O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 4-3-2 (2019)

Definitions

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section GA-LEGlegis.ga.gov (official) JustiaJustia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

As used in this chapter, the term: (1) ‘‘Livestock’’ means all animals of the equine, bovine, or swine class, including goats, sheep, mules, horses, hogs, cattle, and other grazing animals. (2) ‘‘Owner’’ means any person, association, firm, or corporation, natural or artificial, owning, having custody of, or in charge of livestock. (3) ‘‘Public roads’’ means any street, road, highway, or way, including the full width of the right of way, which is open to the use of the public for vehicular travel. (4) ‘‘Running at large’’ or ‘‘straying’’ means any livestock which is not under manual control of a person and which is on any public roads of this state or on any property not belonging to the owner of the livestock, unless by permission of the owner of such property.

History

(Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 380, § 2; Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 395, § 2; Ga. L. 1995, p. 244, § 4; Ga. L. 2008, p. 458, § 3/SB 364.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS ‘‘Owner’’ construed. - Landowner who allowed her cousin to keep his cattle on her property, provided he maintained the fence around the property, did not come within the statutory definition of an ‘‘owner.’’ Evancho v. Baker, 196 Ga. App. 903, 397 S.E.2d 166 (1990).

Owner of a pasture who allowed her son to keep his horse in the pasture was not an ‘‘owner’’ of the horse as that term is defined in this Code section. Supchak v. Pruitt, 232 Ga. App. 680, 503 S.E.2d 581 (1998).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 5 cases, 1990–2020 · leading case: Supchak v. Pruitt, 503 S.E.2d 581 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

Supchak v. Pruitt, 503 S.E.2d 581 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 4× “” OCGA § 4-3-2 (2). Under the facts of this case, neither Ruth Pruitt nor Boyce Pruitt Livestock & Feed falls within that definition of an owner.”

Gill v. Prehistoric Ponds, Inc., 634 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 4× “” 16 In reversing the appellate division’s award, the superior court held that its reliance on OCGA § 4-3-2 to define livestock was error; that its application of OCGA§ 27-1-2 (34) to exclude alligators and to decide that the breeding and raising of alligators is a…”

Evancho v. Baker, 397 S.E.2d 166 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 4-3-2 defines “owner” as “any person .”

Hortman v. Guy, 529 S.E.2d 182 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 2× “We have held that a landowner who allows livestock on his land is not necessarily the “owner” as defined in OCGA § 4-3-2 (2) (“ ‘Owner’ means any person, association, firm, or corporation, natural or artificial, owning, having custody of, or in charge of livestock.”

Billy M. Faulkner v. Sonia L. Crumbley (Ga. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 4× “Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout this state and no local or special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law, except that the General Assembly may by general law authorize local governments by…”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.