O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Any traffic violation under the jurisdiction of the traffic violations bureau shall be characterized and classified as a traffic violation and shall not be considered as a misdemeanor. Whenever any traffic violation is transferred from another court to a court which has a traffic violations bureau, if such offense is classified as a traffic violation on the traffic violations bureau schedule of the receiving court, such violation shall be handled and disposed of by such traffic violations bureau. Where a defendant demands a trial on a traffic violation, it shall be tried before a judge of the court which established the traffic violations bureau. The request for a trial shall not result in a loss of jurisdiction
by the traffic violations bureau.
History
(Ga. L. 1966, p. 381, § 12; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2785, § 29.)
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS O.C.G.A. § 40-13-60 is unconstitutional to the extent the statute may be interpreted as limiting a traffic violator to a bench trial and because the written rights advisement form used with regard to the traffic violations charged against a defendant was tailored only to guilty pleas and did not adequately address the defendant’s right to a jury trial. Smith v. State, 270 Ga. App. 759, 608 S.E.2d 35 (2004). No right to counsel on speeding charge. - Defendant was not entitled to counsel at the bench trial when the defendant was tried for speeding because, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-13-60, the defendant was tried for a traffic violation, and was not subjected to a misdemeanor prosecution. Miller-Roy v. State, 255 Ga. App. 575, 565 S.E.2d 899 (2002).
Right to trial by jury. - O.C.G.A. § 40-13-60 manifestly infringes on Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. XI, Para. I insofar as the statute denies a criminal defendant, who is subject to potential punishment as a misdemeanant, the right to trial by jury; eliminating the language in O.C.G.A. § 40-13-60 that seemingly restricts a traffic violator to a bench trial would not undermine the general intent and overall scheme of O.C.G.A. § 40-13-50 et seq. Geng v. State, 276 Ga. 428, 578 S.E.2d 115 (2003). Cited in Daniel v. State, 169 Ga. App. 722, 314 S.E.2d 737 (1984); Keller v. State, 183 Ga. App. 717, 359 S.E.2d 714 (1987); Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2003).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
10
cases, 1984–2004 · leading case:
Geng v. State, 578 S.E.2d 115 (Ga. 2003).
Geng v. State, 578 S.E.2d 115 (Ga. 2003).
· cites it 56× “" OCGA § 40-13-60. Finally, if a person cited for a traffic violation under the statute fails to appear in court as ordered, the traffic violations bureau loses jurisdiction and the case is forwarded to the prosecuting attorney of the court who shall have an accusation issued…”
State v. Lockett, 576 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 2× “A police officer may be cited for committing traffic violations without a grand jury presentment under OCGA § 40-13-60, which states in part that “a traffic violation .”
Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2003).
· cites it 2× “Ga.Code Ann. §§ 40-13-60, 40-13-61. Because the firearms offense with which Adefemi was charged is graded as at least a misdemeanor, see Ga.”
Gregg v. State, 558 S.E.2d 729 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 2× “3 See OCGA § 40-13-60. 4 Freeman, supra, 194 Ga.”
Keller v. State, 359 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 2× “However, OCGA § 40-13-60 specifies that “[a]ny traffic violation under the jurisdiction of the traffic violations bureau shall be characterized and classified as a traffic violation and shall not be considered as a misdemeanor.”
Ramsey v. State, 375 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 2× “” OCGA § 40-13-60. Yet, if the accused fails to appear and has not posted a cash bond, the traffic bureau loses jurisdiction, the state court gains jurisdiction, “and the prosecuting attorney of the court shall have an accusation issued against such person,” and the case is…”
United States v. Bobby Joe Wilson, 853 F.2d 869 (11th Cir. 1988).
· cites it 3× “O.C.G.A. § 40-13-60, also part of that article, states that “[a]ny traffic violation under the jurisdiction of the traffic violations bureau shall be characterized and classified as a traffic violation and shall not be considered as a misdemeanor.”
Smith v. State, 608 S.E.2d 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 4× “Because Smith raises his claim for the first time on appeal through appellate counsel, the record is insufficient to determine whether Smith knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial.”
Miller-Roy v. State, 565 S.E.2d 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 2× “”); see also OCGA § 40-6-1 (a) (“It is unlawful and, unless otherwise declared in this chapter with respect to particular offenses, it is a misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required in this chapter.”
Daniel v. State, 314 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 2× “Pursuant to OCGA § 40-13-60 (Code Ann. § 24-312a), “[a]ny traffic violation under the jurisdiction of the traffic violations bureau shall be characterized and classified as a traffic violation and shall not be considered as a misdemeanor.”
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