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O.C.G.A.Title 34Chapter 9

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-289 (2019)

Exclusive liability of employer for employee's death or disability from occupational disease

Edition and currency
Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from Release 73 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Aug. 21, 2019) (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020), which replaced the older 2017 print volume for this title. Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTRelease 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session cited 1984–1990 7citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 7 opinions since 1984.

Whenever an employer and employee are subject to this chapter, the liability of the employer under this article for the disablement or death of the employee from an occupational disease in any way incurred by such employee in the course of or because of his employment shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever at common law or otherwise to such employee or to his personal representative, next of kin, spouse, parents, guardian, or any others.

History

(Code 1933, § 114-811, enacted by Ga. L. 1946, p. 103; Ga. L. 1987, p. 1474, § 6.)

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 1987, p. 1474, § 17, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that that Act would apply to

any occupational disease not previously diagnosed before July 1, 1987.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Workers’ Compensation Act is exclusive remedy. - Whether a claimant actually wins compensation is irrelevant

to the fact that the Workers’ Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., is the employee’s exclusive remedy against an

employer. Venable v. John P. King Mfg. Co., 174 Ga. App. 800, 331 S.E.2d 638 (1985). Since the plaintiff ’s ailment was considered an ‘‘other occupational disease’’ both during the plaintiff ’s time of employment and when the plaintiff subsequently learned that the plaintiff ’s employment was the cause, the plaintiff ’s tort action against the former employer for damages resulting from that ailment was barred by O.C.G.A. § 34-9-289. Venable v. John P. King Mfg. Co., 174 Ga. App. 800, 331 S.E.2d 638 (1985). When former employees sued their employer in tort for their development of cancer allegedly as the result of exposure in their place of employment to chemicals, the trial court properly dismissed their complaint; a claim under the workers’ compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is the employees’ sole and exclusive remedy for injury or occupational disease incurred in the course of employment. Ervin v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 195 Ga. App. 317, 393 S.E.2d 467 (1990). It is well settled in this state that a claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., is the employee’s sole and exclusive remedy for injury or occupational disease incurred in the course of employment. This exclusivity includes wilful or intentional acts of the employer, so long as the injury arises out of and in the course of employment, as well as the employer’s failure to furnish its employees with a safe place to work. Bryant v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 770, 417 S.E.2d 688, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 417 S.E.2d 688 (1992). RICO statute does not supersede exclusivity provisions. - There is nothing in the language of the RICO statute which indicates that RICO was intended to supersede the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq. Furthermore, the Workers’ Compensation Act makes no statutory exception to the exclusivity rem-

edy provision. Bryant v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 770, 417 S.E.2d 688, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 417 S.E.2d 688 (1992). Intentional misconduct by employer. - When an employee’s injuries, such as lead poisoning, are compensable under the workers’ compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), the employee is absolutely barred from pursuing a common law tort action to recover for such injuries, even if the injuries resulted from intentional misconduct on the part of the employer. Southwire Co. v. Benefield, 184 Ga. App. 418, 361 S.E.2d 525, cert. denied, 184 Ga. App. 910, 361 S.E.2d 525 (1987). Claim to recover for death of employee barred. - Wrongful death claim was barred by O.C.G.A. § 34-9-289 when the employer locked the premises when employee was working for business purposes, delaying the ability of an emergency medical crew to reach the employee when the employee suffered a stroke. Bryant v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 770, 417 S.E.2d 688, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 417 S.E.2d 688 (1992). Injury from ‘‘occupational disease’’ not compensable without disability. - Injury stemming from an ‘‘occupational disease,’’ as defined by the Workers’ Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., is within coverage of the Act, but it is not compensable without a disability. Synalloy Corp. v. Newton, 254 Ga. 174, 326 S.E.2d 470 (1985). Effect of statutory amendments. - As to the effect of amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., on existing and terminated employment relationships, see Venable v. John P. King Mfg. Co., 174 Ga. App. 800, 331 S.E.2d 638 (1985). Cited in Fenster v. Gulf States Ceramic, 124 Ga. App. 102, 182 S.E.2d 905 (1971); Hull v. Merck & Co., 576 F. Supp. 616 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Snalloy Corp. v. Newton, 171 Ga. App. 194, 319 S.E.2d 32 (1984).

