O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-245 (2019)

Repayment of overpayment by claimant

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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Should the board find that a claimant has received an overpayment of income benefits from the employer, for any reason, the board shall have the authority to order repayment on terms acceptable to the parties or within the discretion of the board. No claim for reimbursement shall be allowed where the application for reimbursement is filed more than two years from the date such overpayment was made.

History

(Code 1981, § 34-9-245, enacted by Ga. L. 1999, p. 817, § 6.)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For annual survey of workers’ compensation law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 453 (2006). For survey article on

workers’ compensation law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 433 (2008).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS De novo standard of review. - In reviewing a decision by the State Board of Workers’ Compensation (board), the trial court correctly employed a de novo standard of review when determining whether O.C.G.A. § 34-9-245 was a statute of repose rather than a statute of limitation, as that matter involved a legal interpretation of a statute; the court was obligated to employ the ‘‘any evidence’’ standard when determining whether the findings by the board that an award of attorney fees to an insurer, a civil penalty assessment to an employee, and a referral of the matter to the Enforcement Division of the board were proper. Trax-Fax, Inc. v. Hobba, 277 Ga. App. 464, 627 S.E.2d 90 (2006). Applicability. - State Board of Workers’ Compensation properly held that an employer was entitled to a credit for overpayments made to a claimant, but only for those made within the two years prior to the employer’s request for reimburse-

ment; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-245 was intended as a statute of repose, and thus giving the employer credit for overpayments made more than two years before its request for reimbursement would allow offsets against future payments when there was no legally cognizant basis for reimbursement. Renu Thrift Store, Inc. v. Figueroa, 286 Ga. App. 455, 649 S.E.2d 528 (2007), cert. dismissed, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 812 (Ga. 2007). Statute of repose retroactively applied. - O.C.G.A. § 34-9-245 is a statute of repose, rather than a statute of limitations, and can be applied retroactively, pursuant to the legislative intent and the wording of the statute; accordingly, an award of reimbursement of benefits paid to an employee was proper when the employee’s accident occurred one year prior to the enactment of § 34-9-245, and preclusion of reimbursement for any overpayments made prior to the two-year period was proper. Trax-Fax, Inc. v. Hobba, 277 Ga. App. 464, 627 S.E.2d 90 (2006).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Validity, and applicability to causes of action, of statute shortening

limitation period or period of repose, 76 A.L.R.6th 31.

ARTICLE 7 COMPENSATION SCHEDULES Law reviews. - For note on the 2000 amendments of O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-261,

34-9-262, 34-9-265, see 17 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2000). For annual survey on

workers’ compensation law, see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 247 (2014). JUDICIAL DECISIONS It is extent of injury received by employee which determines compensation which the employee shall receive. Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Hurt, 176 Ga. 153, 167 S.E. 175 (1932).

Cited in Glynn County Bd. of Comm’rs v. Mimbs, 161 Ga. App. 350, 291 S.E.2d 62 (1982).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Word ‘‘wages’’ is not synonymous with retirement or disability benefits or other monthly pensions. 1971 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 71-136. Loss-of-earnings award reduced when earnings increase. - When an

award is made based upon a percentage of loss-of- earnings, the benefit may be reduced when the employee subsequently receives an increase in earnings. 1960-61 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 589.

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Workmen’s compensation: deductions allowable in computing earnings as basis of compensation, 22 ALR 864. Survival of right to compensation under workmen’s compensation acts upon the death of the person entitled to the award, 24 ALR 441; 29 ALR 1426; 51 ALR 1446; 87 ALR 864; 95 ALR 254. Previous loss or mutilation of member as affecting amount or basis of compensation under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 30 ALR 979. Retroactive effort of provision for reduction or increase of award under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 40 ALR 1473. Workmen’s compensation: double compensation to dependents in case of death of two or more, 45 ALR 894. Specific grounds for commutation of payments under Workmen’s Compensation Acts, 69 ALR 547. Tips or gratuities as factor in determining amount of compensation under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 75 ALR 1223. Board and lodging as a factor in determining the amount of compensation under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 84 ALR 188. Time as of which earnings are to be considered in computing compensation for an injury or incapacity ultimately resulting from causes not immediately operative, 86 ALR 524.

Marriage as terminating right to future payments of workmen’s compensation to injured female employee, 96 ALR 976. Settlement of claim or recovery against physician or surgeon or one responsible for his malpractice on account of aggravation of injury as affecting right to compensation under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 98 ALR 1392. Workmen’s compensation: payment, or period of payment, for separate compensable injuries as concurrent or consecutive, 99 ALR 896. Workmen’s compensation: compensation for loss or impairment of eyesight, 142 ALR 822. Workmen’s compensation: right to compensation as affected by fact that injured employee earns or is offered, as much as, or more than, before the injury, 149 ALR 413. Workmen’s compensation: right to compensation as for a total or partial disability in case of abnormal condition of body or member which results from or is incident to specific injury for which the act makes special allowance, 156 ALR 1344. What constitutes ‘‘salary,’’ ‘‘wages,’’ ‘‘pay,’’ or the like, within pension law basing benefits thereon, 14 ALR2d 634. Workmen’s compensation: crediting employer or insurance carrier with earnings

of employee reemployed, or continued in employment, after injury, 84 ALR2d 1108. Workers’ compensation: tips or gratu-

ities as factor in determining amount of compensation, 16 ALR5th 191.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 5 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2006–2023 · leading case: Trax-Fax, Inc. v. Hobba, 627 S.E.2d 90 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).

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Trax-Fax, Inc. v. Hobba, 627 S.E.2d 90 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 56× “Travelers contends that the superior court erred by (1) failing to apply the “any evidence” standard in reviewing the Board’s decision; (2) interpreting OCGA § 34-9-245 as a statute of repose and applying it retroactively to bar any claims for reimbursement of benefits paid more…”

Renu Thrift Store, Inc. v. Figueroa, 649 S.E.2d 528 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 14× “Renu contends that the superior court erred in affirm - ingthe Board’s ruling (1) by interpreting OCGA § 34-9-245 as barring Renu from obtaining credit for overpayments made more than two years prior to its request for reimbursement, (2) by affirming the ruling that Renu’s…”

Coen v. Aptean, Inc. Et Al., 816 S.E.2d 64 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 2× “2d 90 (2006) (concluding that OCGA § 34-9-245 was statute of repose rather than statute of limitation, given that it had "similar prohibitive language" to other statutes of repose, and given that a separate statute provided a statute of limitation for workers' compensation…”

Fuller Life Chiropractic Ctr., P.C. v. Jodi Marie Threadgill (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 2× “at 466 (2), 469- 470 (2) (a) (concluding that defense predicated on OCGA § 34-9-245 had not been waived as untimely, where the statute in question was determined to be a statute of repose).”

Timothy F. Coen v. Aptean, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 2× “464 , 467- 470 (2) (a) ( 627 SE2d 90 ) (2006) (concluding that OCGA § 34-9-245 was statute of repose rather than statute of limitation, given that it had “similar prohibitive language” to other statutes of repose, and given that a separate statute provided a statute of…”

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