Editor's notes.

- The 1972 amendment to this section, Ga. L. 1972, p. 929, § 2, substantially amended this section to provide for a conclusive presumption of coverage. Hence, cases decided prior thereto should be consulted with care.

Presumption of coverage.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 114-110 and 114-111 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-7 and34-9-10) create a conclusive presumption of coverage unless otherwise specifically provided in the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Fox v. Stanish, 150 Ga. App. 537, 258 S.E.2d 190 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 247 Ga. 71, 274 S.E.2d 327 (1981).

Scope of coverage.

- The 1972 repeal of a former "opt-out" provision determining what state had jurisdiction over a workers' compensation claim broadens and does not narrow the class of employees who are covered, so that all employees who work or sign a contract of employment in the state are covered regardless of their place of employment. Guinn v. Conwood Corp., 185 Ga. App. 41, 363 S.E.2d 271 (1987), cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 910, 363 S.E.2d 271 (1988).

Chapter provisions prevail.

- Provisions of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) prevail over all agreements not clearly in accord therewith, even in a case of agreement between the employer and employee approved by the board, since not only the employer and employee have a real interest in the principles and policies underlying this legislation, but it is affected with the public interest. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Welker, 75 Ga. App. 594, 44 S.E.2d 160 (1947).

Chapter exacting in provisions relating to rejection.

- Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is far-reaching and liberal in its coverage and protection of employees, but is strict, definite, and exacting in its provisions relating to its rejection. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Welker, 75 Ga. App. 594, 44 S.E.2d 160 (1947).

Coverage while employed outside state.

- As to employees who have agreed to be bound by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) by the method prescribed in this section and who have not engaged in any work within this state, it was essential that the contract of employment be executed within this state, in order that such employees may receive compensation for injuries sustained while employed outside of the state. Slaten v. Travelers Ins. Co., 197 Ga. 1, 28 S.E.2d 280, answer conformed to, 70 Ga. App. 665, 29 S.E.2d 98 (1943), cert. dismissed, 197 Ga. 856, 30 S.E.2d 822 (1944); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Swain, 90 Ga. App. 615, 83 S.E.2d 345 (1954).

Jurisdiction.

- Under this section, the state acquired jurisdiction only by act of the parties in coming within the state to execute the contract of employment; in the absence of making of a contract within the state, the parties thereto could not be subjected to the terms of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Slaten v. Travelers Ins. Co., 197 Ga. 1, 28 S.E.2d 280, answer conformed to, 70 Ga. App. 665, 29 S.E.2d 98 (1943), cert. dismissed, 197 Ga. 856, 30 S.E.2d 822 (1944).

The state acquires jurisdiction only by the act of parties in coming within this state to execute a contract of employment; in the absence of making of a contract within the state, when no work thereunder in the state is required, the parties thereto could not be subjected to the terms of the law of this state, for to do so would be to deny to them due process of law, as guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions. Cramer v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 77 Ga. App. 236, 47 S.E.2d 925 (1948).

State Board of Workers' Compensation had jurisdiction to award compensation in a case in which a Georgia employer employed a Georgia resident in Ohio, through an agent of the Georgia employer, to drive a truck loaded with freight from Ohio to Georgia, and the employee was killed in the course of employment in Kentucky while en route to Georgia. Martin v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 215 Ga. 476, 111 S.E.2d 53 (1959).

Employee can invoke jurisdiction for workers' compensation either: (1) when the injury occurred; (2) when the employment was principally located; or (3) when the contract of employment was entered. Guinn v. Conwood Corp., 185 Ga. App. 41, 363 S.E.2d 271 (1987), cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 910, 363 S.E.2d 271 (1988).

Agreement to be bound by foreign law.

- Agreement by an employee that all claims for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment would be governed by workers' compensation laws of Illinois, when the employee was never located in Illinois as an employee, and when the employee's territory as an employee did not include any part of Illinois, but in the main part was located within this state, would not operate to divest the Georgia board of jurisdiction, when the employee's injury was in this state in the course of the employee's employment. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Welker, 75 Ga. App. 594, 44 S.E.2d 160 (1947).

An agreement providing that the law of Illinois would apply to an employment contract, when Illinois did not at the time provide protection similar in principle to that provided in this state, would not be upheld by the courts of this state, nor would such an agreement be upheld if it was intended to relate to employment wholly or in the main in this state and entirely outside of Illinois. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Welker, 75 Ga. App. 594, 44 S.E.2d 160 (1947).

Cited in Georgia Power & Light Co. v. Patterson, 46 Ga. App. 7, 166 S.E. 255 (1932); Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Hunter, 184 Ga. 196, 190 S.E. 598 (1937); Grice v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 187 Ga. 259, 200 S.E. 700 (1938); Slaten v. Travelers Ins. Co., 70 Ga. App. 665, 29 S.E.2d 98 (1944); Johnson v. Great S. Trucking Co., 101 Ga. App. 472, 114 S.E.2d 209 (1960).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers' Compensation, § 1.

C.J.S.

- 100 C.J.S., Workers' Compensation, §§ 877, 878, 895 et seq.

ALR.

- Workmen's Compensation Act as affected by intention to evade or avoid the requirements of that act, 107 A.L.R. 855.

Jurisdiction to consider, and grounds of, attack upon employee's acceptance or rejection of Workmen's Compensation Act, 137 A.L.R. 747.

Applicability and effect of Workmen's Compensation Act in cases of injury to minors, 142 A.L.R. 1018.