O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-262 (2019)

Compensation for temporary partial disability

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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Except as otherwise provided in Code Section 34-9-263, where the disability to work resulting from the injury is partial in character but temporary in quality, the employer shall pay or cause to be paid to the employee a weekly benefit equal to two-thirds of the difference between the average weekly wage before the injury and the average weekly wage the employee is able to earn thereafter but not more than $383.00 per week for a period not exceeding 350 weeks from the date of injury.

History

(Ga. L. 1920, p. 167, § 31; Code 1933, § 114-405; Ga. L. 1949, p. 1357, § 2; Ga. L. 1955, p. 210, § 2; Ga. L. 1963, p. 141, § 6; Ga. L. 1968, p. 3, § 2; Ga. L. 1973, p. 232, § 4; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1143, § 4; Ga. L. 1975, p. 190, § 2; Ga. L. 1978, p. 2220, § 4; Ga. L. 1985, p. 727, § 9; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1409, § 15; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1942, § 22; Ga. L. 1994, p. 887, § 15; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1367, § 9; Ga. L. 1999, p. 817, § 8; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1321, § 6; Ga. L. 2001, p. 748, § 7; Ga. L. 2003, p. 364, § 7; Ga. L. 2005, p. 1210, § 8/HB 327; Ga. L. 2007, p. 616, § 7/HB 424; Ga. L. 2013, p. 651, § 6/HB 154; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1079, § 4/HB 412; Ga. L. 2016, p. 287, § 4/HB 818.)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of workers’ compensation from June 1979 through May 1980, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 261 (1980). For article, ‘‘Workers’ Compensation,’’ see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 521 (2001). For survey article on workers’ compensation law for

the period from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 459 (2003). For annual survey of law of worker’s compensation, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 479 (2004). For annual survey of workers’ compensation law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 419 (2005). For survey article on workers’ compensation law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 463 (2007). For article on the 2013 amendment of this Code section, see 30 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 185 (2013). For note on the 1992 amendment of this Code section, see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 285 (1992).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS ANALYSIS GENERAL CONSIDERATION

SCOPE OF SECTION DEFINITIONS INCAPACITY FOR WORK PERMANENCY IMPAIRMENT OF EARNING CAPACITY General Consideration Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, annotations taken from former versions of Code 1933, §§ 114-404, 114-405, and 114-406, which contained different language and provisions are included in the annotations for this Code section. Term ‘‘weekly benefits’’ under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82(a) does not refer to only those weekly benefits provided under O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-261 and 34-9-262, which compensate for income loss, but also includes permanent partial disability benefits paid pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-263 so as to extend the statute of limitation period for filing a claim to two years after the date of the last such payment. Mickens v. Western Probation Detention Ctr., 244 Ga. App. 268, 534 S.E.2d 927 (2000). Different compensation for separate injuries. - Injured employee may receive compensation for a permanent partial physical disability, while at the same time receiving compensation for a temporary partial economic disability for separate injuries to the same part of the body. City of Atlanta v. Gentry, 184 Ga. App. 8, 360 S.E.2d 611 (1987). O.C.G.A. § 34-9-262 is midway between ‘‘total disability’’ (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-261) and ‘‘permanent partial disability’’ (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-263) and involves both economic and medical evaluation. Blevins v. Atlantic Steel Co., 172 Ga. App. 557, 323 S.E.2d 861 (1984); Holt’s Bakery v. Hutchinson, 177 Ga. App. 154, 338 S.E.2d 742 (1985). Claimant was not entitled to temporary total disability and temporary partial disability benefits when claimant had already collected a lump sum payment for permanent partial disability, and the method of crediting the overpayment was not set forth with sufficient specificity. Universal Ceramics, Inc. v. Watson, 177 Ga. App. 345, 339 S.E.2d 304 (1985).

Superior court erred in affirming the finding of the state board of workers’ compensation appellate division that a worker suffered a change of condition for the worse, under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104, not a new injury, and that the worker’s change of condition claim against the employer was not time-barred by § 34-9-104 (b); in fact, the worker’s claim for additional TTD benefits was time-barred because the claim was filed more than two years after the employer last paid the worker TTD benefits. Mech. Maint., Inc. v. Yarbrough, 264 Ga. App. 181, 590 S.E.2d 148 (2003). Statute of limitations. - Administrative law judge correctly ruled that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the last day on which income benefits were actually paid to the employee, including the penalty payments as income payments for such purposes. Tube v. Hurston, 261 Ga. App. 525, 583 S.E.2d 198 (2003). Untimely claim is barred. - O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b) is clear and unambiguous, and its plain and ordinary meaning is that the statute bars claims for permanent partial disability benefits made more than four years from the last payment of either temporary total disability benefits or temporary partial disability benefits. Bell v. Gilder Timber Co., 337 Ga. App. 47, 785 S.E.2d 682 (2016). Surviving spouse properly awarded benefits. - Because sufficient evidence supported a finding that the decedent’s tinnitis resulted from an automobile accident which occurred in the course of employment, and that such deprived the decedent of normal judgment, the trial court did not err in awarding the surviving spouse both outstanding TTD and statutory death benefits based on the decedent’s suicide. Moreover: (1) the question of whether the decedent’s suicide was a reasonably foreseeable result of the automobile accident was irrelevant; and (2) any finding that the decedent’s suicide constituted an unforeseeable intervening