RESEARCH REFERENCES C.J.S. - 99 C.J.S., Workers’ Compensation, § 163.

ALR. - Validity of contract providing that acceptance of benefits from relief as-

sociation shall bar action against employer, 12 ALR 477. Liability of employer at common law, or apart from workmen’s compensation or specific occupational disease statutes, for occupational disease contracted by employee, 105 ALR 80. Workmen’s compensation provision as

precluding employee’s action against employer for fraud, false imprisonment, defamation, or the like, 46 ALR3d 1279. What conduct is willful, intentional, or deliberate within workmen’s compensation act provision authorizing tort action for such conduct, 96 ALR3d 1064.

The 7 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 34-9-289 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENSynalloy Corp. v. Newton, 326 S.E.2d 470 (Ga. 1985).
cites § 34-9-289 20×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-289
“It is axiomatic that the legislature intended that workers' compensation be the exclusive remedy of an employee who suffers an occupational disease, OCGA § 34-9-289, and the State Board of Workers' Compensation to the sole tribunal hearing the claim, OCGA § 34-9-280 (3) (F).”
The case’s holding
The Workers' Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for employees suffering from occupational diseases, even if the cause of action did not vest until after the enactment of the relevant statutory provisions.
2
GREENVenable v. John P. King Mfg. Co., 331 S.E.2d 638 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 34-9-289 8×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-289
“OCGA § 34-9-289. In her complaint below, plaintiff alleged that the Workers’ Compensation Act was not applicable because “byssinosis was not a listed occupational disease at the time that [she] last worked for Defendant, which was the date that [she] was last exposed to said…”
3
GREENNat'l Data Corp. v. Hooper, 366 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 34-9-289 5×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-289
“We are similarly unpersuaded by appellee’s argument, based on the pre-amendment provisions of the act applicable to this case, that some of his conditions result from occupational diseases which were not listed in former OCGA § 34-9-280 and therefore, under the provisions of…”
Later courts cite it for
“that an injury is not compensable under the act does not necessarily mean it is not within the purview of the act. ... 'in exchange for the right to recover scheduled compensation without proof of negligence on the part of the employer in those cases in which a right of recovery is granted, the employee forgoes other rights and remedies which he might otherwise have had, but if he accepts the terms of the act he as well as the employer is limited to those things for which the act makes provision.” · 1 citing court
4
GREENSouthwire Co. v. Benefield, 361 S.E.2d 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 34-9-289 4×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-289
“See OCGA § 34-9-289; Synalloy Corp. v. Newton, 254 Ga.”
Later courts cite it for
“when an employee's injuries are compensable under the act, he is absolutely barred from pursuing a common law tort action to recover for such injuries, even if they resulted from intentional misconduct on the part of the employer. cits.” · 2 citing courts
5
REDSynalloy Corp. v. Newton, 319 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
cites § 34-9-289 2×cited by 7 cases
Reversed by Synalloy Corp. v. Newton (1985): the Supreme Court of Georgia's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 34-9-289
“§ 114-811 (now OCGA § 34-9-289), providing for common law rights under existing laws.”
6
NEUTRALErvin v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 393 S.E.2d 467 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
cites § 34-9-289 1×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-289
“If there was any doubt about the construction of § 34-9-289 as to occupational diseases (see Synalloy Corp.”
7
NO FLAGHull v. Merck & Co., 576 F. Supp. 616 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
cites § 34-9-289 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-289
“OCGA § 34-9-289 provides as follows: Whenever an employer and employee are subject to this chapter, the liability of the employer under this article for the disability or death of the employee from an occupational disease in any way incurred by such employee in the course of or…”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198419871990

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 1984. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.5Ga.1N.D. Ga.1
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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