CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 28, 2019 | 306 Ga. 338
...ccident.
At the motions hearing, Mondor argued that the indictment should be dismissed because it fails to state all the elements of hit and run in both counts, and in particular fails to state the mens rea required to commit hit and run; that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) -a statute that precludes evidence of failure to wear a seatbelt-is unconstitutional as applied to him because it prevents him from presenting a full and complete defense to the charges in the indictment that he violated OCGA §§ 40...
...amage or injury" caused by an accident involving him. In the same order, the trial court denied Mondor's motion to present seatbelt-use evidence, declining to "find an exception" to the well-established "bar against seatbelt use evidence" under OCGA §
40-8-76.1....
...eral demurrer." (citation and punctuation omitted)). We therefore reverse the trial court's dismissal of the indictment against Mondor for hit and run and for vehicular homicide.5
Case No. S19X0210
2. In his cross-appeal, Mondor contends that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d), Georgia's statutory exclusion of seatbelt-use evidence, is unconstitutional *213as applied to him. Specifically, he argues that Braland's violation of state law by failing to wear a seatbelt is "highly relevant" evidence of causation of Braland's death, and that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) therefore violates his right under the United States Constitution to present a complete defense....
...hat the evidence was inadmissible, and thereby avoiding the constitutional issue); cf. Bell v. State ,
293 Ga. 683, 684 n.2,
748 S.E.2d 382 (2013) (trial court noted that it was unnecessary to address the defendant's constitutional challenge to OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) because it excluded seatbelt-use evidence in limine, but not on the exclusive basis of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) )....
...And indeed, we need not reach the constitutional question here because, as explained more below, the type of evidence Mondor seeks to admit is not relevant to causation in his criminal case and is therefore inadmissible.
For many of the same reasons, we also do not reach the question of whether OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) applies in criminal cases in the first place....
...To be sure, Mondor presumes that the statute applies in criminal cases generally and in this case specifically, given that he asked the trial court to "find an exception to the bar against seatbelt use evidence." And although the trial court did not expressly rule that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) applied (and thus necessitated exclusion of the seatbelt evidence Mondor sought to admit), it necessarily implied that when it declined to grant Mondor's requested "exception," which is best understood as an "exception" to OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) 's exclusion of seatbelt-use evidence as "evidence of negligence or causation." See OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d)....
...That statute provides that "[t]he failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat safety belt ... shall not be considered evidence of negligence or causation [and] shall not otherwise be considered by the finder of fact on any question of liability of any person." OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) (emphasis supplied). This Court has interpreted *214a prior version of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d)6 and rejected certain constitutional challenges to it in a civil case, see C.W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Gover ,
263 Ga. 108, 108-110,
428 S.E.2d 796 (1993), but neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals has relied on OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) to exclude seatbelt-use evidence in a criminal case.
To be sure, the Court of Appeals has before cited a prior version of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) in a criminal vehicular-homicide case where the exclusion of seatbelt-use evidence was affirmed.7
**347Whitener v. State ,
201 Ga. App. 309, 311,
410 S.E.2d 796 (1991). But in Whitener , the Court of Appeals did not construe or otherwise rely on former OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d), and instead rejected the defendant's argument "that the victim's failure to wear a seatbelt should be considered in determining the 'cause' of death" by relying on general principles of proximate causation....
...conduct and the child's serious injuries," and the evidence was therefore sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of serious injury by vehicle); Fletcher v. State ,
307 Ga. App. 131, 132,
704 S.E.2d 222 (2010) (separate and apart from OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d), affirming the exclusion of "evidence that the victim's failure to wear a seat belt was an intervening cause of his death"); Hartzler v. State ,
332 Ga. App. 674, 681,
774 S.E.2d 738 (2015) (separate and apart from OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d), holding that a jury instruction that any negligence on the part of the victim was irrelevant was not error in a vehicular homicide case in which there was evidence that the victim failed to wear a seatbelt)....
...e"); OCGA §
24-4-402 ("Evidence which is not relevant shall not be admissible."). We accordingly affirm the trial court's exclusion of the seatbelt-use evidence in this case based on principles of proximate cause and decline to address whether OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) applies in this, or in any, criminal case. Finally, because we affirm the trial court's evidentiary finding, we need not reach Mondor's argument that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) is unconstitutional as applied to him.
