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O.C.G.A.Title 34Chapter 9

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-23 (2019)

Liberal construction of chapter; purpose

Edition and currency
Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from Release 73 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Aug. 21, 2019) (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020), which replaced the older 2017 print volume for this title. Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTRelease 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session cited 1995–2025 44citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 44 opinions since 1995, 10 of them in the last five years.

This chapter shall be liberally construed only for the purpose of bringing employers and employees within the provisions of this chapter and to provide protection for both. This chapter is intended to provide a complete and exclusive system and procedure for the resolution of disputes between employers and employees who are subject to this chapter concerning accidents and injuries arising out of and in the course of employment as defined by this chapter. The provisions of this chapter shall be construed and applied impartially to both employers and employees.

History

(Code 1981, § 34-9-23, enacted by Ga. L. 1994, p. 887, § 4.)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article, "Workers' Compensation," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 521 (2001). For annual survey of workers' compensation law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 453 (2006). For survey article on workers' compensation law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 463 (2007).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Authority of board. - Insurer's argument that there should be an exception to the rule making declaratory judgments unavailable when there was no future act to which such a judgment could be applied had to be rejected; the premise for the exception was that the State Board of Workers' Compensation (board) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the underlying coverage issue, but, in fact, the board had the authority to resolve ancillary issues such as workers' compensation insurance coverage. Builders Ins. Group, Inc. v. Ker-Wil Enters., 274 Ga. App. 522, 618 S.E.2d 160 (2005).

Board's decision based on erroneous theory. - State Board of Workers' Compensation erred in finding that an employee's accident did not arise out of employment under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4), because the decision was based upon an erroneous theory regarding what conduct constituted a deviation from employment that would bar compensation under the Act; the decision contravened the humanitarian purpose of the Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-23, and distorted the definition of a deviation from employment to say that the employee's attempt to stop a rolling car was a purely personal mission because at the instant the employee's car began to roll, the employee was on duty. Stokes v. Coweta County Bd. of Educ., 313 Ga. App. 505, 722 S.E.2d 118 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0880, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 473 (Ga. 2012).

Cited in Pringle v. Mayor of Savannah, 223 Ga. App. 751, 478 S.E.2d 139 (1996); England v. Beers Constr. Co., 224 Ga. App. 44, 479 S.E.2d 420 (1996); Cartersville Ready Mix Co. v. Hamby, 224 Ga. App. 116, 479 S.E.2d 767 (1996); Woodgrain Millwork v. Millender, 250 Ga. App. 204, 551 S.E.2d 78 (2001); Keystone Auto. v. Hall, 292 Ga. App. 645, 665 S.E.2d 392 (2008); Crossmark, Inc. v. Strickland, 310 Ga. App. 303, 713 S.E.2d 430 (2011); Dixie Roadbuilders, Inc. v. Sallet, 318 Ga. App. 228, 733 S.E.2d 511 (2012); Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rockefeller, 343 Ga. App. 36, 805 S.E.2d 660 (2017), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 258 (Ga. 2018).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. - Right to workers' compensation for injury suffered by employee while driving employer's vehicle, 28 A.L.R.6th 1.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli - compensability under particular circumstances, 39 A.L.R.6th 445.

Right to compensation under state workers' compensation statute for injuries sustained during or as result of horseplay, joking, fooling, or the like, 41 A.L.R.6th 207.

