O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-8-70 (2019)

Horns and warning devices

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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(a) Every motor vehicle when operated upon a highway shall be equipped with a horn in good working order and capable of emitting sound audible under normal conditions from a distance of not less than 200 feet, but no horn or other warning device shall emit an unreasonably loud or harsh sound or a whistle. The driver of a motor vehicle shall, when it is reasonably necessary to ensure safe operation, give audible warning with his or her horn but shall not otherwise use such horn when upon a highway. (b) No vehicle shall be equipped with nor shall any person use upon a vehicle any siren, whistle, or bell except as otherwise permitted in this Code section and Code Section 40-8-94. (c) No vehicle shall be equipped with a theft alarm signal device which is so arranged that it can be used by the driver as an ordinary warning signal.

History

(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 116; Code 1933, § 68E-401, enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 165, § 4; Code 1981, § 40-8-70, enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 165, § 10; Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 40.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Failure to blow horn may be negligence. - Driver who is conscious of the presence of a pedestrian in the street may be found negligent in failing to blow the horn or give such other warning of the approach of the automobile as may be reasonably necessary. Lott v. Herrin, 120 Ga. App. 796, 172 S.E.2d 203 (1969). Unlawful siren use not negligence per se. - In a negligence action arising out of a motor vehicle collision, the defendant’s unlawful use of a siren was not negligence per se. There had to be evidence of a causal relationship between the defendant’s failure to obtain a permit for the siren and the collision. Pryor v. Phillips, 222 Ga. App. 116, 473 S.E.2d 535 (1996).

Cited in Collins v. Alewine, 102 Ga. App. 172, 115 S.E.2d 721 (1960); Myers v. Pearce, 102 Ga. App. 235, 115 S.E.2d 842 (1960); Marsh v. Hargrove, 103 Ga. App. 264, 118 S.E.2d 866 (1961); Grayson v. Yarbrough, 103 Ga. App. 243, 119 S.E.2d 41 (1961); Fuller v. Self, 107 Ga. App. 664, 131 S.E.2d 241 (1963); Hughes v. Brown, 111 Ga. App. 676, 143 S.E.2d 30 (1965); Howard v. Hall, 112 Ga. App. 247, 145 S.E.2d 70 (1965); Bennett v. Haley, 132 Ga. App. 512, 208 S.E.2d 302 (1974); Blizzard v. Bennett, 143 Ga. App. 568, 239 S.E.2d 223 (1977); Hurst v. J.P. Colley Contractors, 167 Ga. App. 56, 306 S.E.2d 54 (1983); Frasard v. State, 278 Ga. App. 352, 629 S.E.2d 53 (2006).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 201. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 597. C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 43 et seq. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 623. 61 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 1208. ALR. - Automobiles: duty and liability

with respect to giving audible signal at intersection, 21 A.L.R.3d 268. Automobiles: duty and liability with respect to giving audible signal before passing, 22 A.L.R.3d 325. Automobiles: duty and liability with respect to giving audible signal upon approaching pedestrian, 24 A.L.R.3d 183.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 8 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1983–2023 · leading case: McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856 (Ga. 2019).

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McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856 (Ga. 2019). · cites it 2× “352, 357 (3) ( 629 SE2d 53 ) (2006) (The trial court refused to give a requested jury instruction on justification because the defendant, who was cited for aggressive driving, did not admit that he drove aggressively, where the defendant testified and argued that he was…”

Simpson v. Reed, 367 S.E.2d 563 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 4× “8 as to the provisions of OCGA § 40-8-70 (a), where there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that appellant should have used her horn and that she failed to do so.”

Hurst v. J. P. Colley Contractors, Inc., 306 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 4× “§ 68-1715)), and horns and warning devices (OCGA § 40-8-70 (Code Ann. § 68-1716)). 1.”

Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 390 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 2× “Thus the matter is thrown into the common law, which does not specifically set this particular requirement either.”

Susan Porter v. Kelly Martinez, 68 F.4th 429 (9th Cir. 2023). “” Ga. Code Ann. § 40-8-70 (a). Idaho: “The driver of a motor vehicle shall when reasonably necessary to insure safe operation give audible warning with his horn, but shall not otherwise use the horn when upon a highway.”

Frasard v. State, 629 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 2× “Frasard asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction as he was “stuck” behind a car traveling five miles an hour on a street with a thirty mile per hour speed limit.”

Pryor v. Phillips, 473 S.E.2d 535 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “She bases this argument on OCGA § 40-8-70 (b), which allows the use of sirens only on authorized emergency vehicles.”

Susan Porter v. Kelly Martinez (9th Cir. 2023). “” Ga. Code Ann. § 40-8-70 (a). Idaho: “The driver of a motor vehicle shall when reasonably necessary to insure safe operation give audible warning with his horn, but shall not otherwise use the horn when upon a highway.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.