Insane and mentally ill synonymous.

- Person who is insane, i.e., who is not legally responsible for the person's own actions because the person cannot distinguish between right and wrong, is mentally ill under this definition. Clark v. State, 151 Ga. App. 853, 261 S.E.2d 764 (1979), aff'd, 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980).

Psychiatrist has "no control" over a voluntary outpatient.

- When the patient was a voluntary outpatient, the psychiatrist had no control of the patient in the sense that the psychiatrist could claim legal authority to confine or restrain the patient against the patient's will unless the patient met the criteria for involuntary commitment set forth in O.C.G.A. § 37-3-1 and the patient had not acquiesced in the treatment plan prescribed by the psychiatrist, the psychiatrist could not have unilaterally imposed the treatment plan upon the patient except in the most extraordinary circumstances. Ermutlu v. McCorkle, 203 Ga. App. 335, 416 S.E.2d 792, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 416 S.E.2d 792 (1992).

Facts sufficient to sustain criteria for civil commitment.

- When the physician's testimony in a release hearing shows only that the defendant did not engage in aggressive, psychotic behavior and was not mentally ill during the defendant's stay at the hospital while in a structured environment, and in view of defendant's medical history, the history of the defendant's functioning in society, and the history of the case, all of which are facts which the trial court is authorized to consider, the court was authorized to find that the criteria for civil commitment had been met. Pitts v. State, 151 Ga. App. 691, 261 S.E.2d 435 (1979).

Although a defendant had not exhibited any violent tendencies or done anything to harm anyone while the defendant was in the custody of the Department of Human Resources (now known as the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities for these purposes), in light of the finding of insanity that was made after the defendant entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to two stalking charges, the presumption under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-21) that the insanity existed thereafter, the evidence that subsequent to the criminal trial, the defendant had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, and the defendant's failure to present much in the way of evidence that the defendant was sane, the defendant's civil commitment was not improper under O.C.G.A. § 37-3-1(9.1). Bonney v. State, 295 Ga. App. 706, 673 S.E.2d 102 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's petition for release from inpatient involuntary treatment under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(f) because the defendant continued to meet the statutory inpatient involuntary treatment criteria under O.C.G.A. § 37-3-1(9.1), and the defendant failed to rebut the presumption of continuing insanity and that inpatient involuntary treatment was still required; the defendant's experts testified that the defendant had physical altercations with patients and had relapsed and experienced an auditory hallucination after the trial court denied the defendant's prior request for release, which led to an increase in medications. Newman v. State, 314 Ga. App. 99, 722 S.E.2d 911 (2012).

Distinction between eligibility for guardian and for becoming an inmate.

- Person may be eligible to have a guardian and may not be eligible to become an inmate of Milledgeville (now Central) State Hospital or continue as such. Tucker v. American Sur. Co., 78 Ga. App. 327, 50 S.E.2d 859 (1948).

Acts admitted by insanity plea sufficient to sustain criteria for civil commitment.

- Acts admitted by a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity establish that the defendant meets the criteria for civil commitment. Once that condition has been established, it is presumed to continue at the time of an application for release. Moses v. State, 167 Ga. App. 556, 307 S.E.2d 35 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 427 S.E.2d 490 (1993).

Treatment outside confines of facility.

- Committing court has the authority to allow an insanity acquittee to pursue treatment, educational or other goals outside the confines of the treating facility. O'Neal v. State, 185 Ga. App. 838, 365 S.E.2d 894 (1988).

Recent expressed threat of violence.

- Patient's threat to put a family member in a body bag qualified as a recent expressed threat of violence under O.C.G.A. § 37-3-1(9.1)(A)(i). Although the incident occurred several months before the patient's habeas hearing, the patient's freedom and activities had been substantially limited by the patient's return to a hospital, thus significantly curtailing the patient's ability to commit additional threats and acts of violence. Dupree v. Schwarzkophf, Ga. , S.E.2d (June 27, 2011).

Evidence sufficient to support conclusion that mentally ill person met criteria for involuntary treatment as "inpatient." See Ruff v. Central State Hosp., 192 Ga. App. 631, 385 S.E.2d 734, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 903, 385 S.E.2d 734 (1989); Gross v. State, 210 Ga. App. 125, 435 S.E.2d 496 (1993).

"Traumatic brain injury" exclusion in O.C.G.A. § 37-3-1 did not preclude defendant's involuntary treatment since the defendant was adjudicated mentally ill as defined in O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131. Sikes v. State, 221 Ga. App. 595, 472 S.E.2d 101 (1996).

Patient did not meet criteria for involuntary commitment.

- When the patient did not express any suicidal or homicidal tendencies, and the patient's psychiatrist did not believe the patient to present a substantial risk of imminent harm to self or others, the medical expert witnesses of record were in agreement that patient's mental status did not meet the criteria for involuntary commitment set forth in O.C.G.A. § 37-3-1. Ermutlu v. McCorkle, 203 Ga. App. 335, 416 S.E.2d 792, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 416 S.E.2d 792 (1992).

When both the state's and the juvenile's expert witnesses testified that the juvenile did not require involuntary commitment, there was ample evidence supporting the juvenile court's determination that the juvenile did not meet the criteria for involuntary commitment; therefore, the transfer from juvenile court to Superior Court for criminal prosecution was proper. In the Interest of A.B.S., 242 Ga. App. 277, 529 S.E.2d 415 (2000).

In finding for the government in an action brought by a wife after her husband shot her rendering her paraplegic, the court concluded that the wife failed to show that the alleged tortfeasor, a licensed social worker, had the requisite control over the husband to give rise to a legal duty as articulated by the Georgia Supreme Court in Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199 (1982); specifically, the court found that at no time did the husband meet the involuntary commitment standard under O.C.G.A. § 37-3-1(9.1), and that even if the husband had exhibited the statutory conditions for involuntary confinement, the social worker alone could not have had him committed in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 37-3-81. Grijalva v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (M.D. Ga. 2003).

