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2018 Georgia Code 34-9-23 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 34 LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Section 9. Workers' Compensation, 34-9-1 through 34-9-432.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

34-9-23. Liberal construction of chapter; purpose.

This chapter shall be liberally construed only for the purpose of bringing employers and employees within the provisions of this chapter and to provide protection for both.This chapter is intended to provide a complete and exclusive system and procedure for the resolution of disputes between employers and employees who are subject to this chapter concerning accidents and injuries arising out of and in the course of employment as defined by this chapter.The provisions of this chapter shall be construed and applied impartially to both employers and employees.

(Code 1981, §34-9-23, enacted by Ga. L. 1994, p. 887, § 4.)

Law reviews.

- For article, "Workers' Compensation," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 521 (2001). For annual survey of workers' compensation law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 453 (2006). For survey article on workers' compensation law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 463 (2007).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Authority of board.

- Insurer's argument that there should be an exception to the rule making declaratory judgments unavailable when there was no future act to which such a judgment could be applied had to be rejected; the premise for the exception was that the State Board of Workers' Compensation (board) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the underlying coverage issue, but, in fact, the board had the authority to resolve ancillary issues such as workers' compensation insurance coverage. Builders Ins. Group, Inc. v. Ker-Wil Enters., 274 Ga. App. 522, 618 S.E.2d 160 (2005).

Board's decision based on erroneous theory.

- State Board of Workers' Compensation erred in finding that an employee's accident did not arise out of employment under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4), because the decision was based upon an erroneous theory regarding what conduct constituted a deviation from employment that would bar compensation under the Act; the decision contravened the humanitarian purpose of the Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-23, and distorted the definition of a deviation from employment to say that the employee's attempt to stop a rolling car was a purely personal mission because at the instant the employee's car began to roll, the employee was on duty. Stokes v. Coweta County Bd. of Educ., 313 Ga. App. 505, 722 S.E.2d 118 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0880, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 473 (Ga. 2012).

Cited in Pringle v. Mayor of Savannah, 223 Ga. App. 751, 478 S.E.2d 139 (1996); England v. Beers Constr. Co., 224 Ga. App. 44, 479 S.E.2d 420 (1996); Cartersville Ready Mix Co. v. Hamby, 224 Ga. App. 116, 479 S.E.2d 767 (1996); Woodgrain Millwork v. Millender, 250 Ga. App. 204, 551 S.E.2d 78 (2001); Keystone Auto. v. Hall, 292 Ga. App. 645, 665 S.E.2d 392 (2008); Crossmark, Inc. v. Strickland, 310 Ga. App. 303, 713 S.E.2d 430 (2011); Dixie Roadbuilders, Inc. v. Sallet, 318 Ga. App. 228, 733 S.E.2d 511 (2012); Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rockefeller, 343 Ga. App. 36, 805 S.E.2d 660 (2017).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Right to workers' compensation for injury suffered by employee while driving employer's vehicle, 28 A.L.R.6th 1.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli - compensability under particular circumstances, 39 A.L.R.6th 445.

Right to compensation under state workers' compensation statute for injuries sustained during or as result of horseplay, joking, fooling, or the like, 41 A.L.R.6th 207.

Injury to employee as arising out of or in course of employment for purposes of state workers' compensation statute - effect of employer-provided living quarters, room and board, or the like, 42 A.L.R.6th 61.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 34-9-23

Total Results: 6  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Maloney v. Gordon Cnty. Farms, 462 S.E.2d 606 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 50 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 16, 1995 | 265 Ga. 825

...This additional requirement departs from Bristol, and contravenes the principle that the Workers' Compensation Act be interpreted liberally "to effect the humane purposes for which it was enacted." Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277, 287, 9 S.E.2d 84 (1940). See also OCGA § 34-9-23 (Ga.L.1994, p....
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Abernathy v. City of Albany, 495 S.E.2d 13 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 41 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 26, 1998 | 269 Ga. 88, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 239

...hat only a physical "injury" is compensable, the General Assembly has expressed its intent that the Act be construed liberally "for the purpose of bringing employers and employees within [its] provisions ... and to provide protection for both." OCGA § 34-9-23....
...Finally, while the majority stresses that its continued misinterpretation of the Act is supported by the Legislature's failure to correct the judicial branch's error, the General Assembly's intent in regard to the purpose of the Act has been the subject of recent current legislative action in the form of OCGA § 34-9-23, which holds that the Act must be "liberally construed" when its construction involves "bringing employers and employees within the provisions of [the Act] and to provide protection to both." The majority has rendered an opinion contrary t...
...y arisen out of and in the course of his employment on the unenlightened and medically-insupportable basis that there can be no "injury" unless there is precedent or concurrent physical damage. Because I would interpret "injury" consistent with OCGA § 34-9-23 as providing protection to employees like Abernathy, who sustained an injury—a mental injury—as a result of his employment, I must respectfully dissent....
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Doss v. Food Lion, Inc., 477 S.E.2d 577 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 41 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 12, 1996 | 267 Ga. 312, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 3975

...ndent action allowed in Zurich. Therefore, we necessarily overrule Zurich. *579 Certified question answered in the negative. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] Doss v. Food Lion, Inc., 83 F.3d 378, 380 (11th Cir.1996). [2] O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4). [3] O.C.G.A. § 34-9-23....
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Southwire Co. v. George, 470 S.E.2d 865 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 3, 1996 | 266 Ga. 739, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 2075

...Act that prevents this Court from holding that a mental injury occasioned by mental stimuli is compensable. Further, to permit employees to recover for mental injuries from mental trauma is consistent with the purpose of the Act as expressed in OCGA § 34-9-23....
...Both of these goals can easily be accomplished with regard to mental injuries brought on by mental trauma. I have already demonstrated that the terms of the Act, even using less than a liberal construction, are broad enough to provide protection to employees for such injuries, thus fulfilling part of the directive of § 34-9-23....
...than those experienced by similarly situated employees would provide protection to employees for legitimate work-related, mental injuries while at the same time ensuring that employers are protected from frivolous claims for such injuries. [19] OCGA § 34-9-23....
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SCI Liquidating Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins., 526 S.E.2d 555 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 28, 2000 | 272 Ga. 293, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 829

...tion Act. For instance, an employer who has less than three employees is not subject to the Workers' Compensation Act and thus Exclusion No. 2 would not serve to bar claims of employees that "arise out of" and "in the course of" employment. [3] OCGA § 34-9-23....
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Pogue v. Oglethorpe Power Corp., 267 Ga. 332 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 4, 1996 | 477 S.E.2d 107, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 3893