O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-3-24 (2019)

Contents of certificate of title; certificate of title not subject to judicial process

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section GA-LEGlegis.ga.gov (official) JustiaJustia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

(a) Each certificate of title issued by the commissioner or the commissioner’s duly authorized county tag agent shall contain: (1) The date issued; (2) The name and address of the owner; (3) The names and addresses of the holders of any security interest and of any lien as shown on the application or, if the application is based on a certificate of title, as shown on the certificate; (4) The title number assigned to the vehicle; (5) A description of the vehicle, including, so far as the following data exist: its make, model, identifying number, type of body, number of cylinders, whether new, used, or a demonstrator and, if a new vehicle or a demonstrator, the date of the first sale of the vehicle for use; and (6) Any other data the commissioner prescribes. (b) The certificate of title shall contain forms for assignment and

MOTOR VEHICLES & TRAFFIC

warranty of title by the owner, and for assignment and warranty of title by a dealer, and may contain forms for applications for a certificate of title by a transferee or naming of a security interest holder and of a lienholder and the assignment or release of the security interest and lien. (c) A certificate of title issued by the commissioner or the commissioner’s duly authorized county tag agent is prima-facie evidence of the facts appearing on it. (d) A certificate of title for a vehicle is not subject to garnishment, attachment, execution, or other judicial process, but this subsection does not prevent a lawful levy upon the vehicle.

History

Ga. L. 1961, p. 68, § 11; Ga. L. 1962, p. 79, § 8; Code 1981, § 40-3-25; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1186, § 7; Code 1981, § 40-3-24, as redesignated by Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 3; Ga. L. 1997, p. 739, § 8; Ga. L. 2024, p. 1052, § 4(36)/SB 448, effective July 1, 2024. Amendments. The 2024 amendment, effective July 1, 2024, part of an Act to revise, modern-

ize, and correct the Code, revised punctuation in paragraph (a)(5).

Annotations

Law reviews. For comment on Maley v. National Acceptance Co., 250 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Ga. 1966), see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 248 (1966).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Bank’s security interest survives owner’s use of unregistered trade name. - Use of an unregistered trade name as the owner’s name does not defeat a creditor’s search for, and the giving of notice to the world of, the existence of the bank’s security interest and does not therefore invalidate the bank’s security interest. In re Firth, 363 F. Supp. 369, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12015 (M.D. Ga. 1973). What constitutes evidence of ownership. - Application for a certificate of title and a certificate stating that the title has been issued is not a copy of a certificate of title and, therefore, is not entitled to the effect that a certificate of title would have under subsection (c) of Ga. L. 1962, p. 79, § 8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-3-24). Harper v. Green, 115 Ga. App. 525, 154 S.E.2d 762, 1967 Ga. App. LEXIS 1151 (1967). Georgia certificate of title is not conclusive. By being only prima facie evidence of the question of title it can be contradicted by other evidence.

Wielgorecki v. White, 133 Ga. App. 834, 212 S.E.2d 480, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 2307 (1975). Certificate of title is prima facie evidence of the ownership of an automobile and is sufficient to prove ownership in the absence of evidence clearly contradicting the facts recited in the certificate. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 11547 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953, 99 S. Ct. 349, 58 L. Ed. 2d 344, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 3715 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953, 99 S. Ct. 349, 58 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1978). “Fact” under subsection (c). - Owner’s name stated in the certificate of title is a “fact” within the meaning of subsection (c) of Ga. L. 1962, p. 79, § 8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-3-24). Thornton v. Alford, 112 Ga. App. 321, 145 S.E.2d 106, 1965 Ga. App. LEXIS 691 (1965). Personal signature of the owner is not a “fact” within the meaning of subsection (c) of Ga. L. 1962, p. 79, § 8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-3-24) but merely a matter of form in making an application for the

certificate. Thornton v. Alford, 112 Ga. App. 321, 145 S.E.2d 106, 1965 Ga. App. LEXIS 691 (1965). Reaching debtor by garnishing title in bank’s hands. - Judgment creditor cannot reach the debtor’s rights in vehicles, certificates of title to which are

held by the bank as security interests for the debtor’s loans by attempting to garnish the certificates of title in the bank’s hand. Cobb Bank & Trust Co. v. Springfield, 145 Ga. App. 753, 245 S.E.2d 42, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2120 (1978).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Priority of stolen vehicle’s original owner’s property right. - Issuance of title to another cannot deprive stolen

vehicle’s original owner of that owner’s property right. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U70-224.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 30, 31.

C.J.S. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 96 et seq.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1983–2021 · leading case: Napper v. Georgia Television Co., 356 S.E.2d 640 (Ga. 1987).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Napper v. Georgia Television Co., 356 S.E.2d 640 (Ga. 1987). · cites it 4× “Subsection (d) of § 10 of the “Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act” (OCGA § 40-3-24 (d)) provides that motor vehicle records which the State Revenue Commissioner is required to maintain are “[e]xempt from the provisions of any law of this state requiring that *166 such…”
Danforth v. Bulman, 623 S.E.2d 732 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 2× “566, 568 (2) ( 322 SE2d 487 ) (1984) (owner under family purpose doctrine is someone who owns vehicle, controls its use, has some property interest in it or supplies it); OCGA § 40-3-24 (c) (a certificate of title is prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on it); Watson v.”
Williams v. Coffee Cnty. Bank, 308 S.E.2d 430 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 2× “However, see OCGA § 40-3-24 (formerly Code Ann. § 68-410a, amended by 1981 Ga.”
United States v. 1997 Int'l 9000 Semi Truck VIN: 1HSRUAER8VH409632, 412 F. App'x 118 (10th Cir. 2011). “See Ga. Code Ann. § 40-3-24 . 6 . Georgia law requires an application for a certificate of title for a vehicle previously registered in another state to contain or be accompanied by "any .”
United States v. Bushay, 34 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (N.D. Ga. 2014). · cites it 2× “See O.C.G.A. § 40-3-24(c). This certificate, however, “is not the title or ownership itSelf but only evidence of it.”
Claudia Josefina Newton Frausto & Eduardo Teodulo Torres (Bankr. D. Neb. 2021). “Ga. Code Ann. § 40-3-24 (c) (West 2021). The owner’s name listed on the title is a fact within the meaning of the statute.”
United States v. Nugen Motor Sports, Inc., 621 F. App'x 968 (11th Cir. 2015). “O.C.G.A. § 40-3-24(c). Consequently, “[t]he certificate is not the title or ownership itself but only evidence of it.”
— 40-3-24(c) — 2 cases
United States v. Bushay, 34 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (N.D. Ga. 2014). “See O.C.G.A. § 40-3-24(c). This certificate, however, “is not the title or ownership itSelf but only evidence of it.”
United States v. Nugen Motor Sports, Inc., 621 F. App'x 968 (11th Cir. 2015). “O.C.G.A. § 40-3-24(c). Consequently, “[t]he certificate is not the title or ownership itself but only evidence of it.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.