O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-240 (2019)

Effect of refusal of suitable employment by injured employee; attempting or refusing to attempt work with restrictions

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) If an injured employee refuses employment procured for him or her and suitable to his or her capacity, such employee shall not be entitled to any compensation, except benefits pursuant to Code Section 34-9-263, at any time during the continuance of such refusal unless in the opinion of the board such refusal was justified. (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section, if the authorized treating physician releases an employee to return to work with restrictions and the employer tenders a suitable job to such employee within those restrictions, then: (1) If such employee attempts the proffered job for eight cumulative hours or one scheduled workday, whichever is greater, but is unable to perform the job for more than 15 working days, then weekly benefits shall be immediately reinstated, and the burden shall be upon the employer to prove that such employee is not entitled to continuing benefits; or (2) If such employee attempts the proffered job for less than eight cumulative hours or one scheduled workday, whichever is greater, or refuses to attempt the proffered job, then the employer may unilaterally suspend benefits upon filing with the board the appropriate form with supporting documentation of the release to return to work

with restrictions by the authorized treating physician, the tender of a suitable job within those restrictions, and a statement that such employee did not attempt the proffered job. Under those circumstances, the burden shall shift to the employee to prove continuing entitlement to benefits.

History

(Ga. L. 1920, p. 167, § 33; Code 1933, § 114-407; Ga. L. 1994, p. 887, § 13; Ga. L. 2003, p. 364, § 5; Ga. L. 2013, p. 651, § 4/HB 154.)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of workers’ compensation from June 1979 through May 1980, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 261 (1980). For annual survey of workers’ compensation, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 431 (1986). For annual survey of law of workers’ compensation, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 479 (2004). For annual survey of workers’ compensa-

tion law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 419 (2005). For annual survey of workers’ compensation law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 453 (2006). For article on the 2013 amendment of this Code section, see 30 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 185 (2013). For note on the 1994 amendment of this Code section, see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 204 (1994).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Section meaningless if termination of compensation based on ex post facto statements. - O.C.G.A. § 34-9-240, requiring proof that the claimant was unjustified in refusing work offered by the employer before compensation can be terminated, is meaningless if, ex post facto, the employer can terminate compensation by merely stating that suitable work was available or is now available; in every such case, the employer could terminate compensation merely on news that the claimant’s condition had improved. Peterson/Puritan, Inc. v. Day, 157 Ga. App. 827, 278 S.E.2d 674 (1981). Refusal does not forever ban receipt of future compensation should the availability of suitable light work cease. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neal, 140 Ga. App. 585, 231 S.E.2d 574 (1976); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 144 Ga. App. 217, 240 S.E.2d 767 (1977); Universal Ceramics, Inc. v. Watson, 177 Ga. App. 345, 339 S.E.2d 304 (1985). Liability suspended. - If an employee should refuse employment procured for the employee suitable to the employee’s capacity, the employer’s liability for the payment of compensation is suspended during the continuance of the refusal and none accrues. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Davis, 106 Ga. App. 369, 126 S.E.2d 909 (1962). Compensation suspended only dur-

ing continuance of refusal. - When an employer procured a light job which an injured employee can perform and the employee refused the job, this section required that compensation be suspended only ‘‘during the continuance of such refusal.’’ Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 144 Ga. App. 217, 240 S.E.2d 767 (1977). Reduction of compensation upon employee’s refusal of work. - It must appear that the injured employee has refused employment procured for the employee suitable to the employee’s then existing capacity, before an employer can claim a reduction of compensation under the provisions of this section. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Cook, 69 Ga. App. 131, 25 S.E.2d 67 (1943). Liability suspended only during availability of work despite initial refusal. - When an employee is injured while at work, is released by a doctor to do light work, is offered light work but refuses to do it and is fired, but the work offered later becomes unavailable, compensation should be paid as of that time, since the reason for the employer’s refusal to pay benefits no longer exists. Coats & Clark, Inc. v. Thompson, 166 Ga. App. 669, 305 S.E.2d 415 (1983). Acceptance of lighter work before employer offers suitable work. - This section was not applicable when, after the injury, an employee is ordered by the

