O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-361 (2019)

Employer’s knowledge of employee’s preexisting permanent impairment

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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It shall be incumbent upon the employer to establish that the employer had reached an informed conclusion prior to the occurrence of the subsequent injury or occupational disease that the preexisting impairment is permanent and is likely to be a hindrance or obstacle to employment or reemployment. Where, however, the employer establishes knowledge of the preexisting permanent impairment prior to the subsequent injury, there shall be a presumption that the employer considered the condition to be permanent and to be, or likely to be, a

hindrance or obstacle to employment where the condition is one of the following: (1) Epilepsy; (2) Diabetes; (3) Arthritis which is an obstacle or hindrance to employment or reemployment; (4) Amputated foot, leg, arm, or hand; (5) Loss of sight of one or both eyes or a partial loss of uncorrected vision of more than 75 percent bilaterally; (6) Residual disability from poliomyelitis; (7) Cerebral palsy; (8) Multiple sclerosis; (9) Parkinson’s disease; (10) Cardiovascular disorders; (11) Tuberculosis; (12) Intellectual disability, provided the employee’s intelligence quotient is such that he falls within the lowest 2 percent of the general population; provided, however, that it shall not be necessary for the employer to know the employee’s actual intelligence quotient or actual relative ranking in relation to the intelligence quotient of the general population; (13) Psychoneurotic disability following confinement for treatment in a recognized medical or mental institution for a period in excess of six months; (14) Hemophilia; (15) Sickle cell anemia; (16) Chronic osteomyelitis; (17) Ankylosis of major weight-bearing joints; (18) Hyperinsulism; (19) Muscular dystrophy; (20) Total occupational loss of hearing as defined in Code Section 34-9-264; (21) Compressed air sequelae; (22) Ruptured intervertebral disc; or

(23) Any permanent condition which, prior to the occurrence of the subsequent injury, constitutes a 20 percent impairment of a foot, leg, hand, or arm, or of the body as a whole.

History

(Code 1933, § 114-914, enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 608, § 1; Ga. L. 2015, p. 385, § 4-15/HB 252.)

Annotations

Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1988, a hyphen was placed between the words ‘‘weight bearing’’ in paragraph (17).

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 2015, p. 385, § 1-1/HB 252, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: ‘‘This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘J. Calvin Hill, Jr., Act.’ ’’

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Cited in Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Hanson Indus., 211 Ga. App. 700, 440 S.E.2d 89 (1994). RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, § 363.

C.J.S. - 99 C.J.S., Workers’ Compensation, §§ 346, 370.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 5 cases, 1989–2016 · leading case: Georgia Elec. Co. v. Rycroft, 378 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. 1989).

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Georgia Elec. Co. v. Rycroft, 378 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. 1989). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 34-9-361. An employee’s intentional misrepresentation of his physical condition unfairly and fraudulently deprives the employer of access to the fund benefits to which it is entitled under the law.”

Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Lumley Drywall, 409 S.E.2d 254 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 2× “” The board reasoned that OCGA § 34-9-361 allows the employer (Mr. Lumley for Lumley Drywall) to reach an informed conclusion that the “employee” (Mr.”

Muscogee Iron Works v. Ward, 455 S.E.2d 363 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 2× “It took the position that the amputated arm had not caused a hindrance to Ward’s employment; that Muscogee did not know of Ward’s impairment before hiring him, as required by OCGA § 34-9-361; and that no merger occurred between the back injury and the previous disability, as…”

Special Fund Div. v. Indus. Comm'n, 376 P.3d 1286 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016). “For example, § 23-1065(C)(3)(n) could have been drafted or amended to state “[p]sychoneurotie disability following inpatient treatment in a recognized medical or mental institution” or “[p]sychoneurotie disability following confinement for treatment in a recognized medical or…”

Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Hanson Indus., 440 S.E.2d 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 8× “” A list of conditions which the legislature has deemed to presumptively create a hindrance or obstacle to employment is set forth in OCGA § 34-9-361. Included in that list is cardiovascular disorders.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.