General Consideration (Cont’d) cause would serve only to relieve the tortfeasor of liability, but would not bear on the question of whether the death was compensable. Bayer Corp. v. Lassiter, 282 Ga. App. 346, 638 S.E.2d 812 (2006). Cited in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Smith, 45 Ga. App. 82, 163 S.E. 247 (1932); Wilkins v. Travelers Ins. Co., 52 Ga. App. 142, 182 S.E. 628 (1935); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Boynton, 54 Ga. App. 419, 188 S.E. 265 (1936); Moore v. American Liab. Ins. Co., 67 Ga. App. 259, 19 S.E.2d 763 (1942); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Pittman, 69 Ga. App. 146, 25 S.E.2d 60 (1943); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Garner, 76 Ga. App. 87, 45 S.E.2d 109 (1947); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Brennan, 85 Ga. App. 163, 68 S.E.2d 170 (1951); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Starnes, 95 Ga. App. 274, 97 S.E.2d 624 (1957); Yates v. United States Rubber Co., 100 Ga. App. 583, 112 S.E.2d 182 (1959); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wilson, 215 Ga. 746, 113 S.E.2d 611 (1960); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. White, 103 Ga. App. 607, 120 S.E.2d 144 (1961); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Wilson, 103 Ga. App. 674, 120 S.E.2d 198 (1961); Cardin v. Riegel Textile Corp., 217 Ga. 797, 125 S.E.2d 62 (1962); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Boyer, 105 Ga. App. 830, 126 S.E.2d 280 (1962); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Davis, 106 Ga. App. 369, 126 S.E.2d 909 (1962); Collins v. Kiker, 106 Ga. App. 513, 127 S.E.2d 489 (1962); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 108 Ga. App. 623, 134 S.E.2d 49 (1963); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Archer, 108 Ga. App. 563, 134 S.E.2d 204 (1963); GMC v. Boggs, 109 Ga. App. 839, 137 S.E.2d 569 (1964); Waters v. NABISCO, 113 Ga. App. 170, 147 S.E.2d 676 (1966); Gulf Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Herndon, 113 Ga. App. 678, 149 S.E.2d 404 (1966); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 114 Ga. App. 487, 151 S.E.2d 816 (1966); Waters v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 114 Ga. App. 744, 152 S.E.2d 754 (1966); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 114 Ga. App. 755, 152 S.E.2d 782 (1966); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Beauchamp, 114 Ga. App. 834, 152 S.E.2d 898 (1966); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 119 Ga. App. 121, 166 S.E.2d 641 (1969); McMullen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 119 Ga. App. 410, 167

S.E.2d 360 (1969); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hale, 119 Ga. App. 565, 168 S.E.2d 204 (1969); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Carroll, 121 Ga. App. 78, 172 S.E.2d 869 (1970); Mull v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 226 Ga. 462, 175 S.E.2d 552 (1970); Hopper v. Continental Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 850, 176 S.E.2d 109 (1970); Jenkins Enters., Inc. v. Williams, 122 Ga. App. 840, 178 S.E.2d 926 (1970); Home Indem. Co. v. Tanksley, 123 Ga. App. 435, 181 S.E.2d 390 (1971); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Allen, 123 Ga. App. 741, 182 S.E.2d 508 (1971); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Buice, 124 Ga. App. 626, 185 S.E.2d 549 (1971); King v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 124 Ga. App. 792, 186 S.E.2d 156 (1971); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Turner, 126 Ga. App. 24, 189 S.E.2d 862 (1972); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Funderburk, 128 Ga. App. 395, 196 S.E.2d 695 (1973); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 129 Ga. App. 354, 199 S.E.2d 673 (1973); Pack v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 129 Ga. App. 589, 200 S.E.2d 300 (1973); Massey v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 368 F. Supp. 668 (S.D. Ga. 1973); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Prance, 130 Ga. App. 735, 202 S.E.2d 832 (1974); West Point Pepperell, Inc. v. Springfield, 140 Ga. App. 530, 231 S.E.2d 811 (1976); Nance v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 143 Ga. App. 537, 239 S.E.2d 156 (1977); Wills v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 143 Ga. App. 562, 239 S.E.2d 219 (1977); Newton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 148 Ga. App. 224, 251 S.E.2d 138 (1978); Hart v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 831, 289 S.E.2d 544 (1982); Georgia Power Co. v. Brown, 169 Ga. App. 45, 311 S.E.2d 236 (1983); GMC v. Summerous, 170 Ga. App. 338, 317 S.E.2d 318 (1984); Georgia Mental Health Inst. v. Padgett, 171 Ga. App. 353, 319 S.E.2d 524 (1984); Caraway v. ESB, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 349, 323 S.E.2d 197 (1984); Smith v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 185 Ga. App. 869, 366 S.E.2d 178 (1988). Scope of Section Ga. L. 1920, p. 167, § 30 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-262) provided for compensation in all cases of partial incapacity, whether temporary or permanent, unless such incapacity was caused by the loss of one of the members of the body enumerated in Ga. L. 1920, p.