employee’s physician to change to lighter work, and the employee finds such work suitable to the employee’s impaired capacity before the employer offers suitable work. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. White, 103 Ga. App. 607, 120 S.E.2d 144 (1961). Proving inability to perform light-duty job. - Testimony of claimant may establish that claimant was incapable of performing light-duty job. Young v. Columbus Consol. Gov’t, 263 Ga. 172, 430 S.E.2d 7 (1993). Employment offered not suitable. - When there was absolutely no evidence that the employment offered to the defendant was suitable to the defendant’s injured capacity, the mere refusal of an employee to continue in the employment of the employer after having received an injury does not bar the defendant from compensation. DeKalb County Merit Sys. v. Johnson, 151 Ga. App. 405, 260 S.E.2d 506 (1979). Generalized statements by counsel do not suffice to carry burden placed on employer/insurer to show availability of work and, indeed, generalized statements by the employer itself do not carry that burden. Peterson/Puritan, Inc. v. Day, 157 Ga. App. 827, 278 S.E.2d 674 (1981). Refusal not justified. - Refusal of a ‘‘light work’’ job by an employee receiving workers’ compensation benefits because the employee did not want to work on the second shift is not justified refusal. McDaniel v. Roper Corp., 149 Ga. App. 864, 256 S.E.2d 146 (1979). Injured worker’s refusal to accept a suitable job based on a legal inability to perform the job resulting from the worker’s voluntary conduct, rather than a lack of skill or physical capacity, was not justified as a matter of law under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-240, and the worker was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Martines v. Worley & Sons Constr., 278 Ga. App. 26, 628 S.E.2d 113 (2006). Incarceration pending adjudication of claimant’s guilt justifies a claimant’s refusal of suitable employment which is offered to claimant while incarcerated but before claimant is adjudicated guilty, since the claimant’s refusal of suitable employment is justified as a

matter of law. Howard v. Scott Hous. Sys., 180 Ga. App. 690, 350 S.E.2d 27 (1986), aff ’d, 256 Ga. 675, 353 S.E.2d 2 (1987). Refusal of employer’s offer and acceptance of different position. - Claimant was not entitled to partial disability benefits when the claimant refused the employer’s offer of full-time suitable work at the claimant’s pre-injury wage and, instead, accepted part-time work from another employer. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Harris, 234 Ga. App. 401, 506 S.E.2d 908 (1998). Suitability of job shown. - There was ample record evidence to show the suitability of the job offered to claimant by the employer. Howard v. Scott Hous. Sys., 180 Ga. App. 690, 350 S.E.2d 27 (1986), aff ’d, 256 Ga. 675, 353 S.E.2d 2 (1987). Discretion afforded the board under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-240 to determine that an employee’s refusal of proffered work is justified must relate to the physical capacity of the employee to perform the job, the employee’s ability or skill to perform the job, or factors such as geographic relocation or travel conditions which would disrupt the employee’s life. City of Adel v. Wise, 261 Ga. 53, 401 S.E.2d 522 (1991). District court properly concluded that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order an employer and workers’ compensation insurer to pay workers’ compensation benefits because the State Board of Workers’ Compensation had exclusive jurisdiction over such claims and the workers’ compensation scheme provided the employee a remedy under O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-221 and 34-9-240. Prine v. Chailland, Inc., No. 10-11706, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23374 (11th Cir. Nov. 9, 2010) (Unpublished). Potential loss of a part-time job may not be considered as a factor in determining whether a job offered by an employer is ‘‘suitable to the capacity’’ of an employee. City of Adel v. Wise, 261 Ga. 53, 401 S.E.2d 522 (1991). Cited in Keel v. American Employers’ Ins. Co., 44 Ga. App. 773, 162 S.E. 847 (1932); Armour & Co. v. Price, 73 Ga. App. 676, 37 S.E.2d 634 (1946); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Gunter, 74 Ga. App. 534, 40 S.E.2d 394 (1946); Rutland v. Vaughn, 96 Ga. App. 499, 100 S.E.2d 609 (1957);

Owensby v. Riegel Textile Corp., 104 Ga. App. 800, 123 S.E.2d 147 (1961); Davis v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 519, 127 S.E.2d 481 (1962); Collins v. Kiker, 106 Ga. App. 513, 127 S.E.2d 489 (1962); Turner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 111 Ga. App. 565, 142 S.E.2d 329 (1965); Cameron v. American Can Co., 120 Ga. App. 236, 170 S.E.2d 267 (1969); Em-

ployers Fire Ins. Co. v. Walraven, 130 Ga. App. 41, 202 S.E.2d 461 (1973); Poulnot v. Dundee Mills Corp., 173 Ga. App. 799, 328 S.E.2d 228 (1985); Clark v. Georgia Kraft Co., 178 Ga. App. 884, 345 S.E.2d 61 (1986); Carod Bldg. Servs. v. Williams, 182 Ga. App. 340, 355 S.E.2d 723 (1987); Goswick v. Murray County Bd. of Educ., 281 Ga. App. 442, 636 S.E.2d 133 (2006).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Workmen’s compensation: duty of injured employee to submit to operation or to take other measures to restore earning capacity, 6 ALR 1260; 18 ALR 431; 73 ALR 1303; 105 ALR 1470. Workmen’s compensation: statutory phrase ‘‘incapacity for work’’ or the like, as including inability to obtain work following an injury, 33 ALR 115. Workmen’s compensation: right to compensation as affected by refusal to accept,