3....
...If Mondor admitted the allegations in Count 1, he would be guilty of vehicular homicide. See Bautista v. State ,
305 Ga. App. 210, 213,
699 S.E.2d 392 (2010) ; see also Duggan v. State ,
225 Ga. App. 291, 297,
483 S.E.2d 373 (1997). Accordingly, Count 1 also survives a general demurrer.
When OCGA §
40-8-76.1 was originally enacted in 1988, subsection (d) provided:
Failure to wear a seat safety belt in violation of this Code section shall not be considered evidence of negligence, shall not be considered by the court on any question of liabil...
...ease in insurance rates, and shall not be evidence used to diminish any recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, occupancy, or operation of a motor vehicle.
Ga. L. 1999, p. 276, § 1 (emphasis supplied). Subsection (d) of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 has remained unchanged since the 1999 amendment.
In addition, the language "or causation" had not yet been added to OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d), see Ga....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 3, 1993 | 263 Ga. 108, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 1760
...The parties have stipulated that Linda Gover was not wearing a seat belt at the time of the collision. Following discovery, appellees moved for partial summary judgment, maintaining that evidence that Linda Gover was not wearing a seat belt is inadmissible under OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d). Appellant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment alleging that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (b) and (d) are unconstitutional; in the alternative, appellant argued that the Code section does not operate to preclude, as a matter of fact, evidence that Gover's failure to wear her seat belt was the sole proximate cause of her injuries and the injuries to her child. In a comprehensive order, the trial court concluded that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 withstands the constitutional challenges raised here, and prohibits admission of evidence that Gover was not wearing a seat belt....
...would show that the sole proximate cause of appellees' injuries was the failure of Linda Gover to wear her seat belt. However, the issues before the trial court on motion for partial summary judgment the construction and constitutionality of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 were issues of law to which the evidence in question was unnecessary for a determination. 2. The appellant argues that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (b) and (d) are unconstitutional on numerous grounds under the Georgia and United States Constitutions. OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (b) provides, in part, that "[e]ach occupant of a passenger vehicle shall, while such passenger vehicle is being operated on a public road ..., be restrained by a seat safety belt...." Subsection (d) provides that Failure to wear a seat...
...A statute satisfies the requirements of due process if it is reasonably related to a proper legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. Quiller v. Bowman,
262 Ga. 769 (425 SE2d 641) (1993); State v. Major,
243 Ga. 255, 257 (253 SE2d 724) (1979). By enacting OCGA §
40-8-76.1, the legislature established the public policy that automobile travellers ought to wear seat belts. It then proceeded to encourage compliance with this policy by imposing a penalty for failure to comply. OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (e). [1] However, the legislature chose to strictly limit that penalty. It limited the imposition of the penalty to cases in which there are additional vehicular violations. OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (e) (2)....
...*110 We further agree with the trial court that the legislature may ensure that those who cause vehicular collisions are not permitted to escape liability by raising the defense that the injured party was not wearing a seat belt. We therefore hold that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 does not violate due process for any of the reasons alleged by appellant....
...Georgian Manor Condo. Assn.,
253 Ga. 410 (3) (321 SE2d 330) (1984). We further hold that the statute denies appellant neither its constitutional right to trial by jury, nor any other constitutional right complained of here. 3. Alternatively, appellant argues that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) applies only to the exclusion of evidence offered as negligence per se, and does not apply where evidence is offered as a breach of a common law duty....
...equired to be excluded as "negligence per se " as it did when enacting OCGA §
40-8-76 (d), regulating the use of automobile safety restraints for children under the age of four years. The legislature stated that one of its purposes in enacting OCGA §
40-8-76.1 was "to provide that a failure to use seat safety belts may not be introduced in evidence in any civil action." (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. L. 1988, p. 31. This broad statement of purpose read in conjunction with the language of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) that failure to wear a seat belt "shall not be considered evidence of negligence," confirms that the legislature did not intend to limit the exclusion of evidence of negligence to issues involving negligence per se....
Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 22, 2022 | 313 Ga. 99
...statute,” which
requires “[e]ach occupant of the front seat of a passenger vehicle” to
“be restrained by a seat safety belt” “while such passenger vehicle is
being operated on a public road, street, or highway of this state,”
OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (b), subject to exceptions laid out in OCGA § 40-
8-76.1 (c). Among other things, OCGA §
40-8-76.1 restricts the use
of evidence of a vehicle occupant’s failure to wear a seat safety belt
in a legal proceeding:
The failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a
seat safety belt in any seat of a motor vehicle wh...
... basis for cancellation of coverage or increase in insurance
rates, and shall not be evidence used to diminish any
recovery for damages arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, occupancy, or operation of a motor vehicle.
OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d). Before us now is a set of certified questions
from the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia, all of which pertain to OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d):
Does OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) preclude a defendant in an
action alleging defective restraint system design and/or
negligent restraint system manufacture from producing
evidence related to:
(1) The existence of seatbelts in a vehicle a...
...(2) Evidence related to the seatbelt’s design and
compliance with applicable federal safety standards;
or
(3) An occupant’s nonuse of a seatbelt as part of their
defense?1
As explained more below, we conclude that OCGA §
40-8-76.1
(d) does not preclude a defendant in an action alleging defective
restraint-system design or negligent restraint-system manufacture
from producing evidence related to the existence of seatbelts in a
vehicle as part of the vehicle’s passenger restraint system. We
1 As noted below in footnote 2, the trial court initially certified a different
set of questions to this Court.
2
further conclude that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) does not preclude such
defendants from producing evidence related to the seatbelt’s design
and compliance with applicable federal safety standards. Finally,
we conclude that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) precludes consideration of
the failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seatbelt for
the purposes set forth in subsection (d), even as part of a defendant-
manufacturer’s defense.
1....
...concerning the issue of whether Plaintiff Kristen Domingue or
Plaintiff Casey Domingue were or were not wearing their seatbelts
at the time of the subject collision.” Ford responded that “evidence
unrelated to [the Domingues’] actual seat belt use falls outside of
[OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d)’s] exclusionary limits” and that the
Domingues’ “defect allegations and expert testimony in this case
....
...int system”; that “it
would be impossible to conclude that a differently designed airbag
would be safer, or would not be more harmful, without considering
4
occupant seat belt use or nonuse”; and that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d)
“would be unconstitutional as applied, infringing upon Ford’s
substantive due process and equal protection rights under both the
Georgia and United States Constitutions” if the district court denied
Ford the “fundamental...
...he district court
certified to this Court the set of questions set forth at the outset of
this opinion. Oral argument was held on February 15, 2022.
2. Analysis
To answer the questions before us, we first look to the text of
OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d)....
...“To that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain
and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the
2 The district court originally certified the following set of questions to
this Court on October 12, 2021:
Does OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) preclude a defendant in an action
alleging defective seatbelt design and/or negligent seatbelt
manufacture from producing evidence related to:
(1) The existence of seatbelts in a vehicle as part of the vehicle’s...
...6
context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in
its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the
English language would.” Id. (citations and punctuation omitted).
(a) Does OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) preclude a defendant in an
action alleging defective restraint system design and/or
negligent restraint system manufacture from producing
evidence related to [t]he existence of seatbelts in a vehicle
as part of the vehicle’s passenger restraint system?
The Domingues contend that the answer to the first question
is “yes” because, they say, OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) “is a comprehensive
prohibition against the ‘failure to wear a seatbelt’ defense on any
question of liability or diminution of damages,” such that “the
‘failure to wear a seatbelt defense’ is not available to any par...
...o remaining probative
value” for evidence related to a vehicle being equipped with a
seatbelt. To support their argument, the Domingues cite Georgia
cases that have referenced the “legislative intent” or “legislative
purpose” of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) and that have excluded or placed
broad restrictions on the consideration of evidence of a vehicle
occupant’s failure to wear a seatbelt. See, e.g., King v. Davis, 287
7
Ga. App. 715, 715-716 (652 SE2d 585) (2007) (stating that “the
legislative intent of [OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d)] was to prohibit the
admission of evidence that no seat belt was worn for all purposes”
and holding that the trial court committed reversible error when it
instructed the jury that it could “take into account evidence of the
Kings’ alleged failure to use an available seatbelt”); Crosby v. Cooper
Tire & Rubber Co.,
240 Ga. App. 857, 863, 866 (524 SE2d 313) (1999)
(stating that “the legislative intent of [OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d)] was to
prohibit the admission of evidence that no seat belt was worn for all
purposes” and holding that the trial court did not err in “denying
admission into evidence that the Crosbys were not wearing seat
safety belts at the time of the rollover”), rev’d on other grounds, 273
Ga....
