O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-9-3 (2019)

Administration of chapter; rules and regulations; hearings; appeals

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) The commissioner shall administer and enforce this chapter and is authorized to adopt and enforce rules and regulations necessary for its administration. The commissioner shall prescribe suitable forms requisite or deemed necessary for the purposes of this chapter. (b) The commissioner shall provide for hearings upon request of persons aggrieved by orders or acts of the commissioner under this chapter. Such hearings shall not be subject to the procedural provisions of Chapter 13 of Title 50, the ‘‘Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.’’ (c) The commissioner is authorized to adopt and enforce rules and regulations necessary for the administration of such hearings, including but not limited to, hearings provided in Code Section 40-9-32. Except as provided in Code Section 40-9-32, a request for a hearing under this chapter shall not operate as a stay of any order or act of the commissioner.

(d) The commissioner’s decision as rendered at such hearing shall be final unless the aggrieved person shall desire an appeal, in which case he or she shall have the right to enter an appeal to the superior court of the county of his or her residence or the Superior Court of Fulton County by filing a complaint in the superior court, naming the commissioner as defendant, within 30 days from the date the commissioner enters his or her decision or order. The appellant shall not be required to post any bond nor pay the costs in advance. If the aggrieved person desires, the appeal may be heard by the judge at term or in chambers or before a jury at the first term. The hearing on the appeal shall be de novo. However, such appeal shall not act as a supersedeas of any order or acts of the commissioner, nor shall the appellant be allowed to operate or permit a motor vehicle to be operated in violation of any suspension or revocation by the commissioner while such appeal is pending.

History

(Ga. L. 1951, p. 565, § 2; Ga. L. 1956, p. 543, § 6; Ga. L. 1973, p. 509, § 1; Code 1933, § 68C-201, enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 1014, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 6-2; Ga. L. 2003, p. 484, § 13; Ga. L. 2004, p. 749, § 9; Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 20-1/HB 501.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Commissioner’s refusal to consider evidence constitutional. - Since Ga. L. 1951, p. 565 authorizes judicial review of all administrative actions, the refusal by the department (now commissioner) to consider evidence as to who was responsible does not violate the requirements of due process. Turmon v. Department of Pub. Safety, 222 Ga. 843, 152 S.E.2d 884 (1967). No conflict with chapter on Uniform Rules of Road. - Ga. L. 1951, p. 565 is not in irreconcilable conflict with (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 6, T. 40), which confers upon the commissioner the power to cancel driver’s licenses. Turmon v. Department of Pub. Safety, 222 Ga. 843, 152 S.E.2d 884 (1967) Ga. L. 1956, p. 543, § 6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-9-3). Exhaustion of administrative remedies. - When the plaintiff made no at-

tempt to comply with the provisions for the reinstatement of the plaintiff ’s license, which had been lawfully revoked by the department (now commissioner), the trial court was correct in holding that the plaintiff had not exhausted the plaintiff ’s remedies and, therefore, refusing a mandamus absolute. Murphy v. Dominy, 211 Ga. 70, 84 S.E.2d 193 (1954). Under Georgia law, the director (now commissioner) of public safety has jurisdiction over the suspension of licenses when no security is furnished following an accident and when no liability insurance covers the vehicle involved or the operator. In such a case, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies or to appeal to the superior court is fatal to any action for relief by the aggrieved person in regard to the license brought in another court. Sellers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 314 F. Supp. 78 (S.D. Ga. 1970).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 21. C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 29 et seq., 33, 34.

ALR. - Requirement that multicoverage umbrella insurance policy offer uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage equal to liability limits under um-

brella provisions, 52 A.L.R. 5th 451.