or failure to seek, other employment, or by entering into business for oneself after injury, 63 ALR 1241. Specific grounds for commutation of payments under Workmen’s Compensation Acts, 69 ALR 547. Necessity and sufficiency of showing that ‘‘substantial and gainful activity’’ is available to disability claimant under federal Social Security Act, 22 ALR3d 440.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 28 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1983–2025 · leading case: City of Adel v. Wise, 401 S.E.2d 522 (Ga. 1991).
City of Adel v. Wise, 401 S.E.2d 522 (Ga. 1991). · cites it 60× “OCGA § 34-9-240 provides: If an injured employee refuses employment procured for him and suitable to his capacity, he shall not be entitled to any compensation at any time during the continuance of such refusal unless in the opinion of the board the refusal was justified.”
Trent Tube v. Hurston, 583 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 14× “Hurston’s TTD benefits were reinstated under OCGA § 34-9-240 (b) (1), and Trent requested a hearing to determine whether Hurston had rejected suitable employment and *526 was no longer entitled to those benefits, pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-240 (a).”
Tim Neal v. Annett Holdings, Inc., 814 N.W.2d 512 (Iowa 2012). · cites it 3× “Ga. Code Ann. § 34-9-240 (a). The Georgia 11 Supreme Court addressed what it meant for a refusal to be justified in City of Adel v.”
Martines v. Worley & Sons Constr., 628 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 14× “We granted the claimant’s application for discretionary appeal in this workers’ compensation case to consider the scope of a “justified” refusal to accept a “suitable job” within the meaning of OCGA § 34-9-240. We conclude that an injured worker’s refusal to accept a suitable…”
Freeman v. Southwire Co., 605 S.E.2d 95 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 8× “Adopting the findings of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”), the Board had ruled that her refusal to continue performing the specially-tailored lighter-duty job which accommodated her work-related injury was unjustified under OCGA § 34-9-240 (a), where the basis for that…”
Howard v. Scott Hous. Sys., Inc., 350 S.E.2d 27 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 34-9-240 provides: “If an injured employee refuses employment procured for him and suitable to his capacity, he shall not be entitled to any compensation at any time during the continuance of such refusal unless in the opinion of the board such refusal was *691 justified.”
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Harris, 506 S.E.2d 908 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 8× “OCGA § 34-9-240 (a) provides that “[i]f an injured employee *402 refuses employment procured for him or her and suitable to his or her capacity, such employee shall not be entitled to any compensation at any time during the continuance of such refusal unless in the opinion of…”
Technical Coll. Sys. v. McGruder, 756 S.E.2d 702 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 14× “She received TTD benefits until she returned to work in a light-duty phone operator/clerical position on September 8, 2009, based on a job offer made by the employer pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-240. 4 McGruder performed the light-duty job through September 17, 2009.”
Brasher v. US Xpress Enter., Inc., 761 S.E.2d 448 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 4× “Brasher also contends that the Board erred in affirming the ALJ’s finding that the light-duty job was suitable to his capacity and that Brasher was not justified in refusing it pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-240. We disagree. The testof OCGA § 34-9-240 is two-pronged.”
Carod Bldg. Servs. v. Williams, 355 S.E.2d 723 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 6× “" 1 OCGA § 34-9-240 provides: “If an injured employee refuses employment procured for him and suitable to his capacity, he shall not be entitled to any compensation at any time during the continuance of such refusal unless in the opinion of the board such refusal was justified.”
Coats & Clark, Inc. v. Thompson, 305 S.E.2d 415 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 4× “See OCGA § 34-9-240 (Code Ann. § 114-407). The board found as a matter of fact that claimant refused the proffered “light” work at the time it was offered but that the work was no longer available.”
Clark v. Georgia Kraft Co., 345 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 2× “Holding that the facts did not show claimant justifiably refused the courier job, the superior court reversed the award of the ALJ.”
— 34-9-240(a) — 1 case
Tim Neal v. Annett Holdings, Inc., 814 N.W.2d 512 (Iowa 2012). “Ga. Code Ann. § 34-9-240 (a). The Georgia 11 Supreme Court addressed what it meant for a refusal to be justified in City of Adel v.”
— 34-9-240(b) — 1 case
Bennon L. Prine, Jr. v. Chailland Inc., 402 F. App'x 469 (11th Cir. 2010).
— 34-9-240(b)(2) — 1 case
Bennon L. Prine, Jr. v. Chailland Inc., 402 F. App'x 469 (11th Cir. 2010).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.