O.C.G.A. § 34-9-23 (2019)
Liberal construction of chapter; purpose
This chapter shall be liberally construed only for the purpose of bringing employers and employees within the provisions of this chapter and to provide protection for both. This chapter is intended to provide a complete and exclusive system and procedure for the resolution of disputes between employers and employees who are subject to this chapter concerning accidents and injuries arising out of and in the course of employment as defined by this chapter. The provisions of this chapter shall be construed and applied impartially to both employers and employees.
History
(Code 1981, § 34-9-23, enacted by Ga. L. 1994, p. 887, § 4.)
Annotations
Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘Workers’ Compensation,’’ see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 521 (2001). For annual survey of workers’ compensation law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 453
(2006). For survey article on workers’ compensation law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 463 (2007).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Authority of board. - Insurer’s argument that there should be an exception to the rule making declaratory judgments unavailable when there was no future act to which such a judgment could be applied had to be rejected; the premise for the exception was that the State Board of Workers’ Compensation (board) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the underlying coverage issue, but, in fact, the board had the authority to resolve ancillary issues such as workers’ compensation insurance coverage. Builders Ins. Group, Inc. v. Ker-Wil Enters., 274 Ga. App. 522, 618 S.E.2d 160 (2005). Board’s decision based on erroneous theory. - State Board of Workers’ Compensation erred in finding that an employee’s accident did not arise out of employment under the Workers’ Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4), because the decision was based upon an erroneous theory regarding what conduct constituted a deviation from employment that would bar compensation under the Act;
the decision contravened the humanitarian purpose of the Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-23, and distorted the definition of a deviation from employment to say that the employee’s attempt to stop a rolling car was a purely personal mission because at the instant the employee’s car began to roll, the employee was on duty. Stokes v. Coweta County Bd. of Educ., 313 Ga. App. 505, 722 S.E.2d 118 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0880, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 473 (Ga. 2012). Cited in Pringle v. Mayor of Savannah, 223 Ga. App. 751, 478 S.E.2d 139 (1996); England v. Beers Constr. Co., 224 Ga. App. 44, 479 S.E.2d 420 (1996); Cartersville Ready Mix Co. v. Hamby, 224 Ga. App. 116, 479 S.E.2d 767 (1996); Woodgrain Millwork v. Millender, 250 Ga. App. 204, 551 S.E.2d 78 (2001); Keystone Auto. v. Hall, 292 Ga. App. 645, 665 S.E.2d 392 (2008); Crossmark, Inc. v. Strickland, 310 Ga. App. 303, 713 S.E.2d 430 (2011); Dixie Roadbuilders, Inc. v. Sallet, 318 Ga. App. 228, 733 S.E.2d 511 (2012).
RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Right to workers’ compensation for injury suffered by employee while driving employer’s vehicle, 28 ALR6th 1. Right to workers’ compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli - compensability under particular circumstances, 39 ALR6th 445. Right to compensation under state
workers’ compensation statute for injuries sustained during or as result of horseplay, joking, fooling, or the like, 41 ALR6th 207. Injury to employee as arising out of or in course of employment for purposes of state workers’ compensation statute - effect of employer-provided living quarters, room and board, or the like, 42 ALR6th 61.