O.C.G.A. § 34-9-289 (2019)
Exclusive liability of employer for employee’s death or disability from occupational disease
Whenever an employer and employee are subject to this chapter, the liability of the employer under this article for the disablement or death of the employee from an occupational disease in any way incurred by such employee in the course of or because of his employment shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever at common law or otherwise to such employee or to his personal representative, next of kin, spouse, parents, guardian, or any others.
History
(Code 1933, § 114-811, enacted by Ga. L. 1946, p. 103; Ga. L. 1987, p. 1474, § 6.)
Annotations
Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 1987, p. 1474, § 17, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that that Act would apply to
any occupational disease not previously diagnosed before July 1, 1987.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Workers’ Compensation Act is exclusive remedy. - Whether a claimant actually wins compensation is irrelevant
to the fact that the Workers’ Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., is the employee’s exclusive remedy against an
employer. Venable v. John P. King Mfg. Co., 174 Ga. App. 800, 331 S.E.2d 638 (1985). Since the plaintiff ’s ailment was considered an ‘‘other occupational disease’’ both during the plaintiff ’s time of employment and when the plaintiff subsequently learned that the plaintiff ’s employment was the cause, the plaintiff ’s tort action against the former employer for damages resulting from that ailment was barred by O.C.G.A. § 34-9-289. Venable v. John P. King Mfg. Co., 174 Ga. App. 800, 331 S.E.2d 638 (1985). When former employees sued their employer in tort for their development of cancer allegedly as the result of exposure in their place of employment to chemicals, the trial court properly dismissed their complaint; a claim under the workers’ compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is the employees’ sole and exclusive remedy for injury or occupational disease incurred in the course of employment. Ervin v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 195 Ga. App. 317, 393 S.E.2d 467 (1990). It is well settled in this state that a claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., is the employee’s sole and exclusive remedy for injury or occupational disease incurred in the course of employment. This exclusivity includes wilful or intentional acts of the employer, so long as the injury arises out of and in the course of employment, as well as the employer’s failure to furnish its employees with a safe place to work. Bryant v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 770, 417 S.E.2d 688, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 417 S.E.2d 688 (1992). RICO statute does not supersede exclusivity provisions. - There is nothing in the language of the RICO statute which indicates that RICO was intended to supersede the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq. Furthermore, the Workers’ Compensation Act makes no statutory exception to the exclusivity rem-
edy provision. Bryant v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 770, 417 S.E.2d 688, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 417 S.E.2d 688 (1992). Intentional misconduct by employer. - When an employee’s injuries, such as lead poisoning, are compensable under the workers’ compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), the employee is absolutely barred from pursuing a common law tort action to recover for such injuries, even if the injuries resulted from intentional misconduct on the part of the employer. Southwire Co. v. Benefield, 184 Ga. App. 418, 361 S.E.2d 525, cert. denied, 184 Ga. App. 910, 361 S.E.2d 525 (1987). Claim to recover for death of employee barred. - Wrongful death claim was barred by O.C.G.A. § 34-9-289 when the employer locked the premises when employee was working for business purposes, delaying the ability of an emergency medical crew to reach the employee when the employee suffered a stroke. Bryant v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 770, 417 S.E.2d 688, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 417 S.E.2d 688 (1992). Injury from ‘‘occupational disease’’ not compensable without disability. - Injury stemming from an ‘‘occupational disease,’’ as defined by the Workers’ Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., is within coverage of the Act, but it is not compensable without a disability. Synalloy Corp. v. Newton, 254 Ga. 174, 326 S.E.2d 470 (1985). Effect of statutory amendments. - As to the effect of amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., on existing and terminated employment relationships, see Venable v. John P. King Mfg. Co., 174 Ga. App. 800, 331 S.E.2d 638 (1985). Cited in Fenster v. Gulf States Ceramic, 124 Ga. App. 102, 182 S.E.2d 905 (1971); Hull v. Merck & Co., 576 F. Supp. 616 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Snalloy Corp. v. Newton, 171 Ga. App. 194, 319 S.E.2d 32 (1984).
RESEARCH REFERENCES C.J.S. - 99 C.J.S., Workers’ Compensation, § 163.
ALR. - Validity of contract providing that acceptance of benefits from relief as-
sociation shall bar action against employer, 12 ALR 477. Liability of employer at common law, or apart from workmen’s compensation or specific occupational disease statutes, for occupational disease contracted by employee, 105 ALR 80. Workmen’s compensation provision as
precluding employee’s action against employer for fraud, false imprisonment, defamation, or the like, 46 ALR3d 1279. What conduct is willful, intentional, or deliberate within workmen’s compensation act provision authorizing tort action for such conduct, 96 ALR3d 1064.