Applicability of section limited.

- Ga. L. 1966, p. 166, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-8-91) is applicable only in cases where vehicles are used in patrolling traffic or in making arrests for traffic violations. Clayton v. Taylor, 223 Ga. 346, 155 S.E.2d 387 (1967).

Construction with other law.

- County sheriff had the independent authority to repaint and remark county-owned sheriff's vehicles assigned to the sheriff's exclusive use, but lacked the authority to modify portions of a county-owned building in which the sheriff's office and jail were housed, as the facility was shared with the superior, state, and magistrate courts of Clayton County as well as the clerks of those courts, the solicitor general, and the district attorney, and hence, not under the sheriff's exclusive use; as a result, subject to compliance with O.C.G.A. § 40-8-91, summary judgment in favor of the county as to the extent of the sheriff's authority was reversed as to the former, but affirmed as to the latter. Hill v. Clayton County Bd. of Comm'rs, 283 Ga. App. 15, 640 S.E.2d 638 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co., 291 Ga. 114, 728 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. 2012).

No marking of police cars as escort vehicles.

- In a suit by a driver who ran into a house while the house was being moved and escorted by police vehicles, there was no merit to the driver's argument that the police vehicles had to be marked as escort vehicles; that would be contrary to O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-6 and40-8-91, which mandate proper markings for police cars and do not allow those vehicles to have amber lights. Hersh v. Griffith, 284 Ga. App. 15, 643 S.E.2d 309 (2007).

Public policy to identify arresting vehicles.

- Ga. L. 1966, p. 166, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-8-91) requires that motor vehicles used by the police on official business shall be marked on the back and on each side. This is an expression of the public policy of the state that vehicles used for the purpose of traffic arrests shall be identified. Clayton v. Taylor, 223 Ga. 346, 155 S.E.2d 387 (1967).

Civil action when failure to mark vehicle is proximate cause of injury.

- Vehicles used for the purpose of traffic arrests shall be identified, and when the failure to make such identification is the proximate cause of injury, a civil action will lie. Ross v. City of Lilburn, 114 Ga. App. 428, 151 S.E.2d 490 (1966).

No civil action if no causal connection exists.

- In an action for damages caused by a car collision, the court did not err in refusing to charge that the failure of the sheriff to have the sheriff's automobile distinctly marked on each side and the back, as provided by Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 107A, was negligence per se, since the defendant, who caused the collision in an attempt to outrun the sheriff's car, contended that the defendant did not know who was pursuing the defendant because such car was unmarked since there was no causal connection between the sheriff's failure to have the sheriff's automobile properly marked and the collision. Fountain v. Smith, 103 Ga. App. 192, 118 S.E.2d 852 (1961).

Arrests from unmarked vehicles.

- O.C.G.A. § 40-8-91 does not invalidate traffic arrests made in unmarked vehicles. State v. Carter, 215 Ga. App. 647, 451 S.E.2d 541 (1994).

O.C.G.A. § 40-8-91 did not require exclusion of the testimony of an officer who made an arrest for reckless driving in an unmarked vehicle. Gilbert v. State, 222 Ga. App. 787, 476 S.E.2d 39 (1996).

Flight from unmarked vehicle.

- Because the circumstances of the defendant's low-speed flight from an uniformed detective, who was driving an unmarked vehicle, were insufficient to present law enforcement with evidence of a particular crime, the defendant could not be charged with the crime of attempting to elude an officer, and police lacked probable cause sufficient to warrant an arrest for the offense; thus, the search incident to the arrest was invalid, warranting suppression of the evidence seized. Stephens v. State, 278 Ga. App. 694, 629 S.E.2d 565 (2006).

Stop by unmarked vehicle.

- O.C.G.A. § 40-8-91 did not require exclusion of the evidence obtained after an officer, who had been following the defendant in an unmarked police car based on a tip, pulled the defendant over after the defendant crossed the center line. Sapp v. State, 297 Ga. App. 218, 676 S.E.2d 867 (2009).

Cited in Poole v. City of Louisville, 107 Ga. App. 305, 130 S.E.2d 157 (1963); Ward v. State, 126 Ga. App. 214, 190 S.E.2d 444 (1972); Barron v. State, 157 Ga. App. 186, 276 S.E.2d 868 (1981); Thomas v. State, 261 Ga. App. 493, 583 S.E.2d 207 (2003); Batten v. State, 341 Ga. App. 332, 801 S.E.2d 57 (2017).

Marking required of sheriff-owned automobile used for law enforcement.

- If the sheriff of a county is required to furnish the sheriff's own automobile for law enforcement purposes, even though the automobile is owned by the sheriff and the county does not furnish the sheriff with a motor vehicle for such purposes, such motor vehicle must be marked in accordance with Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 107A (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-8-91). 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 897.

If a motor vehicle is owned by a sheriff as the sheriff's own individual motor vehicle but is used by the sheriff on official business to make arrests for traffic violations, such motor vehicle should be marked, under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 107A (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-8-91). 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 332.

Use of marked automobile by constable.

- Constable may use a marked automobile that is equipped with a colored light mounted on the cab and a siren, if the constable can do so without holding oneself out to the public as a county police officer. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-214.

Arrest made using unmarked vehicle valid.

- Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 107A (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-8-91) has no effect on the legality of any arrest which is made, and an arrest made by a sheriff or a deputy sheriff using an unmarked motor vehicle would be legal, if otherwise so. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 332.

Mandamus to enforce compliance with section.

- Petition for writ of mandamus brought by a taxpayer or member of the motoring public is the proper method to enforce compliance with Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 107A (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-8-91), requiring the marking of official vehicles. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-49.