O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-168 (2019)

Grounds and procedure for restraining transaction of business by fund or administrator; appointment of receivers; criminal prosecution

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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If the Commissioner finds that any fund or its administrator (1) has failed to comply with any provision of this article, (2) is fraudulently operated, (3) is in such condition as to render further fund operations hazardous to the public interest or to the interests of the fund’s members and their employees, (4) is financially unable to meet its obligations and claims as they come due, or (5) has violated any other provision of law, he may apply to the Superior Court of Fulton County for an injunction. The court may forthwith issue a temporary injunction restraining the transaction of any business by the fund; and, after a full hearing, it may make the injunction permanent and appoint one or more receivers to take possession of the books, papers, moneys, and other assets of the fund in order to settle its affairs and distribute its funds to those entitled thereto, subject to such rules and orders as the court may prescribe. If it appears that a crime has been committed in connection with the administration or management of any fund, the Attorney General may pursue the appropriate criminal action.

History

(Code

1933, § 114-621a, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1686, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 1759, § 1.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Claims in common with the insolvent trust fund versus personal claims. - Trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ breach of contract, misrepresentation, and other claims against a workers compensation trust fund because while the court properly concluded that the Georgia Insurance Commissioner, as an appointed receiver, had the exclusive

authority to prosecute legal claims that were common to the insolvent trust fund, the court erred in finding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to prosecute claims that were personal in nature and not common to the trust fund. Superior Roofing Co. of Ga., Inc. v. Am. Prof ’l Risk Servs., 323 Ga. App. 416, 744 S.E.2d 400 (2013).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 44A Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 1828 et seq.

C.J.S. - 44 C.J.S., Insurance, §§ 105, 108.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 2 cases, 2013–2013 · leading case: Superior Roofing Co. of Georgia, Inc. v. Am. Prof'l Risk Servs., Inc., 744 S.E.2d 400 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).

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Superior Roofing Co. of Georgia, Inc. v. Am. Prof'l Risk Servs., Inc., 744 S.E.2d 400 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 4× “Under OCGA § 34-9-168, the Superior Court of Fulton County has the authority to enjoin a self-insured workers’ compensation trust fund from conducting any further business when, among other things, the fund has failed to comply with workers’ compensation statutory provisions or…”

Superior Roofing Co. of Georgia, Inc. v. Am. Prof'l Risk Servs., Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 4× “Under OCGA § 34-9-168, the Superior Court of Fulton County has the authority to enjoin a self-insured workers’ compensation trust fund from conducting any further business when, among other things, the fund has failed to comply with Workers’ Compensation statutory provisions or…”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.