...he accident
8
may not be considered by [the jury] on the question of liability nor
to reduce any recovery of damages”) (citation and punctuation
omitted).
Ford, for its part, points to the text of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) and
responds that the “plain and unambiguous language of Georgia’s
seatbelt statute provides [a] straightforward and unequivocal”
answer to this question: “No”—an answer with which amici curiae
the Georgia Association of Trial Lawyers (“GTLA”) and the Product
Liability Advisory Council (“PLAC”) agree.3 We also agree that the
plain text of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) answers the first certified
question, and that the answer is “no.”
The text of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) does not purport to restrict
consideration of all seatbelt-related evidence. The text makes clear
3 GTLA contends that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) “does not address the
admissibility of all seatbelt-related evidence” but “excludes evidence of ‘the
failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a safety belt in any seat of a
motor vehicle which has a seat safety belt or belts.’” PLAC contends that
OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) “imposes limits only on evidence of the failure of an
occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seatbelt to suggest fault on the part of
the plaintiff.” Amicus curiae the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association
(“GDLA”) offered its views about the third certified question, but did not
provide analysis of the first two. We thank the amici for their helpful briefs.
9
that the restrictions OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) imposes on evidence
pertaining to seatbelts—i.e., that they “shall not be considered
evidence of negligence or causation,” “shall not otherwise be
considered by the finder of fact on any question of liability of any
perso...
...or belts.” In other words, the statutory restrictions are all
predicated on the “failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear
a safety belt.” It follows that if that evidentiary predicate is not met,
the restrictions outlined in OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) do not apply.
Because “the existence of seatbelts in the vehicle” is something other
than the “failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat
safety belt,” the predicate of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) is not met, and
OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) does not restrict use or consideration of that
evidence.
10
The cases the Domingues cite do not hold otherwise....
...For
example, the Court of Appeals in King reversed an instruction that
would have allowed the jury to consider the vehicle occupants’
alleged failure to wear a seatbelt when considering damages—
evidence that clearly falls within the ambit of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d)’s
restrictions....
...of
evidence that the vehicle occupants were not wearing seatbelts at
the time of the crash at issue for, among other purposes, the “limited
purpose[] of [] reduction of any damages”—evidence that also falls
clearly within the ambit of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d)’s restrictions. See
Crosby,
240 Ga. App. at 863-864, 866. And although both cases
apply OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) to restrict consideration of seatbelt
evidence, neither King nor Crosby appear to grapple with a request
to introduce the type of evidence at issue in the first certified
question (the mere existence of seatbelts in a vehicle)....
...ider evidence
of the vehicle occupant’s failure to wear a seatbelt. Id. at 1222.
The Domingues also point to these same three cases—King,
Crosby, and Denton—as invoking the “legislative intent” or
“legislative purpose” of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d), and argue that they
stand for the proposition that seatbelt-related evidence should be
broadly excluded....
...But that does not change our analysis, because
those cases do no work in interpreting the text of the statute.
Instead, they purport to divine a general “legislative intent” or
“purpose” of the statute from the uncodified caption to the 1988
House Bill that enacted OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d). See Crosby, 240 Ga.
App. at 864, 866; King,
287 Ga. App. at 715-716; Denton, 645
FSupp.2d at 1221-1222. That caption, in turn, summarized OCGA
§
40-8-76.1 (d) as “provid[ing] that a failure to use seat safety belts
may not be introduced in evidence in any civil action and may not
be used to diminish recovery of damages and shall not be a basis for
12...
...835, 837 (700 SE2d 558) (2010) (noting that
“[a]though a preamble is not part of the act and therefore cannot
control over its plain meaning, it may be considered as evidence of
the meaning of an ambiguous, codified law”).4
4 It is also notable that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) was amended in 1993 and
1999, and its uncodified caption was also revised in those years such that it no
longer includes the phrase “may not be introduced in evidence in any civil
action.” See Ga....
...by a finder of fact evidence of negligence or causation and shall not be
considered in determining liability or to diminish a recovery for damages.”).