Injury to employee as arising out of or in course of employment for purposes of state workers' compensation statute - effect of employer-provided living quarters, room and board, or the like, 42 A.L.R.6th 61.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 34-9-23 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENCartersville Ready Mix Co. v. Hamby, 479 S.E.2d 767 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 34-9-23 24×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“It provides that the Act should "be liberally construed only for the purpose of bringing employers and employees within [its] provisions" and providing protection for both, and that its "provisions ... shall be construed and applied impartially to both employers and employees.”
Later courts cite it for
“the term 'compensation' encompasses all of the accrued income benefits, including penalties provided for any late payment” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENAbernathy v. City of Albany, 495 S.E.2d 13 (Ga. 1998).
cites § 34-9-23 12×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“" OCGA § 34-9-23. Applying that liberal construction here, the City is an employer and Abernathy is an employee "within" the provisions of the Act, and the only question is whether that Act provides coverage of Abernathy's claim for a purely psychological injury.”
The case’s holding
A claimant is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits for purely psychological trauma that is not preceded or accompanied by a physical injury.
Later courts cite it for
“even those who regard 'stare decisis' with something less than enthusiasm recognize that the principle has even greater weight where the precedent relates to interpretation of a statute.” · 5 citing courts
3
GREENSouthwire Co. v. George, 470 S.E.2d 865 (Ga. 1996).
cites § 34-9-23 10×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“Further, to permit employees to recover for mental injuries from mental trauma is consistent with the purpose of the Act as expressed in OCGA § 34-9-23. That code section provides as follows: This chapter shall be liberally construed only for the purpose of bringing employers…”
The case’s holding
A mental disability is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act when a compensable physical injury contributes to its continuation, even though the physical injury did not precipitate it.
Later courts cite it for
“a discernible physical 'injury'. . . .” · 1 citing court
4
GREENATC Healthcare Serv., Inc. v. Adams, 589 S.E.2d 346 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 34-9-23 8×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“OCGA § 34-9-23 (the Workers' Compensation act "shall be liberally construed .”
5
GREENCont'l Pet Tech., Inc. v. Palacias, 604 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 34-9-23 4×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“Under the current statutory scheme, employees cannot sue employers for injuries sustained on the job.”
6
GREENSCI Liquidating Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins., 526 S.E.2d 555 (Ga. 2000).
cites § 34-9-23 4×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“16 can be viewed as excluding all claims that "arise out of" and "in the course of" employment but are not covered by the Workers' Compensation Act.”
Later courts cite it for
“we find that exclusion sixteen of the umbrella policy does not exclude coverage for sunrise's claims originating from the sexual harassment suit.” · 5 citing courts
7
GREENSavannah Hosp. Servs., LLC. v. Scriven, 828 S.E.2d 423 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
cites § 34-9-23 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“and all other civil liabilities whatsoever at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service, or death .”
Later courts cite it for
“is designed to provide for relief to injured employees, while also protecting employers from excessive recoveries of damages.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENMaloney v. Gordon Cnty. Farms, 462 S.E.2d 606 (Ga. 1995).
cites § 34-9-23 2×cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“In order to receive workers’ compensation benefits based on a change in condition, a claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she suffered a loss of earning power as a result of a compensable work-related injury; continues to suffer physical…”
The case’s holding
A claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence a loss of earning power from a compensable injury, continuing physical limitations, and diligent but unsuccessful efforts to secure employment.
Later courts cite it for
“a claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she suffered a loss of earning power as a result of a compensable work-related injury; continues to suffer physical limitations attributable to that injury; and has made a diligent, but unsuccessful effort to secure suitable employment following termination.” · 4 citing courts
9
REDFrett v. State Farm Emp. Workers' Comp., 821 S.E.2d 132 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
cites § 34-9-23 2×cited by 8 cases
Reversed by FRETT v. STATE FARM EMPLOYEE WORKERS' COMPENSATION (2020): the Supreme Court of Georgia's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“") (citation omitted); see also OCGA § 34-9-23. The whole purpose of the Act is to "provid[e] relief to the injured employee and protect[ ] employers from excessive damage awards" while enabling the employee to swiftly return to work.”
Later courts cite it for
