O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
It is the purpose of this article to encourage the employment of persons with disabilities by protecting employers from excess liability for compensation when an injury to a disabled worker merges with a preexisting permanent impairment to cause a greater disability than would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone. It shall not be construed to create, increase, or provide any benefits for injured employees or their dependents not otherwise provided by this chapter. The entitlement of an injured employee or dependents to compensation under this chapter shall be determined without regard to this article, the provisions of which shall be considered only in determining whether the employer or insurer who has paid compensation under this chapter is entitled to reimbursement from the Subsequent Injury Trust Fund.
History
(Code 1933, § 114-911, enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 608, § 1; Ga. L. 1995, p. 1302, §§ 14, 15.)
Annotations
Cross references. - Manner of determining right to compensation upon subsequent injury, § 34-9-241.
Law reviews. - For annual survey of law of worker’s compensation, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 479 (2004).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Employee with preexisting permanent impairment injured on the job. - Employer/insurer was entitled to reimbursement for excess liability when an employee with a preexisting permanent impairment, consisting of venous insufficiency, a cardiovascular disorder, suffered a subsequent compensable injury in the
form of a bacterial infection, such that the merger of the preexisting impairment and compensable injury caused greater disability than would have resulted from the compensable injury above. Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Hanson Indus., 211 Ga. App. 700, 440 S.E.2d 89 (1994).
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, § 362. C.J.S. - 100 C.J.S., Workers’ Compensation, § 743 et seq.
ALR. - Workers’ compensation: compensability of injuries incurred traveling to or from medical treatment of earlier compensable injury, 83 ALR4th 110.
Notes of Decisions
Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Muscogee Iron Works, 462 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. 1995).
· cites it 8× “In determining whether such statutory authority exists, the courts are limited to consideration of the provisions of OCGA § 34-9-350 et seq., since it is those provisions which are deemed to control proceedings initiated by an employer or insurer seeking reimbursement from the…”
Caldwell v. Aarlin/Holcombe Armature Co., 481 S.E.2d 196 (Ga. 1997).
· cites it 8× “Further, the Court found the defense to be consistent with the requirements of the Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust Fund, OCGA § 34-9-350 et seq., which allows employers with knowledge of a worker's disability to access the fund, thereby encouraging the employment of disabled…”
Georgia Elec. Co. v. Rycroft, 378 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. 1989).
· cites it 2× “OCGA § 34-9-350 et seq. These funds, however, generally require that the employer have knowledge of the pre-existing condition.”
Barzey v. City of Cuthbert, 763 S.E.2d 447 (Ga. 2014).
· cites it 2× “36, 37 ( 392 SE2d 549 ) (1990), Barzey argues that the “subsequent injury trust fund codified in OCGA § 34-9-350 is unconstitutional” because it diverts death benefits “from the heirs of the decedent to an entirely different worker bearing no relationship to the antecedent death…”
Walston & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 480 S.E.2d 917 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 2× “After reviewing the files and identifying potential claims, Walston & Associates processed the claims by filing notices of claims, conducting investigations into the merits of the claims, and preparing and submitting appropriate claims to the SITF for reimbursement.”
Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Lumley Drywall, 409 S.E.2d 254 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 2× “2 is an “employer” for purposes of reimbursement from the Subsequent Injury Trust Fund (“the Fund”), which was established by OCGA § 34-9-350 “to encourage the employment of the handicapped by protecting employers from excess liability for compensation when an injury to a…”
Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Harbin Homes, Inc., 355 S.E.2d 702 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 2× “Pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-350 et seq., the employer-insurer made application to the Subsequent Injury Trust Fund for reimbursement for her back injury.”
Muscogee Iron Works v. Ward, 455 S.E.2d 363 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 4× “” OCGA § 34-9-350. Permitting the Fund to defend with impunity the claims of employers for reimbursement without reasonable basis would encourage the Fund to do so as a routine practice.”
Altermatts Painting v. Subsequent Injury Trust Fund, 464 S.E.2d 922 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 2× “OCGA § 34-9-350. It protects employers and insurers by reimbursing them for pay *359 ing such compensation to the injured employee, according to a statutory scheme.”
Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Hanson Indus., 440 S.E.2d 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 8× “Accordingly, we choose to rephrase the question before us as follows: The fund asks us to consider, in this case of first impression, whether the fund is liable for excess liability to an employer/insured when a worker with a preexisting permanent impairment is injured on the…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.