But even if the wording of the caption had remained the same, the caption
could not control the plain text set forth in OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d)....
...at 864, 866 (emphasis supplied)—
is especially problematic because the 1988 caption (like the text of the statute
itself) did not contain the phrase “for all purposes.” See Ga. L. 1988, p. 31.
13
In sum: the text of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) does not mention, let
alone expressly restrict, evidence about the existence of seatbelts in
a vehicle....
...Of course, trial
courts may determine, based on the relevant rules of evidence and the facts of
a particular case, that evidence of a vehicle occupant’s seatbelt use is not
relevant, is unfairly prejudicial, or is otherwise not admissible. Such
determinations, however, are not mandated by the text of OCGA §
40-8-76.1
(d)....
...17, 2003) (granting a motion in
limine to “preclude any mention of [the vehicle occupant’s] seatbelt use in front
of the jury at any time”) (emphasis supplied).
14
otherwise admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
(b) Does OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) preclude a defendant in an
action alleging defective restraint system design and/or
negligent restraint system manufacture from producing
evidence related to [] the seatbelt’s design and compliance...
...would allow Ford to imply
to the jury that Kristen Domingue was not wearing her seatbelt.
But the Domingues’ argument about the second certified question
suffers from the same flaw as their argument about the first: it
ignores the text of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d). As explained above, the
evidentiary predicate for application of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) is
“[t]he failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat safety
belt.” OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) does not speak about, let alone purport
to restrict, the introduction or consideration of evidence related to a
15
seatbelt’s design or evidence about federal safety standards. We
answer the second certified question “no,” again emphasizing that
we conclude only that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) itself does not preclude
introduction or consideration of evidence related to a seatbelt’s
design or evidence about federal safety standards....
...evidence admitted for proper purposes, the district court can
determine, based on the evidence presented and arguments,
whether such evidence and arguments would be admissible under
the Federal Rules of Evidence and proper in this case.
(c) Does OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) preclude a defendant in an
action alleging defective restraint system design and/or
negligent restraint system manufacture from producing
evidence related to [a]n occupant’s nonuse of a seatbelt as
part of their defense?
To begin, we clarify that we interpret the third certified
question as asking whether in this type of case—i.e., a case alleging
defective restraint-system design or negligent restraint-system
manufacture—OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) precludes consideration of
16
evidence related to a motor vehicle occupant’s failure to wear a
seatbelt for the purposes set forth in subsection (d), even as part of
a defendant-manufacturer’s defense.6 The text of OCGA §
40-8-76.1
(d) permits only one possible answer to this question: yes. Indeed,
the text of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) does not limit its application to
certain types of cases (such as a negligence case, personal injury
case, manufacturing-defect case, or design-defect case) or to a
certain party (plaintiff, defendant, or third party). See C.W.
Matthews Contracting Co., Inc. v. Gover,
263 Ga. 108, 110 (428 SE2d
796) (1993) (rejecting argument that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) does not
apply to negligence per se cases). Nor does the text contain
exceptions if the evidentiary predicate—the “failure of an occupant
of a motor vehicle to wear a seat safety belt”—is at issue. Because
OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) precludes “[t]he failure of an occupant of a
motor vehicle to wear a seat safety belt” from being “considered
6The certified question asks whether OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) precludes the
“product[ion]” of such evidence. It is not clear what “production” means in this
context, but the text of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) does not reference (let alone
expressly limit) the “production” of any evidence.
17
evidence of negligence or causation,” and because the “failure of an
occupant of a motor vehicle to w...
...otherwise be considered by the finder of fact on any question of
liability of any person, corporation, or insurer, . . . and shall not be
evidence used to diminish any recovery for damages arising out of
the ownership, maintenance, occupancy, or operation of a motor
vehicle,” OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) squarely precludes consideration of a
motor vehicle occupant’s nonuse of a seatbelt for those purposes—
even as part of a defendant-manufacturer’s defense.
Ford argues that this cannot be so, because excluding evidence
of seatbelt usage in this particular type of design-defect case (i.e., an
action alleging defective or negligent restraint-system design or
manufacture) would render OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) unconstitutional
as applied to Ford....