Trial court erred in denying a recommendation filed by the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities that a patient be moved to a group home for outpatient involuntary treatment because the preponderance of the evidence supported a finding that the patient overcame the presumption under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-21) of a continued need for inpatient involuntary treatment, and there was no evidence to support the trial court's finding that under O.C.G.A. § 37-3-1(9.1), the patient posed a substantial risk of imminent harm to the patient or others or was so unable to care for the patient's own physical health and safety as to create an imminently life-endangering crisis; the group home would have only two other suitable patient occupants, both of whom would be under the supervision of live-in supervisors and would have little opportunity to pressure the patient into misconduct, the patient would not be permitted to leave the group home unsupervised, the manager of the group home testified that as soon as patients were admitted into the group home and evaluated, an individualized service plan was created, and there was no statutory requirement that a plan exist prior to release. Nelor v. State, 309 Ga. App. 165, 709 S.E.2d 904 (2011).

Definition of mentally ill outpatient not met.

- There was no evidence to support a finding that without involuntary treatment, the defendant, who had a good insight into the defendant's condition and was compliant and independently caring for self, would be a danger of imminently becoming an inpatient again and thus, the defendant did not fit the definition of mentally ill outpatient. Coogler v. State, 324 Ga. App. 796, 751 S.E.2d 584 (2013).

Primary treating physician acting as chief medical officer.

- It is reasonable to permit a primary treating physician to act as chief medical officer for purposes of the discharge of his or her patients. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Peeks, 261 Ga. 96, 403 S.E.2d 36 (1991).

When a hospital's chief medical officer appointed a patient's primary treating physician to act as chief medical officer for purposes of discharging a patient, the officer's failure to make the appointment in writing did not vitiate the appointment. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Peeks, 261 Ga. 96, 403 S.E.2d 36 (1991).

Mental health records of a person who allegedly shot a number of people in a shopping mall were "clinical records" within the meaning of paragraph (2) of O.C.G.A. § 37-3-1, and therefore not subject to inspection under the Open Records Act. Southeastern Legal Found., Inc. v. Ledbetter, 260 Ga. 803, 400 S.E.2d 630 (1991).

Defendant failed to prove sanity.

- Defendant failed to prove that the defendant was not insane when the evidence indicated, inter alia, that the defendant had multiple fixed delusions, including believing to be a secret service agent and owning the hospital where the defendant was committed. Gross v. State, 262 Ga. App. 328, 585 S.E.2d 671 (2003).

Patient's request for unconditional release denied.

- Patient, who was involuntarily committed to a hospital after the patient was found not guilty by reason of insanity of several crimes, was not entitled to an unconditional release from the hospital because the patient, who had to take medication, had engaged in dangerous or threatening acts towards others, the patient's personality disorders and the patient's schizo-affective disorder qualified as mental illnesses under O.C.G.A. § 37-1-1(12), and the patient's schizo-affective disorder also would have made the defendant an imminent threat of harm to others if the defendant were unconditionally released. Dupree v. Schwarzkophf, Ga. , S.E.2d (June 27, 2011).

Cited in Strickland v. Peacock, 88 Ga. App. 384, 77 S.E.2d 20 (1953); Pennewell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 611, 251 S.E.2d 832 (1979); Bell v. State, 244 Ga. 211, 259 S.E.2d 465 (1979); Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980); Benham v. Edwards, 501 F. Supp. 1050 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Sorrells v. Sorrells, 247 Ga. 9, 274 S.E.2d 314 (1981); Gates v. State, 167 Ga. App. 353, 306 S.E.2d 411 (1983); Pope v. State, 172 Ga. App. 396, 323 S.E.2d 268 (1984); Nelson v. State, 254 Ga. 611, 331 S.E.2d 554 (1985); Roberts v. Grigsby, 177 Ga. App. 377, 339 S.E.2d 633 (1985); Nelson v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 178 Ga. App. 670, 344 S.E.2d 492 (1986); Ledbetter v. Cannon, 192 Ga. App. 392, 384 S.E.2d 875 (1989); Heichelbech v. Evans, 798 F. Supp. 708 (M.D. Ga. 1992); Nagel v. State, 264 Ga. 150, 442 S.E.2d 446 (1994); Bruscato v. Gwinnett-Rockdale-Newton Cmty. Serv. Bd., 290 Ga. App. 638, 660 S.E.2d 440 (2008).

"Governing authority of county" interpretation.

- Hearing officers appointed pursuant to former Code 1933, § 88-502.23 (see O.C.G.A. § 37-3-84) were appointed for the benefit of the probate court making the appointment, not for the benefit of the county of residence of any patient receiving a hearing before such hearing officer; therefore, the reference in paragraph (4) of former Code 1933, § 88-501 (see O.C.G.A. § 37-3-1) to the "governing authority of the county" referred to the governing authority of the county in which the probate court was found. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U78-38.

Limitation of scope of patient.

- An inmate transferred to Central State Hospital for treatment of a mental disorder would not be a patient within the meaning of this section. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-54 (see O.C.G.A. § 37-3-1).

C.J.S.

- 56 C.J.S., Mental Health, §§ 1, 3.

ALR.

- Effect of death of appellant upon appeal from judgment of mental incompetence against him, 54 A.L.R.2d 1161.

Civil liability of psychiatrist arising out of patient's violent conduct resulting in injury to or death of patient or third party allegedly caused in whole or part by mental disorder, 80 A.L.R.6th 469.