167, § 32 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-263); in such a case, that section applied exclusively. Georgia Cas. Co. v. Jones, 156 Ga. 664, 119 S.E. 721 (1923). Construction of §§ 34-9-262 and

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 28 cases, 1983–2014 · leading case: Shaw Indus., Inc. v. Shaw, 586 S.E.2d 80 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).

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Shaw Indus., Inc. v. Shaw, 586 S.E.2d 80 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 10× “We granted a discretionary application in this workers’ compensation case in order to address the correct method of calculating temporary partial disability benefits under OCGA § 34-9-262 and Rules and Regulations of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation, Rule 262 (a).”

City of Atlanta v. Sumlin, 574 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 6× “On August 14, 2000, the employer filed with the State Board of Workers’ Compensation and served on Sumlin a WC-104 form providing for a reduction of Sumlin’s benefits from the temporary total disability benefits rate to the temporary partial disability benefits rate provided…”

Holt's Bakery v. Hutchinson, 338 S.E.2d 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 4× “It is undisputed that Hutchinson did not receive any temporary partial disability benefits as provided in OCGA § 34-9-262 nor any permanent disability benefits as authorized by OCGA § 34-9-263, immediately following the cessation of payments in 1981 for temporary total…”

Trent Tube v. Hurston, 583 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 2× “The statute of limitation does not begin to run until an employee receives his last payment authorized by OCGA § 34-9-261 or § 34-9-262, whether he is later determined to be entitled to them or not.”

Universal Ceramics, Inc. v. Watson, 339 S.E.2d 304 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 6× “Appellant’s final two enumerations of error raise the propriety of awarding claimant benefits for temporary total disability (see OCGA § 34-9-261 (a)) for the period of October 24, 1983 to February 14, 1984 as well as benefits for temporary partial disability (see OCGA §…”

Georgia Power Co. v. Brown, 311 S.E.2d 236 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 2× “Because appellee was engaged in part-time work for another employer at the time of the hearing, the ALJ determined that appellee was partially disabled and should be awarded compensation benefits pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-262 (Code Ann. § 114-405). On his own motion, the ALJ also…”

Mountainside Med. Ctr. v. Tanner, 484 S.E.2d 706 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 5× “OCGA § 34-9-262 provides: “[WJhere the disability to work .”

Bahadori v. Sizzler 1543, 505 S.E.2d 23 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 4× “1, and the employee is not working, the board shall determine that a change in condition for the better has occurred and the employee shall be entitled to the payment of benefits for partial disability in accordance with Code Section 34-9-262 if it is determined that the…”

Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Thompson, 757 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “Within 60 days of the employee’s release to return to work with restrictions or limitations, the employer shall provide notice to the employee on a form provided by the [B]oard that will inform the employee that he or she has been released to work with limitations or…”

Augusta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Carter, 322 S.E.2d 365 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 5× “Following his termination from light-duty work assigned to him after a disabling, on-the-job injury, the claimant in this worker’s compensation case was awarded continuing benefits for temporary partial disability pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-262. The superior court affirmed, and we…”

In Re Cain, 91 B.R. 182 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988). · cites it 2× “§ 34-9-261; (2) for temporary partial disability, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-262; and (3) for permanent partial disability, O.”

Gen. Motors Corp. v. Summerous, 317 S.E.2d 318 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 4× “Benefits are available under OCGA § 34-9-262 for temporary partial disability, “where the disability to work resulting from the injury is partial in character but temporary in quality .”

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