...Additionally, Ford contends that
18
interpretation of the statute would violate Ford’s due process and
equal protection rights under both the United States and Georgia
Constitutions. 8 Pretermitting whether each of the state and federal
interpreting OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) to “broadly exclude all mention or evidence
of seatbelts” would render the statute unconstitutional as applied, but we have
already explained in our answers to the first two certified questions that the
text of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) does not bar introduction or consideration of all
evidence related to seatbelts. Ford does not contend that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d)
is facially unconstitutional.
8 Pointing to C.W....
...8-76.1 (d) is constitutional, and specifically that it does not violate the due
process provisions of the Georgia and United States Constitutions or the equal
protection provision of the Georgia Constitution. There is no dispute that this
Court in C.W. Matthews held that “OCGA §
40-8-76.1 does not violate due
process for any of the reasons” the appellant in that case alleged, which
appeared to be that the statute was “arbitrary and denie[d] him due process of
law” under the Georgia and United States Constitutions. C.W. Matthews,
263
Ga. at 109-110 (emphasis supplied). There is also no dispute that we held that
OCGA §
40-8-76.1, which we said “allow[s] appellees to introduce proof of their
claim of negligence, but [denies] the opportunity to introduce proof that [the
vehicle occupant] was negligent in not wearing her seat belt,” did not violate
the equal pr...
...both—as applied in C.W. Matthews—does not necessarily control the as-
19
constitutional claims Ford raises in this appeal were adequately
raised in the district court, 9 we decline Ford’s request to determine
whether OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) is unconstitutional as applied.
applied constitutional challenges in this case....
...Finally, we note that this
Court’s holdings on matters of federal constitutional law are not binding on
federal courts like the one that certified the questions to us in this case.
9 In Ford’s response to the Domingues’ motion in limine, it argued that
if OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) were interpreted to exclude evidence of the failure of
vehicle occupants to wear a seatbelt, then §
40-8-76.1 (d) would violate Ford’s
due process and equal protection rights under the Georgia and United States
Constitutions....
...With respect to all of its constitutional claims,
Ford repeated verbatim in its brief before this Court the arguments it made
before the trial court.
20
First, Ford asks this Court to invoke the canon of constitutional
doubt to conclude that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) is unconstitutional as
applied....
...evidence it seeks to introduce in this case is necessary to its defense.
That is an inherently fact-specific theory that requires more factual
10 In its amicus brief, the GDLA asks this Court to recognize a “judicial
exception” to OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) in “product liability action[s] involving
vehicle crashworthiness claims”—i.e., in cases like this one that involve
allegations that a vehicle’s restraint-system design or manufacture is
defective....
... development than has occurred at this early stage of litigation.
Moreover, after this Court answers the certified questions, the
district court could conclude that the evidence the parties seek to
proffer in this case is inadmissible for any number of reasons not
related to OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d), which could make consideration of
the constitutionality of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) unnecessary....
...Coleman,
294 Ga. 170,
172 n.7 (751 SE2d 337) (2013). Finally, Ford has claimed violations
under both the Georgia and United States Constitutions. If the
district court were to conclude—based on the particular facts and
circumstances of this case—that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) violates the
United States Constitution as applied to Ford, that conclusion could
moot the Georgia constitutional questions Ford has raised....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 28, 2019
...At the motions hearing, Mondor argued that the indictment
should be dismissed because it fails to state all the elements of hit
and run in both counts, and in particular fails to state the mens rea
required to commit hit and run; that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) — a
statute that precludes evidence of failure to wear a seatbelt — is
unconstitutional as applied to him because it prevents him from
presenting a full and complete defense to the charges in the
indictment that he violated O...
...
caused by an accident involving him. In the same order, the trial
court denied Mondor’s motion to present seatbelt-use evidence,
declining to “find an exception” to the well-established “bar against
seatbelt use evidence” under OCGA §
40-8-76.1....
...210, 213 (699 SE2d 392) (2010); see also Duggan v. State,
225 Ga.
App. 291, 297 (483 SE2d 373) (1997). Accordingly, Count 1 also survives a
general demurrer.
14
2. In his cross-appeal, Mondor contends that OCGA §
40-8-76.1
(d), Georgia’s statutory exclusion of seatbelt-use evidence, is
unconstitutional as applied to him. Specifically, he argues that
Braland’s violation of state law by failing to wear a seatbelt is
“highly relevant” evidence of causation of Braland’s death, and that
OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) therefore violates his right under the United
States Constitution to present a complete defense....
