86, aff'd, 237 Ga. 736, 229 S.E.2d 607 (1976).

The equitable principle that when a party by that party's declaration leads another to act or fail to act in reliance upon those declarations that party may not later disavow them, may be applicable as well as this section when there was evidence of an employer deducting from the worker's pay a fee for workers' compensation insurance over an extended period of time, and it was implicit in the circumstances that the worker relied upon the declaration that the worker was to be covered by workers' compensation insurance. Hartford Ins. Group v. Voyles, 149 Ga. App. 517, 254 S.E.2d 867 (1979); Gulf Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 150 Ga. App. 179, 257 S.E.2d 44 (1979).

When an insurer receives from an employer sums designated by the employer as being for payment of workers' compensation premiums for an employee, and when such sums were deducted from the employee's earnings, the insurer and employer are estopped to deny workers' compensation insurance policy coverage regardless of whether the employee is an independent contractor rather than an employee of the employer. Gulf Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 150 Ga. App. 179, 257 S.E.2d 44 (1979).

Regardless of what the technical status of the claimant may have been vis-a-vis the employer/employee/independent contractor distinction, the insurer, who issued a policy covering the claimant and collected premiums reflecting such coverage, thereby causing the claimant to rely on the contract of insurance, was estopped to deny coverage on the basis of an assertion that the claimant was for some reason exempt from provisions of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) or was otherwise ineligible for workers' compensation benefits. Lawrence v. Atlanta Door Co., 171 Ga. App. 741, 320 S.E.2d 627 (1984).

Employer was entitled to insure defendant independent contractor under policy.

- Employer was entitled under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-124(b) to bring an independent contractor under its workers' compensation policy so that the contractor's tort action for injuries was barred by the exclusive remedy of workers' compensation under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 and was also barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because of the administrative law judge's findings in the workers' compensation adjudicative process that the employer's workers' compensation policy applied. Apperson v. S. States Coop., F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Sept. 16, 2005).

Theory of estoppel under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-124 cannot confer liability when no jurisdiction exists. Ramirez v. Bradley Constr. Co., 161 Ga. App. 753, 288 S.E.2d 742 (1982).

Construction subcontractor, who hired third party to install refrigeration equipment for owner's travel center, was estopped from denying coverage for injuries to one of its hired contractor's employees under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-124(b), because it voluntarily undertook to ensure that its subcontractors' employees had workers' compensation coverage. Murph v. Maynard Fixturecraft, Inc., 252 Ga. App. 483, 555 S.E.2d 845 (2001).

Cited in DeKalb County v. Grice, 51 Ga. App. 887, 181 S.E. 703 (1935); Liberty Mut. Co. v. Henry, 56 Ga. App. 868, 194 S.E. 430 (1937); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Posey, 58 Ga. App. 723, 199 S.E. 543 (1938); Grice v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 187 Ga. 259, 200 S.E. 700 (1938); General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. John P. King Mfg. Co., 60 Ga. App. 281, 3 S.E.2d 841 (1939); Pasler v. Maryland Cas. Co., 97 Ga. App. 263, 103 S.E.2d 90 (1958); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 100 Ga. App. 677, 112 S.E.2d 273 (1959); Home Indem. Co. v. Hernlen, 100 Ga. App. 860, 112 S.E.2d 409 (1959); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Rozier, 117 Ga. App. 178, 160 S.E.2d 236 (1968); Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cochran, 127 Ga. App. 55, 192 S.E.2d 547 (1972); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 131 Ga. App. 681, 206 S.E.2d 574 (1974); Hill-Harmon Pulpwood Co. v. Walker, 237 Ga. 736, 229 S.E.2d 607 (1976); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Murray, 140 Ga. App. 708, 231 S.E.2d 502 (1976); Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Moore, 142 Ga. App. 191, 235 S.E.2d 591 (1977); Denis Aerial Ag-Plicators, Inc. v. Swift, 154 Ga. App. 742, 269 S.E.2d 890 (1980); George v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 254 Ga. 95, 326 S.E.2d 744 (1985); Lott v. Ace Post Co., 175 Ga. App. 196, 332 S.E.2d 676 (1985); Levco Wood, Inc. v. Hudson, 186 Ga. App. 508, 367 S.E.2d 823 (1988).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers' Compensation, § 480.

C.J.S.

- 100 C.J.S., Workers' Compensation, § 875 et seq.

ALR.

- Right of insurer under Workmen's Compensation Act to recover from employer, who has breached warranty, the amount it has been obliged to pay employee, 22 A.L.R. 1481.

Insurance under Workmen's Compensation Act as coextensive with insured's liability under act, 108 A.L.R. 812.

Policy of workmen's compensation insurance issued to individual as covering employees of partnership of which he is a member, 114 A.L.R. 724.

Refusal of workmen's compensation or employers' liability insurer to act upon claim against employer, or delay or repudiation of liability in that regard, as justifying payment or compromise by employer without complying with provisions of policy that make judgment against employer or agreement with insurer's consent a condition of its liability, 128 A.L.R. 565.