Constitutionality.

- This section was not invalid as being in violation of the due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions, nor did it deny to the defendant the equal protection of the laws. City of Macon v. Benson, 175 Ga. 502, 166 S.E. 26 (1932).

The workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), insofar as it applies to municipal corporations, is not unconstitutional as authorizing municipal corporations to appropriate money for an association for noncharitable purposes. City of Atlanta v. Pickens, 176 Ga. 833, 169 S.E. 99 (1933).

Municipal corporations.

- Municipal corporations and employees come under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), irrespective of the number of employees in the service of the corporation. Carruthers v. City of Hawkinsville, 46 Ga. App. 607, 168 S.E. 120 (1933); City of Brunswick v. Edenfield, 87 Ga. App. 434, 74 S.E.2d 133 (1953), for comment, see 15 Ga. B. J. 499 (1953).

Under this section, any municipality within the state, as well as the employees of such subdivisions, must operate under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.); they are subject to its provisions involuntarily. Bartram v. City of Atlanta, 71 Ga. App. 313, 30 S.E.2d 780 (1944).

This section, relating to the exclusivity of rights and remedies, applied to municipalities, and employees thereof. Bartram v. City of Atlanta, 71 Ga. App. 313, 30 S.E.2d 780 (1944).

A municipal corporation may be liable for compensation for injuries or death of employees under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) in a proper case. City of Brunswick v. Edenfield, 87 Ga. App. 434, 74 S.E.2d 133 (1953), for comment, see 15 Ga. B. J. 499 (1953).

A municipal corporation is not given the right to accept or reject provisions of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), but is automatically placed in the category of an "employer". City Council v. Young, 218 Ga. 346, 127 S.E.2d 904 (1962).

A municipality is an employer for the purposes of workers' compensation and thus liable for benefits to which city employees are entitled. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 173 Ga. App. 95, 325 S.E.2d 408 (1984).

Tort recovery from municipality.

- A provision that employees of municipal corporations are entitled to compensation under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, and that they cannot reject the provisions of the law, prevents any recovery at common law or by statute from the municipal corporation for homicide of an employee resulting from a violation by the employer of any duty owed to the employee arising out of a master and servant relationship. Carruthers v. City of Hawkinsville, 46 Ga. App. 607, 168 S.E. 120 (1933).

Since municipalities and their employees are under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) by operation of law rather than acceptance or rejection, rights and liabilities as applied to municipalities and employees thereof are the same as those which apply to employees and employers who come under the provisions of the law by acceptance. Bartram v. City of Atlanta, 71 Ga. App. 313, 30 S.E.2d 780 (1944).

Police officers.

- When an insurance company insures a city under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) and the policy expressly covers police officers employed by the city, the salaries of the police officers being taken into consideration in fixing the premium, the police officers, insofar as the insurance company is concerned, are employees of the city and are entitled to compensation under the policy. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Wells, 35 Ga. App. 759, 134 S.E. 788 (1926).

Employer's insolvency.

- Employer's insolvency provides no defense to its liability for workers' compensation. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 173 Ga. App. 95, 325 S.E.2d 408 (1984).

Cited in Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Henderson, 37 Ga. App. 238, 139 S.E. 688 (1927); City Council v. Reynolds, 50 Ga. App. 482, 178 S.E. 485 (1935); Petty v. Mayor of College Park, 63 Ga. App. 455, 11 S.E.2d 246 (1940); Fortson v. Clarke County, 97 Ga. App. 410, 103 S.E.2d 597 (1958); Polk County v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 262 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1959); Yancey v. Green, 129 Ga. App. 705, 201 S.E.2d 162 (1973).

Counties.

- A county is a political subdivision of the state. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 404.

Continuation of order requiring hearing and award.

- Although the budget bureau may in its discretion alter its policies regarding expenditure control, the Governor's informal 1945 order requiring a hearing and an award by the state board of workers' compensation before any compensation can be paid to employees of the various departments of the state under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) continues in force and effect. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-52.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers' Compensation, § 144 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 99 C.J.S., Workers' Compensation, § 265 et seq.

ALR.

- Remedy for enforcement of award made under Workmen's Compensation Act in case of injury to public officer or employee, 10 A.L.R. 190.

Right of firemen and policemen to recover under Workmen's Compensation Acts, 81 A.L.R. 478.

Needy persons put to work by municipality or other public body as means of extending aid to them as within protection of Workmen's Compensation Act, 96 A.L.R. 1154; 127 A.L.R. 1483.

Who are "workmen" or "operatives" within Workmen's Compensation Act, 129 A.L.R. 990.

Schoolteacher as an employee within Workmen's Compensation Acts, 140 A.L.R. 1383.

Liability of urban redevelopment authority or other state or municipal agency or entity for injuries occurring in vacant or abandoned property owned by governmental entity, 7 A.L.R.4th 1129.