Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1910, §§ 1770(4), 1770(29), and 1770(50) are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Purpose of regulations.

- Purpose of the several regulations of motor vehicles is the protection of the lives and limbs of all persons upon or using such streets and highways, not only those who may be met, overtaken, or passed by the driver, but as well for the protection of those who may accompany the driver. Black v. State, 34 Ga. App. 449, 130 S.E. 591 (1925) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(50)).

Violation is negligence per se.

- It is negligence per se to operate an automobile along one of the public highways of this state from one hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise without carrying a proper light. Sheppard v. Johnson, 11 Ga. App. 280, 75 S.E. 348 (1912) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(4)).

Whether or not vehicle is equipped with lights.

- Under former Code 1910, § 1770, it was a criminal offense for a person to operate a motor vehicle on a public highway of this state during the period between one hour (now a half-hour) after sunset and one hour (now a half-hour) before sunrise, without having any lights burning on the vehicle, whether or not the vehicle was equipped with such lights as is required by the statute. Davis v. West Lumber Co., 32 Ga. App. 460, 123 S.E. 757 (1924) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(50)); Fuller v. State, 33 Ga. App. 372, 126 S.E. 302 (1925) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(29)).

Headlights not required.

- Trial court did not err when the court granted summary judgment to a driver when the driver had the right of way over the vehicle with which the driver collided, and though not required by law to have the driver's headlights on, the driver stated that the driver's headlights were in fact on because the driver remembered turning the lights on, and because the light from the headlights reflected off of the other car immediately before the collision. Charles v. Glover, 258 Ga. App. 710, 574 S.E.2d 910 (2002).

Section is strict liability statute.

- O.C.G.A. §§ 40-8-20 and40-8-22 are examples of "strict criminal liability" motor vehicle safety statutes, which can be violated and enforced of necessity through a criminal sanction without a showing of mens rea or guilty knowledge on the part of the violator. Queen v. State, 189 Ga. App. 161, 375 S.E.2d 287 (1988).

Presumption as to compliance.

- With nothing appearing to the contrary, it will be assumed that the automobile was duly equipped with "front lights" and that the lights were "throwing strong white lights to a reasonable distance in the direction in which such vehicle is proceeding," in accordance with the requirements of former Code 1910, § 1770. City of Macon v. Jones, 36 Ga. App. 799, 138 S.E. 283 (1927) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(50)).

Violation as basis for traffic stop and search.

- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the methamphetamine seized as a result of a traffic stop on the vehicle the defendant was a passenger in as sufficient evidence supported the trial court's finding that an officer's stop of the vehicle was justified by the officer's reasonable articulable suspicion of a crime, specifically, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-8-20. Richardson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 89, 640 S.E.2d 676 (2006).

Trial court's finding that the officer's initial stop of the defendant's vehicle was lawful based upon the trial court's finding that the visibility warranted the use of headlights and taillights was consistent with witness testimony. Owens v. State, 334 Ga. App. 203, 778 S.E.2d 830 (2015).

Negligence per se instruction not supported by evidence.

- When a driver collided with a second driver's stalled truck, it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on negligence per se in relation to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-202 as the charge was not supported by the evidence; the highway was in a rural area, the second driver had not been driving without lights, but lost illumination when the vehicle's engine failed, and there was no evidence that the second driver had "parked" the truck, but that the truck came to a stop of the truck's own volition. White v. Scott, 284 Ga. App. 87, 643 S.E.2d 356 (2007).

Cited in Southeastern Liquid Fertilizer Co. v. Mock, 92 Ga. App. 270, 88 S.E.2d 531 (1955); Maulding v. Atlanta Transit Sys., 101 Ga. App. 11, 112 S.E.2d 666 (1960); Fields v. Jackson, 102 Ga. App. 117, 115 S.E.2d 877 (1960); Mathis v. Patrick, 109 Ga. App. 376, 136 S.E.2d 166 (1964); Plyler v. Smith, 193 Ga. App. 114, 386 S.E.2d 881 (1989); Cannon Air Transp. Servs. v. Stevens Aviation, Inc., 249 Ga. App. 514, 548 S.E.2d 485 (2001); State v. Hasson, 334 Ga. App. 1, 778 S.E.2d 15 (2015); Jenkins v. State, 345 Ga. App. 684, 813 S.E.2d 438 (2018).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 205, 206.

C.J.S.

- 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 18, 43 et seq. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 625 et seq., 697, 698. 61 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 1317, 1330, 1338, 1353, 1359. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 1640.