...evidentiary question, holding that the evidence was inadmissible,
and thereby avoiding the constitutional issue); cf. Bell v. State,
293
Ga. 683, 684 n.2 (748 SE2d 382) (2013) (trial court noted that it was
unnecessary to address the defendant’s constitutional challenge to
OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) because it excluded seatbelt-use evidence in
15
limine, but not on the exclusive basis of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d))....
...And
indeed, we need not reach the constitutional question here because,
as explained more below, the type of evidence Mondor seeks to admit
is not relevant to causation in his criminal case and is therefore
inadmissible.
For many of the same reasons, we also do not reach the
question of whether OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) applies in criminal cases
in the first place....
...To be sure, Mondor presumes that the statute
applies in criminal cases generally and in this case specifically,
given that he asked the trial court to “find an exception to the bar
against seatbelt use evidence.” And although the trial court did not
expressly rule that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) applied (and thus
necessitated exclusion of the seatbelt evidence Mondor sought to
admit), it necessarily implied that when it declined to grant
Mondor’s requested “exception,” which is best understood as an
“exception” to OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d)’s exclusion of seatbelt-use
evidence as “evidence of negligence or causation.” See OCGA § 40-
8-76.1 (d)....
...That statute provides
that “[t]he failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat
safety belt . . . shall not be considered evidence of negligence or
causation [and] shall not otherwise be considered by the finder of
fact on any question of liability of any person[.]” OCGA §
40-8-76.1
(d) (emphasis supplied). This Court has interpreted a prior version
18
of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d)6 and rejected certain constitutional
challenges to it in a civil case, see C.W. Matthews Contracting Co. v.
Gover,
263 Ga. 108, 108-110 (428 SE2d 796) (1993), but neither this
Court nor the Court of Appeals has relied on OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d)
to exclude seatbelt-use evidence in a criminal case.
To be sure, the Court of Appeals has before cited a prior version
of OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) in a criminal vehicular-homicide case where
6 When OCGA §
40-8-76.1 was originally enacted in 1988, subsection (d)
provided:
Failure to wear a seat safety belt in violation of this Code section
shall not be considered evidence of negligence, shall not be
considered by the court on any...
...19
the exclusion of seatbelt-use evidence was affirmed.7 Whitener v.
State,
201 Ga. App. 309, 311 (410 SE2d 796) (1991). But in Whitener,
the Court of Appeals did not construe or otherwise rely on former
OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d), and instead rejected the defendant’s
argument “that the victim’s failure to wear a seatbelt should be
considered in determining the ‘cause’ of death” by relying on general
principles of proximate causation....
...; “‘[s]o long as
the defendant’s negligence proximately caused the death of another,
the crime has been committed, even if there are other factors which
7 In addition, the language “or causation” had not yet been added to
OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d), see Ga....
...conduct and the child’s serious injuries,” and the evidence was
therefore sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of serious
injury by vehicle); Fletcher v. State,
307 Ga. App. 131, 132 (704 SE2d
222) (2010) (separate and apart from OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d),
affirming the exclusion of “evidence that the victim’s failure to wear
a seat belt was an intervening cause of his death”); Hartzler v. State,
332 Ga. App. 674, 681 (774 SE2d 738) (2015) (separate and apart
from OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d), holding that a jury instruction that any
negligence on the part of the victim was irrelevant was not error in
a vehicular homicide case in which there was evidence that the
victim failed to wear a seatbelt)....
...OCGA §
24-4-402 (“Evidence which is not relevant shall not be
admissible.”). We accordingly affirm the trial court’s exclusion of the
seatbelt-use evidence in this case based on principles of proximate
cause and decline to address whether OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) applies
in this, or in any, criminal case. Finally, because we affirm the trial
court’s evidentiary finding, we need not reach Mondor’s argument
that OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d) is unconstitutional as applied to him.
3....
...30
review. Chulpayev,
296 Ga. at 784; Bell,
293 Ga. at 684.
Judgment affirmed in Case No. S19X0210. Judgment reversed
in Case No. S19A0209. All the Justices concur.
Decided June 28, 2019.
OCGA §
40-8-76.1 (d); constitutional question....