“the extension of the ingress and egress rule to cover cases in which the employee is injured while leaving and returning to work” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENStokes v. Coweta Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 722 S.E.2d 118 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 34-9-23 2×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“The provisions of [the Act] shall be construed and applied impartially to both employers and employees.”
The case’s holding
An employee does not deviate from employment when responding instinctively to a sudden emergency arising directly from the performance of job duties.
Later courts cite it for
“as a reviewing court, the superior court applies an any-evidence standard of review to the board's findings of fact, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing before the board, and lacks authority to substitute itself as a fact-finding body in lieu of the board.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENGulf States Underwriters of Louisiana, Inc. v. Bennett, 580 S.E.2d 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 34-9-23 4×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“2d 14 (1975) (predecessor agency of State Board lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claim in which damages sought for alleged fraud).”
12
GREENDoss v. Food Lion, Inc., 477 S.E.2d 577 (Ga. 1996).
cites § 34-9-23 2×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“3 OCGA § 34-9-23. 4 OCGA § 34-9-11. 5 253 Ga.”
The case’s holding
Georgia law does not recognize an independent tort cause of action for an employer's intentional delay in authorizing medical treatment that exacerbates a work-related injury.
Later courts cite it for
“the quid pro quo for workers receiving a guarantee of prompt benefits for work-related injuries without regard to fault or common-law defenses and without the delay inherent in tort litigation.” · 4 citing courts
13
GREENCrisp Reg'l Hosp., Inc. v. Oliver, 621 S.E.2d 554 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 34-9-23 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“” OCGA § 34-9-23. Accordingly, where the WCA is applicable, it provides the exclusive remedy for an injured employee against the employer.”
14
GREENTeasley v. Freeman, 699 S.E.2d 39 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 34-9-23 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“) OCGA § 34-9-23. 16 (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 34-9-1 (2).”
Later courts cite it for
“therefore, where the act applies, it provides the employee's exclusive remedy against his employer and precludes recovery on a tort claim by an injured employee against his employer.” · 7 citing courts
15
GREENAetna Workers' Comp Access, LLC v. Coliseum Med. Ctr., 746 S.E.2d 148 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
cites § 34-9-23 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“OCGA § 34-9-23. Although the Providers’ claim against Aetna is clearly not one between an employer and employee under the Act, that does not end the inquiry of whether the Board has jurisdiction.”
Later courts cite it for
“the construction of contracts is initially a question of law for the court.” · 1 citing court
16
GREENBuilders Ins. Grp., Inc. v. Ker-Wil Enter. Inc., 618 S.E.2d 160 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 34-9-23 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“OCGA § 34-9-23. We hold that a “complete and exclusive system for the resolution of disputes” between employers, their workers’ compensation insurers, and their employees does, of necessity, include the power to resolve workers’ compensation insurance coverage issues that bear…”
Later courts cite it for
“whether the policy at issue required reimbursement as between the insurer and the insured employer, it was a contract dispute for which the superior court had jurisdiction.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENBoulware v. Quiktrip Corp., 486 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 34-9-23 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“[OCGA § 34-9-23.]” Doss v. Food Lion, 267 Ga.”
18
GREENOlde South Custom Landscaping, Inc. v. Mathis, 494 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 34-9-23 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“” OCGA § 34-9-23. Accordingly, “[w]e act even-handedly when we apply the Act as it is written.”
19
GREENHous. Auth. City of Cartersville v. Jackson, 486 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 34-9-23 4×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“The Authority contends the superior court erred in affirming the State Board’s finding that Jackson was an “employee” entitled to medical benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. See OCGA §§ 34-9-120; 34-9-200.”
20
GREENKeystone Auto. v. Hall, 665 S.E.2d 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 34-9-23 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-23
“” Keystone Automotive contends this statement was superceded by OCGA § 34-9-23, which states that the chapter shall be liberally construed only for the purpose of bringing employers and employees within the provisions of the chapter and to provide protection for both.”
Later courts cite it for
“the question of whether the superior court applied the correct legal standard in evaluating the evidence, however, is one of law, which we review de novo.” · 3 citing courts

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Citing cases by year
199520102025

One bar per year. Tallest: 6 cases in 1996. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.38Ga.6
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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