Section not limited to enumerated parts.

- Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess. p. 556, §§ 102 and 123 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-8-7), in proscribing unsafe vehicles, is not limited in effect only to the parts enumerated, but is sufficiently broad to cover any other equipment on a motor vehicle which, being defective, renders the vehicle dangerous to others. Beck v. Wade, 100 Ga. App. 79, 110 S.E.2d 43 (1959).

Construction.

- On the statute's face, O.C.G.A. § 40-8-7 plainly punishes both driving a vehicle in an unsafe condition endangering another and driving a vehicle having defective equipment, and the statute does not condition multiple violations thereof upon different arrests or separate and isolated incidents. Edmondson v. State, 285 Ga. App. 543, 647 S.E.2d 92 (2007).

Strict criminal liability.

- In a prosecution for driving an unsafe motor vehicle with defective equipment, it was proper to instruct the jury that such crimes are violations of strict liability criminal statutes; meaning that the state must prove that the defendant must do the acts or make the omissions that are prohibited, but does not have to prove a mental fault. Coates v. State, 216 Ga. App. 93, 453 S.E.2d 35 (1994).

In a prosecution for driving an unsafe motor vehicle with defective equipment, the defense of accident did not apply. The fact that there was no criminal scheme, undertaking, or criminal negligence was not a defense to this strict liability criminal statute. Coates v. State, 216 Ga. App. 93, 453 S.E.2d 35 (1994).

State was not required to prove guilty knowledge in a prosecution for driving an improperly equipped vehicle. Nelson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 623, 481 S.E.2d 605 (1997).

Violation provided probable cause for investigatory stop.

- Officer's observation of a three-inch crack in the taillight and a hole in the lens of the defendant's car provided the officer with a valid basis for an investigatory stop. Loveless v. State, 337 Ga. App. 894, 789 S.E.2d 244 (2016).

Trial court erred by finding that a traffic stop was not authorized because the stop was outside of the officer's jurisdiction; the stop was authorized under the hot pursuit doctrine because it started immediately after the officer observed the defendant's broken tag light, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-8-7(a), and was continuous until the stop was effected. State v. Charles, 344 Ga. App. 456, 810 S.E.2d 627 (2018).

Original equipment not required.

- Defendant's truck's lack of an interior rearview mirror did not constitute a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-8-7 or O.C.G.A. § 40-8-72, neither of which required the vehicle to contain all original equipment from the time of manufacture and, as a result, could not have given the officer the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a stop. Abercrombie v. State, 343 Ga. App. 774, 808 S.E.2d 245 (2017).

Determination of safety for jury.

- It is proper to allow the jury to determine whether a vehicle was unsafe. Elliott v. Leavitt, 122 Ga. App. 622, 178 S.E.2d 268 (1970).

Sufficient evidence of guilt.

- Given evidence from an ensuing police officer identifying the defendant as the driver of the vehicle stopped, and because the jury was the judge of the credibility of the witnesses presented at trial, and was authorized to reject the defendant's alibi defense, sufficient evidence was presented to support the defendant's convictions for reckless driving, failure to maintain a lane, driving with defective equipment, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and obstruction of a police officer. Daniel v. State, 282 Ga. App. 291, 638 S.E.2d 430 (2006).

Sentencing.

- Because there was no evidence that the defendant had commenced serving the sentence announced at trial, the trial court did not erroneously increase the sentence nine days later to 12 months' confinement by means of a nunc pro tunc order. Edmondson v. State, 285 Ga. App. 543, 647 S.E.2d 92 (2007).

In a case arising from a single traffic accident involving the defendant's tractor-trailer, the trial court did not err in not merging the defendant's convictions on 12 counts of driving a vehicle with defective equipment; O.C.G.A. § 40-8-7 does not condition multiple violations upon different arrests or separate incidents, and each equipment defect count charged different defects and thus was proven on different facts. Edmondson v. State, 285 Ga. App. 543, 647 S.E.2d 92 (2007).

Negligence per se instruction not supported by evidence.

- When a driver collided with a second driver's stalled truck, it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on negligence per se in relation to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-202 as the charge was not supported by the evidence; the highway was in a rural area, the second driver had not been driving without lights, but lost illumination when the vehicle's engine failed, and there was no evidence that the second driver "parked" the truck, but that the truck came to a stop of the truck's own volition. White v. Scott, 284 Ga. App. 87, 643 S.E.2d 356 (2007).

Merger.

- Given that each of the defendant's defective equipment convictions were proven on different facts, no error resulted from the trial court's failure to merge such offenses for sentencing purposes. Edmondson v. State, 285 Ga. App. 543, 647 S.E.2d 92 (2007).

Cited in Southeastern Liquid Fertilizer Co. v. Mock, 92 Ga. App. 270, 88 S.E. 531 (1955); Sims v. Hoff, 106 Ga. App. 626, 127 S.E.2d 679 (1962); Borochoff v. Russell, 108 Ga. App. 266, 132 S.E.2d 861 (1963); Arnold Servs., Inc. v. Sullins, 110 Ga. App. 19, 137 S.E.2d 727 (1964); Shirey v. Woods, 118 Ga. App. 851, 165 S.E.2d 891 (1968); Glynn Plymouth, Inc. v. Davis, 120 Ga. App. 475, 170 S.E.2d 848 (1969); Southeast Transp. Corp. v. Hogan Livestock Co., 133 Ga. App. 825, 212 S.E.2d 638 (1975); Simpson v. Reed, 186 Ga. App. 297, 367 S.E.2d 563 (1988); Newman v. Collins, 186 Ga. App. 595, 367 S.E.2d 866 (1988); United States v. Delyea, 703 F. Supp. 83 (M.D. Ga. 1989); Brock v. State, 196 Ga. App. 605, 396 S.E.2d 785 (1990); Robinson v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 197 Ga. App. 628, 399 S.E.2d 252 (1990); Hall v. Buck, 206 Ga. App. 754, 426 S.E.2d 586 (1992); In the Interest of W.N.J., 268 Ga. App. 637, 602 S.E.2d 173 (2004); Valentine v. State, 323 Ga. App. 761, 748 S.E.2d 122 (2013).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 68-1723 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Each operation of unsafe vehicle is misdemeanor.

- Once a vehicle has been declared unsafe, a misdemeanor citation may be issued each time the vehicle is found moving on the highways for purposes other than effecting the requisite repairs. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-31 (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-1723).

Persons who may be issued citations.

- Citations may be issued not only to the driver of an unsafe school bus but also to any person who knew the school bus to be in an unsafe condition and yet ordered or directed the driver to take the bus upon the highways, and to the owner of the school bus if such owner knew of the unsafe condition and yet permitted continued operation of the school bus. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-31 (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-1723).

Motor scooters.

- Retailer of motor scooters must comply with the inspection requirements of former Code 1933, § 1723 prior to shipment or sale of such motor scooters to a purchaser. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-91 (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-1723).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 717.

C.J.S.

- 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 1504 et seq., 1639, 1640.

ALR.

- Contributory negligence of driver or occupant of motor vehicle driven without lights or with defective or inadequate lights, 67 A.L.R.2d 118; 62 A.L.R.3d 560; 62 A.L.R.3d 771; 62 A.L.R.3d 844.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by absence or insufficiency of lights on parked or standing motor vehicle, 61 A.L.R.3d 13.